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Preface 
The transcendental deduction of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason aims to establish that the 
categories—a priori concepts including “substance” and “cause and effect”—genuinely apply to 
objects of experience. I argue that Kant’s under-investigated notion of empirical cognition is the 
transcendental deduction’s central epistemological notion and that it refers primarily to “rational 
sensory discrimination”. Kant’s focus on empirical cognition is of interest insofar as more 
familiar epistemological concerns—e.g., about certainty or justification—are secondary to his 
distinctive task of explaining how it is possible for us to make rational sensory discriminations. 
Chapter 1 traces the history—beginning with Descartes but continuing through Leibniz 
and Wolff—of the epistemological notions of clarity and distinctness. With this historical 
background, I argue in Chapter 2 that Kant conceives of empirical cognition as clear and 
discursively distinct representation: the identification or differentiation (whether correct or not) 
of objects of experience from each other, occurring through a capacity to become aware of and 
express normative reasons (whether good or not) for those identifications or differentiations. 
That is, empirical cognition is “rational sensory discrimination”. I show in Chapter 3 that the 
transcendental deduction’s starting assumption is that we have empirical cognition in this sense. 
Although others have held that Kant assumes we have empirical cognition, I provide fuller 
evidence for this interpretation over its competitors and show how Kant understood Hume as 
likewise assuming we have empirical cognition. 
Kant’s argumentative strategy consists of two intertwined strands: (1) the objective 
deduction, which aims to show that the categories have objective validity; and, (2) the subjective 
deduction, whose purpose has been a matter of scholarly debate. I argue in Chapter 4 that the 
subjective deduction aims to shed light on the conditions for the possibility of empirical 
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cognition in the sense described above. Namely, it shows how the understanding contributes to 
empirical cognition via a spontaneous threefold synthesis. In Chapter 5, I focus on the argument 
of the subjective deduction, that empirical cognition requires an empirical threefold synthesis 
grounded on three faculties of the mind. My interpretation of empirical cognition sheds light on 
this argument because Kant’s argument is that such an empirical threefold synthesis is required 
for a cognitive subject to represent normative reasons. 
Chapters 6, 7, and 8 continue my interpretation of the subjective deduction by explaining 
why Kant thinks that—in addition to the a priori faculty of sensibility investigated in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic—there must also be two additional a priori faculties that make possible 
the empirical threefold synthesis: transcendental apperception and pure imagination. And as I 
argue in those chapters, Kant’s arguments for each of these a priori faculties are not only shared 
by the subjective and objective deductions, but are also central to the Transcendental Deduction 
chapter of both editions of the first Critique. 
In Chapter 6, I argue that Kant holds that transcendental apperception—a faculty that 
makes it possible for a cognitive subject to have an a priori self-consciousness of her own 
numerical identity as a cognitive subject—is necessary for empirical cognition insofar as a 
cognitive subject must be sensitive to the normativity of concepts used in her empirical 
cognition. I conclude this chapter by sketching how this argument for transcendental 
apperception provides the basis for the objective deduction’s main task of demonstrating the 
categories’ objective validity. 
In Chapter 7, I present the A-edition’s argument that a faculty of pure imagination is 
necessary for empirical cognition. This argument is of great importance because it also shows 
that, by means of the categories, the understanding must legislate a priori laws of nature. This 
 ix 
means that all appearances, even ones that are not directly given to the senses and hence are not 
directly cognized, must stand under the categories. Nevertheless, the A-edition’s argument 
suffers from a crucial flaw, and I show in Chapter 8 how Kant attempts to correct this flaw by 
introducing the new notion of “formal intuition”. In explaining this new argument, I thereby 
offer a new answer to Dieter Henrich’s famous “problem of the two-steps-in-one-proof”, namely, 
the oddity that the B-edition’s argument contains two steps, the second of which seems to be 
redundant. I argue that the solution to this problem lies in recognizing that whereas the first step 
attempts to establish that the categories have objective validity insofar as any appearance directly 
given and cognized by us must stand under them, the second step appeals to our formal intuitions 
of space and time in order to show that all appearances—even those that are not directly 
presented to our senses—must stand under the categories. Kant attempts to demonstrate the latter 
thesis by showing that, insofar as all appearances are in space and time, they must be subject to a 
priori laws of nature legislated by our faculty of understanding.  
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 1 
Introduction 
One of Kant’s major aims in the Critique of Pure Reason is to explain the possibility of 
synthetic a priori cognition, i.e., cognition that is not based on any particular experience but that 
is informative beyond what is analytically contained in our concepts. For Kant, cognition 
requires both intuitions—representations immediately related to objects and provided by the 
passive faculty of sensibility—and concepts—representations mediately related to objects and 
provided by the active faculty of the understanding. Cognition, then, is a form of representation 
in which concepts are applied to objects given by intuition. Synthetic a priori cognition, then, 
must involve the application of concepts to objects of intuition. 
But the possibility of such cognition is puzzling because it requires that concepts be 
applied a priori to objects, and hence does not require any particular experience of those objects. 
Alternatively put: given that sensibility and the understanding are distinct faculties, and given 
that objects are given to us by sensibility, it does not seem as though there should be any 
guarantee that the understanding's concepts successfully apply to the particular objects given by 
sensibility (A88-91/B120-3). For example, given that the understanding gives us the concept of 
cause, it seems quite possible that we could be presented with objects in experience without ever 
needing to suppose that there is any actual causal connection among those objects. 
Kant recognizes the puzzling nature of the possibility of synthetic a priori cognition and 
the need to offer an “explanation of the way in which concepts can relate to objects a priori” 
(A85/B117). Kant calls this explanation the transcendental deduction of a priori concepts.1 More 
specifically, the transcendental deduction explains how the “categories”—twelve fundamental 
                         
1 I will use “Transcendental Deduction” to refer to the chapter “On the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of 
the Understanding”. I will append to this “in the A-edition” or “in the B-edition” to refer to the chapter of 
only one of the two editions. As I contend that each of these chapters presents fundamentally the same 
argument, I will use “transcendental deduction” to refer to the main argument they share. 
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and a priori concepts derived from twelve corresponding logical forms of judgment—have an a 
priori relation to objects. Accordingly, if Kant is to show that we do in fact have synthetic a 
priori cognition, he needs to discount the possibility that the categories could fail to relate to 
objects of experience. 
Kant attempts to do this in the transcendental deduction, which is supposed to provide a 
“deduction of [the categories’] entitlement” in being applied to objects of experience (B117). 
More specifically, it attempts to demonstrate that the categories are necessarily applied to 
appearances because they make appearances possible as objects (A92/B124). Hence, this 
deduction—i.e., the demonstration that the categories are legitimately applied to objects of 
experience—is “transcendental” insofar as it shows that the categories are “a priori conditions of 
the possibility of experiences” (A94/B126). 
The importance of the transcendental deduction for Kant’s philosophical project is clear. 
Unfortunately, the argument of the Transcendental Deduction chapter of the first Critique is a 
confusing mixture of obscure assertions and opaque inferences. And even though Kant revised 
the Transcendental Deduction chapter in the second edition of the first Critique in order “to 
remove as far as possible […] difficulties and obscurities” (Bxxxvii), it can often seem that he at 
best succeeded only in multiplying the number of difficulties and obscurities. As a result, there 
has come to be a vast secondary literature on Kant’s transcendental deduction. This dissertation 
is yet another attempt to gain clarity on the transcendental deduction, but it takes a new 
perspective. Namely, I approach the transcendental deduction by examining Kant’s notion of 
empirical cognition [Erkenntnis]. My account of empirical cognition is based on a close 
examination of both Kant’s own texts and books by his early-modern predecessors with which he 
was well acquainted. My thesis is that a proper understanding of Kant’s notion of empirical 
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cognition is crucial for understanding all aspects of the argument of the transcendental deduction, 
including its premises, inferences, and conclusions. 
Nevertheless, my dissertation is limited in scope due to the structure of the transcendental 
deduction. The transcendental deduction, at least in the A-edition of the first Critique, is 
described by Kant as having two sides, one subjective and one objective. As we shall see in 
Chapter 4, there is much debate about what exactly the subjective side, or the “subjective 
deduction”, is. Nevertheless, it is clear that the objective side is the argument that directly 
attempts to show that the categories have what Kant calls “objective validity”, and this amounts 
to showing that they have an a priori relation to objects. I understand the objective deduction as 
having the following outline: 
(OD1) All experience—empirical cognition of objects—is possible only if the objects 
given by intuition are thought by means of concepts. 
(OD2) The categories are a priori conditions for the thought of the objects given by 
intuition. 
(OD3) Therefore, the categories have objective validity. [OD1-OD2] 
The primary aim of my dissertation is to explain what (OD1) means and why Kant asserts it. In 
Chapter 1, I present the historical context and philosophical terminology relevant for 
understanding Kant’s notion of empirical cognition. I use these results in Chapter 2, along with 
an examination of Kant’s own texts, to present my account of what Kant means by empirical 
cognition and why he is interested in it. Finally, I show in Chapter 3 that Kant does in fact begin 
the objective deduction by assuming that we have empirical cognition, i.e., by assuming (OD1). 
This historical and analytical account of (OD1) and why Kant asserts it, however, differs 
from Kant’s own attempt to elucidate (OD1). Beginning with Chapter 4, the remainder of my 
 4 
dissertation aims to provide Kant’s own explanation of (OD1). As I argue in Chapter 4, the A-
edition’s subjective deduction—which corresponds to a brief passage in the B-edition—is Kant’s 
own attempt at elucidating (OD1). Namely, the subjective deduction aims to explain how the 
faculty of the understanding has a relation to objects in producing empirical cognition. In 
Chapters 5 through 7, I further attempt to offer a complete account of the A-edition’s subjective 
deduction, and I thereby present Kant’s own explanation of (OD1). In Chapter 5, I present Kant’s 
argument that empirical cognition requires a threefold empirical synthesis carried out by the 
understanding and grounded on three corresponding empirical subjective sources of cognition. 
It seems that this might suffice for completing the primary aims of the subjective 
deduction, but Kant’s procedure for carrying out the subjective deduction has a complication. 
Namely, the subjective deduction identifies not merely three empirical subjective sources or 
faculties that ground the understanding’s cognitive relation to objects of experience but also 
three corresponding a priori or pure subjective sources. In effect, this means that Kant’s 
procedure in carrying out the subjective deduction takes the subjective deduction beyond an 
explanation of (OD1). Namely, the subjective deduction both overlaps with the objective 
deduction in one significant way and extends the results of the objective deduction. 
In Chapter 6, I show how the subjective deduction overlaps with part of the objective 
deduction’s case for (OD2). The subjective deduction contains an argument that one of the a 
priori and transcendental subjective sources of cognition is transcendental apperception, and this 
same argument for transcendental apperception is used by Kant in making progress toward 
establishing (OD2). Accordingly, this chapter explains what Kant means by “transcendental 
apperception” and presents Kant’s argument that it is necessary for empirical cognition. This 
argument, however, is also part of his case for (OD2) insofar as he argues that the categories are 
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a priori conditions for the transcendental apperception involved in empirical cognition. At the 
end of Chapter 6, I briefly outline Kant’s strategy for showing that transcendental apperception 
requires the categories. 
In addition to overlapping with the argument of the objective deduction, the subjective 
deduction also extends the results of the objective deduction proper. Namely, it contributes to an 
argument for a conclusion stronger than (OD3). To see how this is so, it is first necessary to 
clarify what it means to show that the categories have objective validity. As noted above, if the 
categories have objective validity, then they have an a priori relation to objects of experience and 
are legitimately applied to those objects. Kant’s argument for (OD3) shows that they have 
objective validity insofar as the empirical concepts involved in empirical cognition stand under 
or are instances of the categories as meta-concepts. But this leaves open the possibility that we 
cognize by means of the categories only insofar as we have empirical cognition by means of 
concepts that are specifications of the categories. That is, even though the categories are a priori 
concepts that are independent of any specific contents of experience, it might still be the case 
that they do not afford us with cognition that is independent of the specific contents of 
experience. That is, the objective deduction’s demonstration of (OD3) does not directly entail 
that we have synthetic a priori cognition through the categories. 
As I show in Chapters 7 and 8, both the A- and B-editions of the first Critique contain 
arguments that attempt to show that the categories’ objective validity suffices for synthetic a 
priori cognition.2 In Chapter 7, I explain how Kant completes the A-edition’s subjective 
deduction by attempting to show that the imagination is another a priori subjective source of 
cognition. This is Kant’s argument for what he calls “transcendental affinity”, which amounts to 
                         
2 Of course, the transcendental deduction does not aim to specify particular synthetic a priori principles or 
offer arguments for them one-by-one, as that task is reserved for the Analytic of Principles. 
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a lawful and necessary connection between appearances. Insofar as the imagination makes 
possible this transcendental affinity by means of the categories, the understanding legislates a 
priori laws of nature. Since these laws of nature are synthetic a priori, this attempted 
demonstration of transcendental affinity amounts to showing that the categories not only have 
objective validity but also suffice for synthetic a priori cognition. 
Chapter 7 completes my interpretation of the A-edition’s subjective deduction, and it 
thereby finishes my account of Kant procedure for elucidating (OD1) in the A-edition. Since one 
of my long-term aims in studying the transcendental deduction is to show that the Transcendental 
Deduction chapters of the A- and B-editions are more alike than commonly thought, I conclude 
the dissertation in Chapter 8 by showing how the B-edition contains an argument analogous to 
the one presented in Chapter 7. In §§15-20 of the B-edition, Kant supplies an argument that he 
describes as a “transcendental deduction”—which exhibits the categories’ “possibility as a priori 
cognitions of objects of an intuition in general”—but in §26 he further provides a 
“Transcendental deduction of the universally possible use of the pure concepts of the 
understanding in experience” (B159). I understand the former argument as aiming to establish 
the categories’ objective validity and the latter argument as aiming to establish further that we 
have synthetic a priori cognition through the categories. 
Although he does not use the phrase “transcendental affinity” in the B-edition, his 
argument in §26 does try to show that the imagination is an a priori source of cognition insofar as 
it legislates synthetic a priori laws of nature according to which appearances are connected and 
combined. Here, we can consider Kant’s famous statement in the B-edition that “we can cognize 
of things a priori only what we ourselves have put into them” (Bxviii). This means that a 
principle could count as synthetic a priori cognition of appearances only if somehow we “put 
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into” appearances something by means of that principle. Accordingly, I show how Kant attempts 
to demonstrate that this necessary condition is genuinely met, and this paves the way for the 
remainder of the first Critique’s investigation of the possibility of synthetic a priori cognition.  
 8 
Chapter 1: The Historical Background of Kant's Notions of Clarity and Distinctness 
As I shall argue in the next chapter, Kant’s primary epistemological notion of “cognition” 
[Erkenntnis] arises out of an early-modern tradition, beginning with Descartes, that attempts to 
classify mental states or acts by means of the epistemic distinctions of clarity and distinctness. 
Put roughly, my main interpretive thesis will be that an empirical cognition for Kant is a clear 
and conceptually distinct representation. This is put roughly, since we shall see in this chapter 
that the notions of clarity and distinctness undergo various transformations in Kant’s German-
philosophical heritage—primarily Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten, and Meier—and not everyone 
understands the notions of clarity and distinctness the same way. Nevertheless, we shall find that 
the notions are characterized in roughly similar manners across all these thinkers in ways that are 
relevant for understanding Kant’s notions of clarity, distinctness, and empirical cognition. 
1.1 Descartes 
The notions of clarity and distinctness are familiar from Descartes’ Meditations, but it is 
tricky to understand what Descartes means by them. Moreover, he himself suggests that clarity, 
distinctness, obscurity, and confusion are all “more easily learned from examples than from 
rules” (Meditations, Reply to Second Set of Objections, AT VII, 165). Nevertheless, Descartes 
does attempt a more general characterization of them later in his Principles of Philosophy. In 
§45, entitled “What a clear and distinct perception is”, he writes:  
There are even a number of people who throughout their lives perceive nothing 
so correctly as to be capable of judging it properly. For the knowledge upon 
which a certain and indubitable judgment can be formed should be not only clear 
but also distinct. I call a perception clear when it is present and apparent to an 
attentive mind, in the same way as we say that we see objects clearly when, 
being present to the regarding eye, they operate upon it with sufficient strength. 
But I call a perception distinct when it is clear and so different from all other 
objects that it contains within itself nothing but what is clear. (Principles, AT 
IXb, 21-2) 
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Descartes’ conception of clarity in this passage is opaque, and I suggest that we work our way to 
understanding it by first considering distinctness. The above passage quite plainly defines 
distinctness in terms of clarity: a perception is distinct if two conditions are met: 
(i) “it is clear”; and, 
(ii) it is “so different from all other objects that it contains within itself 
nothing but what is clear”. 
Both conditions appeal to clarity, which Descartes does not define in any straightforward way. 
But by considering his example of a clear but indistinct perception, we can work our way toward 
a characterization of clarity. 
In §46 of the Principles, Descartes gives this example: 
When, for instance, a severe pain is felt, the perception of this pain may be very 
clear, and yet not always distinct, because people usually confuse the perception 
with the obscure judgment they form about its nature, assuming as they do that 
something exists in the affected part similar to the sensation of pain, even though 
it is only the sensation they perceive clearly. In this way perception may be clear 
without being distinct, and cannot be distinct without also being clear. 
(Principles, AT IXb, 22) 
Descartes does not claim that the perception of a severe pain is always indistinct or confused. 
Rather, he describes here the lack of distinctness as the result of an avoidable error. He thinks 
people often err because they “usually confuse the perception with the obscure judgment they 
form about its nature” (my emphases). Note how Descartes’ language here relates to clarity and 
distinctness: for Descartes, the opposite of clarity is obscurity, whereas that of distinctness is 
confusion. So, to put Descartes’ claim in other words, the failure to have a distinct perception of 
the severe pain is the result of confusing two different perceptions or ideas, namely the following 
two: 
(P) the clear perception of the pain itself; and, 
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(J) the obscure judgment that something similar to the sensation of pain exists in the 
affected part of the body. 
We shall return shortly to what makes (J) obscure. But for now note Descartes’ use of the term  
“confusion”—i.e., the fusing together of two things—as well as his language describing what is 
required for distinctness. Both suggest that the case he describes is one in which multiple 
perceptions are combined together into one. I suggest we consider the following to be the overall 
representation, (O), which results from the mistaken fusing together of (P) and (J): 
(O) the perception that clearly presents severe pain but confuses it with something 
corresponding in one’s body, which confusion arises from an obscure judgment 
According to Descartes, a subject who has perception (O) has a perception that is overall clear 
yet indistinct. In virtue of component (P), such a subject meets the condition (i) of distinctness 
given above, which holds that a distinct representation must be clear. But in virtue of component 
(J), such a subject fails to meet the condition (ii). For the overall perception (O) both fails to 
differentiate the pain from all other objects—namely, some part of the body—and contains 
something unclear—namely, the obscure judgment (J). 
The failure of (O) to be distinct ultimately resides, then, in the obscurity of (J). And this 
brings us back to the question how Descartes understands the notions of clarity and obscurity. If 
we look again at §45 of the Principles, we find that he associates the clarity of a perception with 
the following features: 
(a) a perception’s being present to a subject; 
(b) a perception’s being apparent to a subject; and, 
(c) the subject’s being attentive to or regarding the perception. 
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So, if we want to understand what makes a perception clear, it seems worthwhile to consider how 
a perception might fail to possess these features and hence be obscure. But one complication here 
is that Descartes denies the possibility of unconscious perceptions or mental operations. Due to 
this, it is difficult to see how he might distinguish between a subject’s being conscious of a 
perception and (a) that perception’s being present to a subject. Nevertheless, it seems quite 
possible to distinguish a subject’s being conscious of a perception from its being apparent to a 
subject (b) and from the subject’s being attentive to a perception (c). But how exactly might 
Descartes distinguish either apparent from unapparent perceptions or attentive from non-attentive 
consciousness? Another way to frame this question: how might Descartes use (b) or (c) to 
explain how a perception is conscious yet unclear? 
I suggest that passages from the Meditations can help with answering these questions. 
First, consider how Descartes describes various secondary properties: 
But as for the remaining items, such as light and colors, sounds, odors, tastes, 
heat and cold, and other tactile qualities, I think of these only in a very confused 
and obscure manner, to the extent that I do not even know whether they are true 
or false, that is, whether the ideas I have of them are ideas of things or ideas of 
non-things. (Meditations AT VII, 43) 
Descartes claims that the ideas we have of these secondary qualities are both obscure and 
confused, but he unfortunately does not distinguish for us wherein the obscurity lies from 
wherein the confusion lies. But one way in which a perception can lack distinctness is by lacking 
clarity, and as a working hypothesis I suggest that we understand this case in that manner. For I 
believe that doing so will make most sense of the above passages and those to come. If this 
hypothesis is correct, then the ideas of secondary qualities in Descartes’ list all are obscure to a 
subject “to the extent that [the subject] does not know whether [those ideas] are true or false”. 
For us, it might be peculiar to characterize ideas, rather than judgments or propositions, in terms 
of truth or falsity, but Descartes elaborates on this: 
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For although a short time ago I noted that falsity properly so called (or “formal” 
falsity) is to be found only in judgments, nevertheless there is another kind of 
falsity (called “material” falsity) which is found in ideas whenever they 
represent a non-thing as if it were a thing. (Meditations AT VII, 43) 
Thus, we have two kinds of truth and falsity for Descartes: whereas judgments are formally true 
or false, ideas are materially true or false. And an idea is materially true just in case the thing it 
represents is really a thing, but materially false just in case it represents a non-thing as a thing. 
Hence, on my hypothesis, a subject’s idea is obscure for a subject if that subject cannot 
determine whether the idea is materially true, i.e., cannot tell whether what she represents is a 
thing or a non-thing. Accordingly, a subject’s idea is clear just in case it is not obscure.3 
My tentative account of clarity and obscurity so far applies only to ideas but not 
judgments. But a parallel analysis applies to judgments, as the following passage from the 
Meditations indicates: 
For I am indeed of such a nature that, while I perceive something very clearly 
and distinctly, I cannot help believing it to be true. Nevertheless, my nature is 
also such that I cannot focus my mental gaze always on the same thing, so as to 
perceive it clearly. Often the memory of a previously made judgment may return 
when I am no longer attending to the arguments on account of which I made 
such a judgment. Thus, other arguments can be brought forward that would 
easily make me change my opinion, were I ignorant of God. And thus I would 
never have true and certain knowledge about anything, but merely fickle and 
changeable opinions. (Meditations AT VII, 69, my emphases) 
Descartes suggests that it is in our nature that we sometimes fail to perceive clearly, namely 
when one does not focus one’s mental gaze always on the same thing. This fits with the claim in 
the Principles that clear perception requires an attentive mind. But this passage also makes a 
                         
3 Descartes elaborates on this by going on in the following manner: “For example, the ideas I have of heat 
and cold fall so far short of being clear and distinct that I cannot tell from them whether cold is merely 
the privation of heat or whether heat is the privation of cold, or whether both are real qualities, or whether 
neither is. And because ideas can only be, as it were, of things, if it is true that cold is merely the absence 
of heat, then an idea that represents cold to me as something real and positive, will not inappropriately be 
called false. The same holds for other similar ideas.” (Meditations AT VII, 43-4, my emphasis) 
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connection between attention and my hypothesis about clarity and obscurity in the previous 
paragraph. For Descartes suggests here that when a subject’s attention is deficient with respect to 
a judgment, and hence when her judgment is obscure, she is less capable of telling whether that 
judgment is true. Descartes emphasizes this point again after providing a mathematical example.4 
These passages suggest, then, that a subject’s judgment is obscure just in case that subject is 
inattentive to it, and she is inattentive to it just in case she is not able to tell whether the judgment 
is true. And accordingly, a subject’s judgment is clear just in case it is not obscure. 
By drawing on the Meditations, I have attempted to explain the nature of how the notions 
of clarity and obscurity apply to ideas and to judgments. Recall from earlier that Descartes 
presents two types of truth and falsity, one applying to ideas and the other to judgments. By 
using those distinctions, I can sum up and offer a unified account of clarity and distinctness, 
which covers both ideas and judgments: 
A subject has a clear perception—either an idea or a judgment—just in case she is able to 
tell whether that perception is true. Specifically: 
(i) if the perception is a mere idea, then she can tell whether it is materially 
true, i.e., whether it represents a thing or non-thing; and, 
(ii) if the perception is a judgment, she can tell whether it is formally true. 
A subject has a distinct perception—either an idea or a judgment—just in case 
(i) it is clear; and, 
                         
4 “But no sooner do I turn the mind’s eye away from the [mathematical] demonstration, than, however 
much I still recall that I had observed it most clearly, nevertheless, it can easily happen that I entertain 
doubts about whether it is true, were I ignorant of God. For I can convince myself that I have been so 
constituted by nature that I might occasionally be mistaken about those things I believe I perceive most 
evidently, especially when I recall that I have often taken many things to be true and certain, which other 
arguments have subsequently led me to judge to be false.” (Meditations AT VII, 69-70, my emphasis) 
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(ii) it contains nothing but what is clear, thereby allowing the subject to 
differentiate the represented thing from all other things. 
I can now clarify why condition (ii) of distinctness states two apparently non-equivalent 
requirements, namely that the perception contains nothing but what is clear and that the subject 
be able to differentiate the object from all other objects. For it seems plausible that a subject 
could differentiate the object of a perception from all other objects only if she also perceives the 
true and essential features of that object. But in order for her to do that with certainty, she must 
perceive all of those features clearly. And hence, if a perception is to be differentiated from all 
other objects, a subject must perceive “nothing but what is clear” in the features of the original 
perception. 
I offer the following passage from Descartes’ Reply to the Second Set of Objections as a 
last piece of textual evidence in favor of my interpretation: 
But a concept is said to be obscure or confused only because something 
unknown is contained in it. (AT VII, 147) 
Descartes here claims that containing something unknown is sufficient for both obscurity and 
confusion. But if it is sufficient on its own for obscurity, this would likewise account for its 
confusion, as we have seen in the earlier surveyed characterization of distinctness. Following my 
interpretive hypothesis, I suggest that being “unknown” amounts to not being able to tell the 
truth of something, whether an idea or a judgment. Hence, the obscurity of a subject’s perception 
ultimately resides in that subject’s incapacity to determine the truth, whether material or formal, 
of that perception. 
To conclude my interpretation, I now suggest how it explains the initial example from the 
Principles. Recall that Descartes asserts that (J)—the judgment that something similar to the 
sensation of pain exists in the affected part of the body—is obscure. This judgment is obscure 
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because the people who make this judgment are thereby incapable of attending to whether it is 
really true that a sensation of pain is located in a body part. And of course, as Descartes holds, 
attention to this issue would reveal that whereas pain is something unextended, the injured body 
part corresponding to that pain is extended. That is, appropriate attention would reveal the falsity 
of (J). With this account of the obscurity of (J), we can now consider why (O) is clear but 
confused. Recall that (O) is a complex perception that clearly presents the sensation of severe 
pain but presents something similar as being located in the body. This complex perception 
contains (P), the perception of the sensation of severe pain. (P) itself is clear insofar as pain is not 
a privation but a real thing. But in having the perception (O), people not only have the perception 
(P) but also affirm (J), the judgment that a sensation of pain is located in the physical location of 
an injury. But unlike (P), (J) is obscure. For if they were to attend to (J), they would recognize its 
falsity on account of the fact that whereas the bodily injury is extended, the pain is not. This lack 
of attention to (J) entails the obscurity of (J). Since (O) contains (J), (O) itself contains something 
obscure. But since the distinctness of a perception requires that it contains nothing but what is 
clear, it follows that (O) is indistinct. Nevertheless, since what is represented overall by (O) is 
the clear perception of the sensation of severe pain, (O) is overall clear. 
Before moving on, I would like to note one difficulty with this interpretation. Recall that 
Descartes affirms as a general rule that “that everything I very clearly and distinctly perceive is 
true” (Meditations AT VII, 35). He nevertheless thinks that this general rule needs to be 
supported by argument, as he explicitly states in his synopsis (AT VII, 15) and sets out on at the 
start of the Second Meditation. Presumably, the point in affirming this general rule and offering 
an argument for it is to establish that clarity and distinctness can be relied on with certainty to 
find the truth. If that is so, then it seems that clarity and distinctness should be capable of 
 16 
characterization independently of the notion of truth; for otherwise stating that clarity and 
distinctness guarantee truth is uninformative. Yet it seems that my account is uninformative in 
just this way, for my characterizations of clarity and distinctness involve the notion of truth. But 
they are not completely uninformative. Rather than characterizing the clarity and distinctness of 
perceptions in terms of whether they are true, my account characterizes these notions in terms of 
whether a subject has a capacity for determining the truth of perceptions. This still might not be 
all that informative for a subject who wants to know whether particular perceptions are clear and 
distinct; but it is still informative for us in understanding how Descartes uses these notions. 
Regardless of this difficulty, there are three historically-significant aspects of Descartes’ 
account of clarity and distinctness. First, he will be followed in taking the clarity of a 
representation to relate to the existence of the thing represented. Second, the capacity for 
distinguishing objects from one another—which Descartes appeals to in his characterization of 
distinctness—will be of primary significance for later philosophers’ understanding of both clarity 
and distinctness. Third, some these later philosophers will also follow Descartes in defining 
distinctness in terms of clarity, but they will do so in more nuanced ways. But it needs to be 
emphasized that whereas Descartes affirms the “general rule that everything I very clearly and 
distinctly perceive is true” (Meditations AT VII, 35), these later philosophers use the notions 
only for characterizing and categorizing various mental states, acts, or content. Let us now turn 
to these later thinkers, beginning with Leibniz, with whose texts Kant was familiar. 
1.2 Leibniz 
In his first published philosophical essay, “Meditations on Knowledge [cognitio], Truth, 
and Ideas” of 1684, Leibniz proposes several “distinctions and criteria that relate to ideas and 
knowledge [cognitio]”, which it seems he hoped would mediate disagreements between Arnauld 
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and Malebranche. Although that debate is not of so much interest for present purposes, the 
following diagram gives an overview of how Leibniz grades knowledge or cognition [cognitio] 
(1989: 23): 
 
Although Leibniz does not describe or define what cognition is in general, he does characterize 
and give examples of the various types of cognition that fall under it, as I have depicted in my 
diagram. Despite introducing these distinctions as applying to cognition, Leibniz soon starts 
applying them to notions and propositions, particularly the former. This suggests that notions and 
propositions are forms of cognition. But as we shall see, Leibniz applies his distinctions to ideas 
as well. It is important to note that although Leibniz applies his distinctions to propositions, he 
and his followers generally apply them to non-propositional mental states such as notions and 
representations generally. My present goals require an account of only the first two degrees of 
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epistemic success, clarity and distinctness, although Kant was clearly familiar with the other 
degrees.5 
According to Leibniz, cognition is “clear when I have the means for recognizing the 
thing represented” (1989: 24). He calls the failure to be clear obscurity, and his example of 
obscurity is helpful:  
A notion which is not sufficient for recognizing the thing represented is obscure, 
as, for example, if whenever I remember some flower or animal I once saw, I 
cannot do so sufficiently well for me to recognize that flower or animal when 
presented and to distinguish it from other nearby flowers or animals (1989: 23-
4). 
To use a different example that will help us later: my parents’ pet dog Duke has a clear notion or 
cognition of me insofar as he is in some way able to recognize me and differentiate me from a 
stranger (as indicated by his growling at the stranger but not at me). We can characterize clarity 
and obscurity in the following manner: a subject’s cognition of something is clear just in case 
that subject—by means of that cognition—can (i) recognize the object as the same; and, (ii) 
distinguish it from other things. Accordingly, a subject’s cognition of something is obscure just 
in case the cognition is not clear. 
Let us now turn to the contrast between distinct and confused cognition. First of all, it is 
to be noted that distinctness is a possibility only for a cognition that is clear (as indicated by my 
diagram above). This view is shared by all the philosophers of present concern. Leibniz goes 
about explicating ‘distinctness’ by explaining how distinctness might be lacking in a clear 
cognition. According to Leibniz, my cognition is confused “when I cannot enumerate one by one 
marks sufficient for differentiating a thing from others” or when I distinguish objects “not by 
way of explicit marks” (1989: 24). This has the result that one cannot explain the thing in 
                         
5 For the degree of ‘adequacy’ or ‘completeness’, see for example FS 2: 58-59, ID 2: 393-394, and 
R1678. And for ‘symbolic’ and ‘intuitive’ cognition, see for example, MD 28: 674. 
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question to others, make the thing clear to others, explain one’s judgments about the thing, or 
reply to questioning about the thing (1989: 24). In other words, even if a subject is successful in 
recognizing and distinguishing a thing to oneself, thereby having clear cognition of that thing, 
she might be incapable of explaining to others what it is in virtue of which she recognizes that 
thing and distinguishes it from other things. 
In Leibniz’s logical terminology, I have the capacity for explaining wherein objects are 
differentiated from one another in virtue of representing marks by which I recognize that thing 
and distinguish it from other things. For example, unlike Duke, I distinctly represent my friend 
Stefanie because I not only can recognize her and differentiate her from others but also can make 
and express judgments to communicate the marks (e.g., blond hair, glasses, German accent, etc.) 
by which I recognize and differentiate her from others. To summarize, a subject’s cognition of 
something is distinct just in case that subject—by means of that cognition—can (i) recognize the 
object as the same; (ii) distinguish it from other things; and, (iii) enumerate the marks possessed 
by that thing, by which the subject recognizes and distinguishes it. Likewise, a subject’s 
cognition of something is confused just in case the cognition is not distinct. And since (i) and (ii) 
are conditions for clarity, it follows on Leibniz’s view that all obscure cognition is likewise 
confused. 
Although—as my diagram above indicates—Leibniz outlines several further degrees of 
knowledge or cognition, those of clarity and distinctness are of primary relevance for my 
purposes. Leibniz was satisfied with his characterizations of these two degrees much later in his 
career, as attested by his presentation of them in his New Essays Concerning Human 
Understanding (1996: 254-6), a work which Kant read soon after its posthumous publication. 
Although Leibniz in the New Essays refers back to his earlier article, he no longer applies these 
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distinctions primarily to cognition or knowledge but rather to ideas [Idées]. Although this later 
work was not available to the general philosophical public until 1765, it is clear that Leibniz’s 
distinctions were influential earlier than that date, as attested by the works of Christian Wolff, 
Georg Friedrich Meier, Johann Heinrich Lambert, and others. By looking at some of their works, 
we are given evidence that Kant was quite familiar with these distinctions. Moreover, we shall 
see that these distinctions need not, unlike what Leibniz’s “Meditations on Truth, Knowledge 
and Ideas” suggests, pertain only to that which counts as full-blooded cognition. 
1.3 Wolff 
We find Leibniz’s distinctions drawn in nearly the same way by Christian Wolff in both 
his German Logic, first published in 1713, and his German Metaphysics, first published in 1720. 
But Wolff did not follow Leibniz completely in either of these two works, since he does not take 
cognition [cognitio or Erkenntnis] to be the genus to which the distinctions of clarity and 
distinctness are applied. In Chapter 1 §§9-13 of the German Logic, Wolff applies the distinctions 
to concepts, which are a subspecies of thoughts. He gives a quite general definition of what a 
thought [Gedancke] is: “that activity of the soul through which we are conscious” (§2; Cf. DM 
§194). Following this, he defines ‘a concept’ [Begrif] as “a representation of a thing [einer 
Sache] in our thoughts” (§4). Thus, although Wolff does not present the distinctions of clarity 
and distinctness in terms of cognition [Erkenntnis or cognitio] like Leibniz, he nonetheless 
presents them as applying to conscious mental states or acts that have objects, and these 
representations can be non-propositional. Similarly, despite focusing more generally on thoughts 
rather than on concepts, Wolff’s German Metaphysics provides characterizations and examples 
of the same distinctions all in terms of objects (§§198-214). 
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Although Wolff’s account of the distinctions largely follows Leibniz’s, there are three 
differences worth highlighting. First, he offers a more detailed presentation of distinctness. Like 
Leibniz, he holds that a subject has a distinct mental state or act of a thing only if one can 
recognize and differentiate that thing by means of that thing’s marks (GL §13, §19; GM §206). 
But he goes further than Leibniz in using the notion of clarity itself to explain how distinctness is 
possible: 
When we then think of something, and [when] our thoughts are clear with 
respect to that thing’s parts or to the manifold—which manifold is to be 
encountered in one thing—then there arises out of this clarity distinctness. When 
we receive clear thoughts from the parts—so that we can distinguish them from 
one another, whether or not we are indeed capable of determining the actual 
difference [between them]—then we have a distinct thought of the whole. (GM 
§207) 
Thus, a distinct thought of a thing is one that not only represents clearly that thing as a whole but 
also represents that thing’s parts clearly. As we shall see shortly, Meier follows Wolff in this 
account of distinctness. But its significance will become apparent only once we finally return to 
Kant’s views. For now, let us consider the additional two ways in which Wolff goes beyond 
Leibniz. 
The second difference between Leibniz and Wolff is that the latter explicitly grounds the 
capacity for distinct representations in the faculty for understanding [Verstand]. He defines the 
understanding as “[t]he faculty to represent the possible distinctly” (GM §277). Although this 
definition pertains specifically to the representation the possible [das Mögliche], it is clear that 
the understanding is responsible for any distinct representation. For he continues by claiming that 
the faculties of the senses [Sinnen] and imagination [Einbildungs-Kraft] are distinguished from 
the understanding insofar as the representations of the former two faculties all by themselves 
alone are never distinct. 
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Third, in both the German Logic and the German Metaphysics, the notions of clarity and 
distinctness ultimately apply to thoughts, which are inherently conscious. This does not mean 
that Wolff takes everything mental to be conscious. For he explicitly claims, following Leibniz, 
that some operations of the mind can be unconscious (GM §§193-194). But despite Wolff’s 
following Leibniz’s views about the possibility of non-conscious mental operations, it is not 
clear whether Leibniz intended the notions of clarity and distinctness to apply only to conscious 
ones or to unconscious ones as well. What is more significant for Kant, however, is that Wolff 
makes even closer ties between consciousness, thought, and clarity. For Wolff claims that “we 
are conscious of things when we differentiate them from one another” (GM §729). But likewise, 
Wolff also claims the converse: “[w]hen we do not notice the difference between things that we 
encounter, we are then not conscious of what falls to our senses” (GM §729). As we have 
already seen, a clear thought is one the object of which is differentiated from other things. So it 
follows from the two previous quotations that we are conscious of things if and only if we clearly 
represent them. This allows for the possibility of a subject’s having unconscious representations 
in the following sense: a subject has unconscious representations just in case that subject has 
those representations but does not differentiate them from one another. 
In the last paragraph, we have learned that clarity and consciousness are coextensive. But 
Wolff does not stop there with his discussion of their relationship: 
Yet since clarity arises from the observation of the difference in the manifold, 
and distinctness from the clarity of the parts, it can thus in this manner be 
comprehended that clarity and distinctness of thoughts ground consciousness 
(GM §732). 
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The key claim here is that clarity and distinctness ground consciousness, i.e., make 
consciousness possible.6 Wolff continues by arguing that reflection [Ueberdencken] and memory 
[Gedächtnis] are two additional necessary conditions for consciousness, since both are necessary 
conditions for the differentiation of things (GM §§733-734). That leads him to the conclusion 
that “memory and reflection bring forth consciousness” (GM §735). Although memory and 
reflection are like clarity and distinctness insofar as they make consciousness possible, the 
former notions bear different ties to consciousness than the latter ones do. For Wolff, plausibly 
enough, does not treat every act of consciousness as at the same time an act of memory or 
reflection. In contrast, he never gives a gloss of what consciousness amounts to in terms other 
than what he claims is constitutive of clarity. This suggests, then, that for Wolff clarity is 
constitutive of consciousness and that differing degrees of clarity correspond to degrees of 
consciousness. Indeed, we shall see that Meier follows him in this and that Kant understood this 
to be his predecessors’ view. 
To sum up the above discussion of Wolff’s views, we have seen that he goes beyond 
Leibniz in the following respects. First, whereas Leibniz characterized distinctness in terms of 
how a thing’s parts or marks are represented, Wolff adds that distinctness requires that such 
representations’ parts/marks must themselves be clear. Second, Wolff gives an explanation of 
how distinctness comes about: only the understanding—and neither the senses nor imagination 
on their own—can produce distinct representations. Third, Wolff holds that representations are 
                         
6 This claim seems stronger than what Wolff’s argument up to this point has established. The preceding 
passages (GM §§729-31) suggest only that consciousness requires and is grounded on the differentiation 
of things, i.e., clarity. But nothing in those passages suggests that distinctness, the clear representation of 
a things’ parts, is necessary for consciousness. Yet perhaps what Wolff has in mind is the following. 
Since distinctness amounts to a clarity of the marks or parts of the things one differentiates, a distinct 
representation has a higher overall level of clarity than does a merely clear but indistinct representation. 
And so perhaps Wolff’s thought is that the higher level of clarity of distinct thoughts brings about a 
higher degree of consciousness. 
 24 
clear if and only if they are conscious, and he holds more strongly that clarity is constitutive of 
consciousness. 
1.4 Baumgarten 
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s Metaphysics does not treat the distinctions of clarity 
and distinctness in nearly as much detail as do the other philosophers discussed here. He 
characterizes clarity and distinctness in terms very similar to Wolff (§520-522). He likewise 
follows Wolff in holding that the understanding, which he also calls the higher cognitive faculty, 
is responsible for distinct cognition (§624). But Baumgarten formulates a corollary of this claim 
much more clearly than Wolff does: 
A REPRESENTATION that is not distinct is called SENSIBLE. Thus the 
power of my soul represents sensible perceptions through the lower faculty [of 
cognition]. (§521) 
As we shall see in the next chapter, Kant quite explicitly disagrees with this way of 
distinguishing between the higher and lower cognitive faculties, i.e., between sensibility and 
understanding. 
1.5 Meier 
Kant was familiar with Wolff’s works, but perhaps even more with Meier’s Auszug aus 
der Vernunftlehre of 1752, the aforementioned work that Kant used as his logic textbook, as well 
as Meier’s Vernunftlehre of the same year, which Kant possessed in his library. Here, I shall 
focus primarily on the Auszug. In this work, Meier takes representation [Vorstellung] to be the 
primitive notion (AV §10; cf. V §24), but he soon claims that “one can also, without worrying 
about any noticeable error, take representations and cognition [Erkenntniss] to be the same 
[einerlei]” (AV §11; cf. V§25). And it is with the latter notion, cognition, that Meier 
distinguishes clarity from obscurity (AV §124; cf. V §155) as well as distinctness from 
confusion (AV §137; cf. V §168). Despite differing from Wolff in applying the distinctions of 
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clarity and distinctness to cognition/representation rather than to thoughts, Meier does follow 
Wolff in some of the modifications to Leibniz’s views. Namely, he follows Wolff in the first two 
points of my summary of the latter’s modifications to Leibniz’s views. First, like Wolff he holds 
that a distinct cognition is one in which marks are represented clearly (AV §137; V §168). 
Second, he agrees with Wolff and Baumgarten that the understanding is responsible for 
distinctness, and he follows Baumgarten in claiming that the senses are only capable of clarity  
(Meier 1749: §32 and 1765: §525). But for our purposes, Meier is of interest insofar as he differs 
from Wolff with respect to the connections between clarity, distinctness, and consciousness. 
Early in the Auszug, Meier writes: 
We are conscious of our representations and our cognition (conscium esse, 
adpercipere) in so far as we differentiate them and their object from other 
representations and objects. Consciousness is a doubled representation: a 
representation of the object and a representation of its difference from others. 
(AV §13; cf. V §27, §146) 
As we have seen, for Descartes, Leibniz, and Wolff, a clear mental state or act is one that 
suffices for recognizing and differentiating an object from other objects. The first sentence of the 
above passage suggests that Meier holds, like Wolff, that consciousness of something is had 
insofar as there is clear representation of that thing.7 But a later passage indicates both a 
terminological difference as well as a doctrinal one: 
A cognition contains either so many marks as are required for consciousness, 
or not. The former is a clear cognition (cognitio clara), which is identical 
[einerlei] with thought and cognition—which cognition we are conscious of (§. 
123). The latter is an obscure cognition (cognitio obscura), which is thus 
neither a thought nor connected with consciousness (§. 123). (AV §124) 
This passage indicates that Meier also treats clarity as corresponding with consciousness. But 
note that clarity is defined here differently: no longer is a clear representation one by which a 
                         
7 And AV §123 expresses Meier’s agreement with Wolff about the possibility of non-conscious 
representations and cognitions. 
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subject differentiates the represented object from other objects; rather, a clear representation is 
one with enough marks for consciousness. Whereas Leibniz and Wolff appealed to marks or 
parts of a thing in their explanations only of distinctness, Meier already does so already at the 
level of clarity. 
The necessity of marks for clarity, along with the association of clarity with 
consciousness, explains why in §13 Meier describes consciousness as a doubled representation. 
This becomes clearer when we examine the notion of a “mark”, which Meier characterizes in the 
following passage: 
A mark, a characteristic [Kennzeichen] of cognition and of things (nota, 
character cognitionis et rei), is that in the cognition or in the things which, when 
cognized, is the ground for why we are conscious of them—or they are the 
distinction-pieces [Unterscheidungsstücke] of cognition and its objects. Where 
then there is consciousness, there is a mark cognized. (AV §115; cf. §122; V 
§§146-147) 
Marks, then, are both characteristics or features of a thing that differentiate it from other things 
and the representations of those characteristics or features. Furthermore, this passage suggests 
that marks are in some sense necessary conditions for both consciousness and clarity.8 This view 
is also seen in the Vernunftlehre, where Meier writes that “marks are the source of 
consciousness” (V §146). His claim that marks are ‘distinction-pieces’ suggests that they are the 
second of the ‘doubled representation’ that constitutes consciousness, namely the representation 
of wherein an object differs from other objects. An example from Meier’s Vernunftlehre (§146) 
can help clarify the sense in which consciousness is a doubled representation. Insofar as my 
representation or cognition ‘island’ is conscious, I must differentiate the island in question from 
other objects, including other islands. The representation ‘island’ is the first-half of the doubled 
representation required for consciousness. But insofar as I differentiate the island from other 
                         
8 But in AV §119 Meier denies that they are sufficient conditions. 
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things on the ground of a mark, e.g., ‘possessing a mountain’, I also have ‘a representation of its 
difference from others’. The mark itself is thus the second-half of the doubled representation. We 
should be careful not to take Meier as committed to holding that consciousness requires an 
awareness of these marks. For Meier claims that a mark is that which “when cognized, is the 
ground for why we are conscious” of a thing (AV §115, my emphasis). So, when I am conscious 
of the island, I need only differentiate it on the basis of the mark ‘possessing an island’ but need 
not at the same time be aware or conscious of the mark itself. 
In summary, although Meier holds with Descartes, Leibniz, and Wolff that clarity of 
representations corresponds to the consciousness of those representations, he provides a different 
account of clarity, and so a different account of consciousness. On Meier’s view, clarity requires 
that one represent a thing on the basis of some mark. This means that Meier’s view has a more 
stringent criterion for consciousness: whereas his predecessors held that consciousness required 
only the mere differentiation of an object from other things, Meier holds that this differentiation 
must occur on the basis of a mark whereby that object is distinguished from other things. 
1.6 Summary 
Although there are several other discussions of clarity and distinctness among pre-
Kantian Germanic philosophers,9 this chapter suffices for working out Kant’s conception of 
cognition. In the next chapter, I shall show that Kant follows his predecessors in treating clarity 
and distinctness as forms of epistemic success for his most fundamental mental state or act, 
namely representation. Moreover, I shall argue that the ways in which clarity and distinctness are 
epistemic successes are what is primarily distinctive of what Kant calls “cognition” [Erkenntnis]. 
But Kant does not merely apply the label ‘cognition’ to what his predecessors called clear and 
                         
9 See Lambert 1764: §§8-9, as well as Eberhard 1776: 67-72. 
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distinct. As we shall see, Kant’s views of clarity and distinctness are more nuanced—specifically 
with respect to the nature of consciousness—and are in some ways an improvement over his 
predecessors. But before turning to these tasks, some remarks on the philosophical terminology 
are perhaps in order. 
We have seen the notions of clarity and distinctness applied to different mental states or 
acts: perceptions for Descartes, cognition and ideas for Leibniz, thoughts and concepts for Wolff, 
and representations and cognition for Meier. These differences in terminology ultimately do not 
amount to much. But in each discussion of clarity and distinctness, the philosopher applies the 
distinctions to whatever mental state or act is of primary concern in that context. In the 
“Meditations on Truth, Knowledge and Ideas”, Leibniz applies the distinction primarily to 
cognitions, whereas in the New Essays he applies it to ideas. But this is accounted for by the fact 
that the former work takes cognition to be of primary interest and the latter work was a reply to 
Locke, who took an idea to be the most general type of mental state or act. Similarly, in Wolff’s 
German Metaphysics, thought is the most basic mental state or act of interest, and so—even 
though he admits of mental states or acts that are not thoughts, i.e., not conscious—he applies the 
distinction primarily to thoughts. Likewise, his German Logic takes “concept” as a primitive 
term to which this distinction applies. Finally, Meier treats “representation” and “cognition” 
interchangeably as the basic or fundamental mental state or act of concern, and he applies the 
notions of clarity and distinctness to them. So with all of these philosophers, it seems, the 
distinctions apply to whatever mental state or act is taken as basic or primitive in a particular 
context. And whatever this basic or generic mental state or act might be, clarity and distinctness 
count as epistemic improvements over a merely general mental state or act that lacks clarity and 
distinctness. Furthermore, for all these philosophers, these epistemic improvements pertain to 
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how the objects of mental states or acts are portrayed, depicted, or represented. And we have 
already seen how Kant’s concern with cognition relates to a focus on objects of mental states or 
acts.  
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Chapter 2: Kant's Conception of Empirical Cognition 
In this chapter, I argue that in the sense of greatest epistemological concern for Kant, 
empirical cognition is “rational sensory discrimination”: the identification or differentiation of 
sensory objects from each other (whether correctly or not) that occurs through a capacity to 
become aware of and express judgments (whether correct or not). With this account of empirical 
cognition, I show how the transcendental deduction of the first Critique is most plausibly read as 
having as its fundamental assumption the thesis that we have empirical cognition, and I provide 
evidence that Kant understood Hume as granting this assumption. 
I provide my account of empirical cognition in five steps. I first show in Section 1 that 
Kant uses the notion of cognition in a broad sense to refer to any mental state that refers to an 
object. Section 2 shows that there is a conceptual link between a stricter sense of empirical 
cognition—one which is more central to Kant’s epistemological concerns—and the notions of 
clarity and distinctness. In Section 3, I carefully examine key passages from Kant’s logical works 
because Kant’s published Logic was compiled by someone other than Kant, and this book 
contains a passage concerning cognition that is widely cited in the secondary literature. I detail in 
that section the extent to which that passage is representative of Kant’s own thought. In Section 
4, I use the preceding sections to present Kant’s stricter conception of empirical cognition. In 
Section 5, I explain that this notion of empirical cognition expresses an epistemological 
paradigm of “rational sensory discrimination”. 
2.1 Why a Better Account of Cognition is Necessary 
Surprisingly, one of the essential tasks for interpreting Kant’s thought has rarely been 
carried out, namely to work out an explicit account of what Kant understands by “cognition”. 
Although most commentators hold that empirical cognition is an epistemic state that requires 
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both intuition and concepts, few explain the sense in which empirical cognition counts as an 
epistemic success.10 Without knowing the type of epistemic success Kant intends to pick out by 
‘empirical cognition’, we fail to know why both intuitions and concepts are required for it. 
In Kant’s Thinker, Kitcher stresses that empirical cognition requires concepts that are 
marks of things, where such marks serve as “grounds of cognition that are recognized as such”.11 
What it means to recognize grounds of cognition as such is explained by her claim that for Kant 
“unlike animals, humans can know the reasons for their cognitions.”12 That is, for concepts to be 
not only grounds of cognition but also recognized as such, a subject must be able to use such 
concepts for giving reasons. 
Although I agree with practically everything Kitcher says about cognition, her account is 
incomplete in one crucial respect: she has not told us the sense in which empirical cognition 
counts as an epistemic success. Rather, all she has done is to state what Kant holds cognition to 
require, namely concepts and the capacity for being aware of reasons. But without knowing the 
type of epistemic success Kant intends to pick out by “empirical cognition”, we fail to know why 
he claims that concepts are required for it. 
Yet even more problematically, without specifying how empirical cognition counts as an 
epistemic success, we lack any grounds for evaluating whether Kant is justified in assuming that 
our experience consists in empirical cognition. Furthermore, without a detailed account of 
empirical cognition, it is easy to treat it as a type of knowledge that a sceptic could doubt we 
                         
10 Patricia Kitcher has recently given a lengthy and persuasive account of cognition (2011: 118-21), but 
her account is lacking in this particular respect. 
11 2011: 121. 
12 Ibid. Kitcher does not make clear what these are supposed to be reasons for. If she has in mind that 
these are supposed to be reasons for belief, then I think she is mistaken. For as I shall argue, although 
cognition does indeed require the capacity for giving reasons, these reasons are not directly reasons for 
belief. Rather, they are reasons for acts of identifying or differentiating objects. 
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have; it would thus seem to be an improper starting point for the transcendental deduction.13 
Similarly, an account of how empirical cognition is an epistemic success is required for 
understanding Kant’s grounds for thinking that the first Critique responds to “the Humean 
problem in its greatest possible amplification” (4:261). Given this description of the first 
Critique, it is reasonable to try to make sense of how Kant could have taken his assumptions 
about experience to be granted by Hume, at least insofar as Kant understood Hume.14 I shall 
return to this Humean problem in the next chapter, once we have 
2.2 Kant’s Broad Sense of Cognition 
In the first Critique, Kant presents a “Stufenleiter”—a stepladder or progression of types 
of representation—that exhibits what I call Kant’s broad sense of cognition (A319-20/B376-7). 
The Stufenleiter treats representation as a genus with two species: those accompanied with 
consciousness and those that are not. The former type are perceptions, which are in turn 
classified as subjective—sensations referring to the state of the subject—or objective—
cognitions referring to the object. Hence, according to the Stufenleiter (as well as many other 
passages) a cognition is an objective perception, i.e., a conscious representation relating to an 
object.15 Kant perhaps inherited this broad notion of cognition from Meier’s logic textbook, 
which associates cognition with the representation of an object.16 
                         
13 For example, see Dicker 2004: 88-90. 
14 In her earlier Kant’s Transcendental Psychology, Kitcher does discuss how the transcendental 
deduction engages with Hume’s views, where she takes the assumption to be granted by Hume as “the 
ability of cognitive states to represent” (1990: 109). In “Changing the Name of the Game: Kant’s 
Cognitivism Versus Hume’s Psychologism”, she focuses on Kant’s response to Hume in the Second 
Analogy and claims that all that Kant needs to assume is “thinking B followed A”, where such thinking 
need not be propositional (1991: 225). Nevertheless, Kitcher’s fuller account of cognition in Kant’s 
Thinker does not address how Kant could have taken himself to respond legitimately to the Humean 
problem with the assumption that experience consists in empirical cognition. 
15 Bix-x, Bxvii-xviii; R1685, R1693, R2128, R2836, R3055, and R5221. 
16 AV §10-11. 
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Unfortunately, this characterization of cognition is not particularly helpful for 
understanding Kant’s views in first Critique. For the Stufenleiter classifies intuitions and 
concepts each on their own as counting as cognitions. This seems to clash with the doctrine of 
the first Critique that neither intuition alone nor concepts alone are sufficient for cognition.17 But 
in a late work, Kant explains his peculiar use of terminology in the Stufenleiter: even though 
both intuition and concepts are required for cognition, a cognition can be described as either an 
intuition or a concept ‘after that to which I particularly attend on each occasion, as the 
determining ground [of the cognition]’.18 Although we have learned from the Stufenleiter that a 
defining characteristic of cognition is that it is a representation relating to an object, that passage 
fails to shed light on what is distinctive about cognition and exactly how it requires both intuition 
and concepts. But Kant uses many terms, e.g., “understanding”, in broad and stricter senses. I 
provide in the next subsection two passages that offer clues about a stricter sense of cognition. 
2.3 Kant’s Stricter Sense of Cognition 
First, Reflexion 2394 gives the following degrees of representations. 
The following degrees are to be distinguished: 
1. to represent something. 
2. to know something. To represent with consciousness. (Later addition: 
representing to oneself with consciousness. […] 
3. to be acquainted with something. Thereby in comparison to differentiate 
from others. 
4. to understand something. (Later addition: What I am acquainted with and 
understand, that I cognize. to be able to expound and communicate to others.) 
to cognize something through the understanding. […] (R2394, my translation) 
Kant introduces the notion of cognition in his presentation of the fourth degree: to understand 
something. There, he claims that acquaintance and understanding are jointly sufficient conditions 
                         
17 A51-2/B75-6. 
18 WF 20: 325. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer from the Kantian Review for drawing my 
attention to this passage. 
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for cognizing something: ‘[w]hat I am acquainted with and understand, that I cognize’. This 
claim gestures at Kant’s doctrine that cognition requires both intuition and concept. For it seems 
that while intuition would be required for us to be acquainted with things so as to differentiate 
them, concepts would be required for us to understand those things.19 
Second, Kant’s Anthropology relates the notions of clarity and distinctness to cognition: 
Consciousness of one's representations that suffices for the differentiation of one 
object from another is clarity. But that consciousness by means of which the 
composition of representations also becomes clear is called distinctness. 
Distinctness alone makes it possible that an aggregate of representations 
becomes cognition, in which order is thought in this manifold, because such a 
composition with consciousness presupposes unity of that consciousness, and 
consequently presupposes a rule for that composition. […] in every cognition 
(since intuition and concept are always required for it), distinctness rests on the 
order according to which the partial representations are combined […] (A 7: 
137-8, my translation; Cf. R2281) 
This passage affirms the first Critique’s doctrine that both intuition and concept are required for 
cognition, so it is a good source for understanding the stricter sense of cognition.20 Yet whereas 
R2394 put forward acquaintance and understanding as jointly sufficient for cognition, this 
passage states that clarity and distinctness give rise to cognition. 
As I shall argue, R2394’s treatment of cognition in terms of acquaintance and 
understanding can in turn be explicated with the Anthropology’s notions of clarity and 
distinctness. My main interpretive thesis is that empirical cognition in the stricter sense is a clear 
and discursively distinct representation, where clarity is provided by means of acquaintance and 
distinctness by means of understanding. 
                         
19 It is widely noted that Kant understands concepts as marks with which we can identify or differentiate 
things. So it might be thought that acquaintance, which is described here as that by which we differentiate 
between things, is possible only by means of concepts. But this would be to overlook that Kant also held 
there to be sensible or intuitive marks. For an illuminating account of the evidence for this and an 
interpretation of intuition using this evidence, see Smit 2000. 
20 Cf. A 7: 140. 
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Unfortunately, the first Critique does not offer much to say on these notions or how they 
relate to cognition. Kant’s characterizations of cognition in that key critical-period work are 
various and often present the notion in very general terms. For example, we find the following 
two characterizations in each edition’s Transcendental Deduction chapter: ‘a whole of compared 
and connected representations’ (A97) and ‘a determinate relation of given representations to an 
object’ (B137).21 These characterizations prompt many questions: what sort of connections 
obtain between representations in a cognition, and what sort of determinate relation do 
representations have to objects? Of course, part of Kant’s task in the first Critique is to offer a 
detailed answer to these questions. But many of these answers are arrived at through contentious 
argumentation. My approach to this problem—namely that Kant’s characterizations of cognition 
are either too vague or too loaded—is to try to understand what he would have taken his 
potential interlocutors as willing to grant about the nature of our cognitive engagement with the 
world. Kant’s target audience was primarily thinkers with pre-critical views and terminology, 
and for him to persuade that audience of the critical philosophy, he must assume at least some of 
those views and use some of that terminology. So, I proceed by investigating how pre-critical 
Germanic philosophical thought, including that of Kant himself, understood some of the key 
notions involved in characterizing our experience. Accordingly, I begin by outlining the 
Germanic-philosophical heritage behind the notions of clarity and distinctness.22 
2.4 Erkenntnis in Kant’s Logical Works 
In this section, I focus on texts pertaining to Kant’s thoughts on logic. Although a 
passage from Kant’s Logic is widely referred to for understanding Kant’s conception of 
                         
21 The other main characterizations of cognition are at Bxvii-iii, A50/B74, A67-8/B92-3, and A319-
20/B376-7. 
22 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer at the Kantian Review for offering constructive criticism 
regarding my use of pre-critical texts. 
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cognition, this work was not penned by Kant himself but rather compiled by Benjamin Jäsche. 
So, it is imperative to determine its fidelity to Kant’s thought. I compare the passage with other 
sources, including Reflexionen and students’ lecture notes. I argue that several of the text’s 
peculiarities stem from Jäsche rather than Kant, but that nevertheless Jäsche largely got Kant's 
view right, with one major exceptions. Namely, Jäsche’s text fails to reproduce Kant’s key thesis 
that acquaintance [kennen] and understanding [verstehen] are jointly sufficient for cognition. 
In the Logic, there is a commonly-cited passage for understanding Kant’s conceptions of 
cognition and other mental states. Many commentators use this passage either without 
acknowledging that Kant himself did not pen the text or without investigating its fidelity to 
Kant’s thought. I aim here to begin such an investigation.23 Jäsche had access to Kant’s personal 
copy of Georg Friedrich Meier’s Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, and it is clear that he used many 
of Kant’s Reflexionen written in that book for compiling the Logik.24 For the passage in question, 
it is evident that Jäsche used Reflexion 2394.25 Here are the two passages side-by-side, through 
the relevant portions for my purposes: 
Jäsche Logic (9: 64-65) R2394 (16: 342-343, translation modified) 
In regard to the objective content of our 
cognition in general, we may think the 
following degrees, in accordance with which 
cognition can, in this respect, be graded: 
 
The first degree of cognition is: to 
represent something [sich etwas vorstellen]; 
 
The second: to represent something with 
consciousness or to perceive [wahrnehmen] 
(percipere); 
 
 
 
The following degrees are to be 
differentiated: 
 
 
 
1. to represent something [sich etwas 
vorstellen]. 
 
2. to know something [etwas wissen]. to 
represent with consciousness. (Later 
addition: to represent to oneself with 
consciousness. perceive percipere. 
apprehendere grasp: the beginning of 
percipere.) 
                         
23 See Allais 2009: 392-3n; Keller: 1999: 245n; Kitcher 2011: 19-20; McLear 2011: 5. 
24 Ameriks and Naragon 1997: xvi-iii. 
25 Adickes gives the following possible dating: 1769? 1769-70? 1764-66? 
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The third: to be acquainted with 
something [etwas kennen] (noscere), or to 
represent something [etwas] in comparison 
with other things [Dingen], according to 
both sameness [Einerleiheit] and difference 
[Verschiedenheit]; 
 
The fourth: to be acquainted with 
something with consciousness, i.e., to 
cognize [erkennen] (cognoscere). Animals 
also are acquainted with objects 
[Gegenstände], but they do not cognize 
them. 
 
 
 
 
 
The fifth: to understand [verstehen] 
something (intelligere), i.e., to cognize 
something through the understanding by 
means of concepts, or to conceive 
[concipiren]. One can conceive [Concipiren] 
much, although one cannot comprehend 
[begreifen] it, e.g., a perpetuum mobile, 
whose impossibility is shown in mechanics. 
 
3. to be acquainted with something [etwas 
kennen]. Thereby in comparison to 
differentiate from others. 
 
 
 
 
4. to understand something [etwas 
verstehen]. (Later addition: What I am 
acquainted with and understand, that I 
cognize. to be able to expound and 
communicate to others.) to cognize 
something through the understanding. (Later 
addition: concipere: to cognize through a 
concept. intelligere: through a judgment.) 
[…] 
 
There are several striking differences between the two texts, and these suggest that Jäsche took a 
bit too much liberty in compiling the Logik. Nevertheless, a careful consideration of the 
differences between the two texts, along with several other texts, will help us better understand 
Kant’s views as well as support many of Jäsche’s own modifications. Jäsche’s most puzzling 
modification is to make cognition a degree of itself. In this section, I explain how this can be 
made sense of and show how it is related to Jäsche’s additional modification of treating the 
degrees as graded in terms of objective content [objectiver Gehalt]. 
Kant’s Reflexion does not state what these degrees are of, and it includes only six 
degrees, none of which are labeled as cognition. So it is quite a significant departure for Jäsche 
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both to describe the degrees as being ones of cognition and to insert cognition as a fourth degree 
of itself. Given this, it appears that Jäsche is responsible for the confusing view that cognition is 
itself a degree of cognition. But if we limit ourselves to the above Reflexion penned by Kant, we 
are given no evidence to think of cognition either as a degree or as the overall genus of the 
degrees. Jäsche’s additions raise two important questions: (1) what did Kant himself take these 
degrees to be degree of, i.e., what is the genus of which the degrees are species? (2) how does 
cognition relate to these degrees? In this section, I limit my focus to the first of these questions, 
and I turn to the second in the next section. 
Let us consider first the textual evidence concerning what Kant might have taken to be 
the genus of the degrees. As far as I have been able to determine, there are only three other 
writings penned by Kant himself that give similar lists of degrees.26 Unfortunately, none of these 
attribute a genus to the degrees, and these lists also differ from each other in what are counted as 
degrees. In students’ notes of Kant’s lectures on logic, we find similar but nevertheless varying 
lists of degrees. There are at least six different descriptions of what the degrees are of: (1) 
“cognition” (LBl 24: 132); (2) “human cognition” (LBl 24: 134); (3) “our cognition” (LBl 24: 
136); (4) “concepts” (LPh 24: 418); (5) “distinctness” (LW 24: 845); and, (6) ‘different manners 
of representing things’ (LBu 24: 636). Thus, explicit textual evidence concerning the genus of 
the degrees is inconclusive. 
Nevertheless, Kant’s well-known Stufenleiter (A319-20/B376-7) gives us a hint for 
explaining Jäsche’s choice to characterize the degrees as being of cognition. According to the 
Stufenleiter what is distinctive about cognition is that it relates to an object. R2394 fits this 
insofar as each of the degrees it gives pertains to representing something [etwas]. In addition to 
                         
26 R 16: 81-2, 536-7, 538-9. 
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the Stufenleiter, Jäsche had access to many other passages that suggest that what is distinctive 
about cognition is its having a relation to an object.27 If Jäsche consulted these texts, he quite 
reasonably would have taken cognition in general to be a mental state or act that relates to an 
object. And since Kant’s handwritten note portrays different degrees or manners in which objects 
are represented, we can see why Jäsche might have taken their genus to be cognition. 
Furthermore, Kant’s logic textbook itself, Meier’s Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, seems a 
likely additional ground for Jäsche to treat Kant’s degrees as being of cognition. Near the 
beginning of his work, Meier treats “Vorstellung” as identical with the Latin terms 
“repraesentatio” and “perception”.28 Following this, he characterizes Erkenntnis in the following 
manner: 
Cognition (cognitio) is either an inclusive concept [Inbegriff] of many 
representations or that action whereby a representation of a thing is effected. 
One can take, without producing any notable error, representations and 
cognition to be the same. (AV §11) 
This passage likely explains not only why Jäsche might have used the notions of representation 
and cognition interchangeably but also why Kant often does so. Moreover, Kant’s handwritten 
note occurs around §140 of his copy of Meier’s Auszug, in the middle of a discussion of varying 
types of clearness and distinctness of cognition. Moreover, Meier classifies and grades cognition 
in these passages according to the manner of sophistication in which it represents an object. 
Hence, if Jäsche were to have consulted Meier’s work, he would have been given reason to take 
Kant’s own degrees as being of cognition. Finally, Christian Wolff’s Deutsche Metaphysik—a 
significant influence for Meier—treats cognition as a mental state or act that relates to an 
object.29 
                         
27 Bix-x, Bxvii-iii; R 16: 83, 85, 246, 538. 
28 Meier 1752a: §10. 
29 Wolff 1751: §278. 
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Jäsche’s recognition of the intimate tie between cognition and objects is likely the source 
of his grading the degrees according to “objective content” [objectiver Gehalt]. Although this is 
a phrase which as far as I can tell Kant himself never uses, Jäsche’s use of it seems to be on the 
right track. For unlike the Stufenleiter, Kant’s logical grading is not meant to be a categorization 
or ranking of our mental states in general; rather, it ranks only those mental states that relate to 
an object. Accordingly, whereas the Stufenleiter starts with representation in general, the Logic 
passage starts with representation of something. Although the Stufenleiter passage suggests that 
representations do not necessarily have an object—as that only comes in at the level of cognition 
in the Stufenleiter—his use of “Vorstellung” sometimes does treat representations as having 
objects merely in virtue of being representations. But again, given that Meier treats 
representations and cognition as equivalent, as well as Kant’s familiarity with Meier, this is not 
so surprising. This does not mean that Kant assumes that all representations have objective 
content; rather, it means that Kant often considers only those representations that have objective 
content. Even if the notion of objective content comes ultimately from Jäsche, it nevertheless 
seems an apt way of expressing how each higher degree in Kant’s list at R2394 presents an 
object in a more sophisticated manner than the last. 
We can now address what exactly Kant’s degrees are of and how they are graded. The 
overall list is one of mental states or acts that relate to objects, and these come in degrees insofar 
as a mental state or act can portray an object in more or less sophisticated manners. This seems 
clear enough, whether or not we want to follow Jäsche in characterizing all the degrees either as 
cognition or as having objective content. 
Although we have seen reasons why Jäsche was warranted in treating the degrees as 
being of cognition, it is still peculiar why he would add cognition itself as a fourth degree, 
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thereby making the characterization of cognition circular. Out of all of Kant’s own various lists 
of degrees and students’ lecture notes, only two list cognition [cognitio] as a distinct degree of its 
own.30 But in R2394 quoted above, Kant introduces the notion of cognition in his presentation of 
the fourth degree: “to understand something” [etwas verstehen]. This degree is represented in 
most of the various lists of degrees to be found in Kant’s Reflexionen and in students’ lecture 
notes. Kant claims in R2394 that “whatever I am acquainted with and understand, that I 
cognize”. This suggests that cognizing something is distinct from understanding something. 
Accordingly, Jäsche makes each its own degree. But he seems mistaken not only in treating 
understanding as a higher degree than cognition but also in defining the former in terms of the 
latter. For in the passage just quoted Kant defines the latter in terms of the former. Jäsche’s 
presentation makes it seem as if understanding is one special form of cognition, whereas R2394 
treats it as a condition for cognition. 
Furthermore, Jäsche’s reworking of Kant’s text fails to reproduce the claim that that 
acquaintance together with understanding suffice for cognition. This is unfortunate because that 
claim gestures at Kant’s important doctrine that cognition requires both intuition and concepts 
(A51-2/B75-6). For there is good reason to take acquaintance to occur through intuition and 
understanding to occur through concepts. To be acquainted with something [etwas kennen] is to 
represent an empirical object as identical to or different from other things, and intuition makes 
this possible insofar as identical or different characteristic marks of empirical objects are 
represented by means of intuition. To understand something [etwas verstehen] further allows for 
that thing to be distinctly represented, such that a characteristic mark of a thing is “cognized as a 
characteristic mark of the thing” (FS 2: 58). Hence to understand something is not only to 
                         
30 R 16: 81, 538. 
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represent that thing as identical to or different from other things but also to be capable of 
becoming aware of one’s reasons for such discriminations between things. Understanding in this 
sense occurs by means of concepts because an awareness of such reasons requires that one make 
judgments (FS 2: 58.27), which for Kant always use concepts. I suggest, then, that if we are to 
place cognition as a degree of its own on Kant’s list, it should come after understanding rather 
than before, as in Jäsche’s text. 
We have seen that Kant himself does not characterize cognition circularly, but rather that 
Jäsche ended up with this result in trying to flesh out Kant’s handwritten note. Jäsche correctly 
perceived both that “Erkenntnis” for Kant designates a mental state or act that relates to an object 
and that Kant’s own handwritten degrees are graded in terms of the sophistication of the manner 
in which an object is represented. Nonetheless, Jäsche’s text is misleading in two ways because it 
mistakenly treats understanding as a species of cognition, where Kant clearly maintains that 
understanding is a condition for cognition. 
2.5 Kant's Conception of Empirical Cognition in Terms of Clarity and Distinctness 
I now argue that in Kant’s stricter sense, empirical cognition is a clear and discursively 
distinct representation, where those notions are to be understood in roughly Leibnizian-Wolffian 
terms. I do so by showing how acquaintance and understanding are respectively to be understood 
in terms of clarity and distinctness. 
Let us first consider acquaintance and clarity. There are two reasons to identify 
acquaintance with clear representation. First, several of Kant’s characterizations of acquaintance 
fit the Leibnizian-Wolffian model of clarity, which requires that one be aware of something by 
differentiating it from other things.31 For example, in R2394, Kant writes that when one is 
                         
31 See R2394 as well as LBl 24: 134-5 and LPh 24: 418-9. 
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acquainted with something, one is ‘thereby to differentiate in comparison from others’.32 Second, 
this conception of acquaintance also fits Kant’s own characterizations of clarity across many 
works. For example, the Logik Blomberg and the Metaphysik Mrongovius both discuss what it 
means to represent clearly and distinctly the Milky Way and its parts (its constitutive stars).33 
When we fail to represent clearly the stars of the Milky Way—i.e., when we represent them 
“obscurely”—we fail to differentiate the stars from one another. Hence, a failure to represent 
something clearly amounts to a failure to be acquainted with that thing. Accordingly, there is 
good reason to say acquaintance and clear representation are equivalent.34 
Let us now consider understanding and distinctness. There is good textual support 
showing that distinctness is made possible by the understanding. Recall that Wolff explicitly 
grounds the capacity for distinct representations on the faculty of understanding. As exhibited in 
the Anthropology passage cited earlier, Kant too views the distinctness required for cognition as 
arising by means of three things: thought, unity of consciousness, and a rule for composition. 
The understanding, however, is responsible for all three: thought (in the form of judgment), unity 
of consciousness (in the form of apperception) and rules (in the form of concepts).35 
Furthermore, in a pre-critical essay, Kant claims that the capacity to judge, i.e., the 
                         
32 Cf. LPh 24: 418-9; LBl 24: 132-5. 
33 LBl 24: 41, 119 and MM 29: 879-80. 
34 It is important to note that Kant differs from Wolff in how clarity relates to consciousness. For Wolff, 
we are conscious of something if and only if we differentiate it from other things (GM §§729ff.). Hence, 
clarity and consciousness ultimately amount to the same thing, and Meier follows him in this 
characterization of consciousness (AV §13). But in the B-edition of the first Critique, Kant holds that a 
representation can be conscious without being clear, and he states that all clear representations are 
conscious (B414-5n.). Presumably, he has in mind here only the clear representations of human beings. 
For in some places Kant attributes clear representations to non-human animals (FS 2: 59), and there is 
evidence he denies them consciousness (MD 28: 689-90; ML2 28: 594; MM 24: 845-7; PE 29: 44-5). For 
my purposes here, empirical cognition involves clarity insofar as it involves identifying or differentiating 
objects. I leave for another occasion a more detailed discussion of Kant’s views of consciousness and its 
relation to clarity and cognition. 
35 See, respectively, A69/B94, A119, and A132/171. 
 44 
understanding, is what distinguishes us from mere animals, and his explanation appeals to the 
view that the understanding provides us with distinct representations.36 He claims that it is 
possible for non-human animals to differentiate things “physically” by having something like a 
clear representation of the characteristic marks of things. Presumably, to differentiate physically 
is to act through “instinct”, which Kant elsewhere describes as the principle of animal life and is 
the faculty for performing actions without consciousness.37 Hence, for animals to differentiate 
physically is for them to act out of non-conscious physical impulse in response to clear 
representations of the characteristic marks of things. We, in contrast, are also able to differentiate 
things “logically” with distinct representations. Kant claims that a distinct representation requires 
that a characteristic mark of a thing be cognized as a characteristic mark of the thing.38 So 
unlike animals, we can be aware of why characteristic marks differentiate things. We can do this 
because we have the capacity to judge.39 In other words, the understanding provides us with 
distinct representations. 
We have good reason, then, to interpret Kant as identifying understanding something 
with distinctly representing something. But there is an important qualification. Namely, Kant 
mentions in several places that there is both intuitive or sensible distinctness as well as 
conceptual or discursive distinctness.40 This view is distinctive because philosophers preceding 
Kant recognized only one form of distinctness, namely that which comes from the 
understanding. I here pass over what intuitive or sensible distinctness is or why Kant introduces 
                         
36 FS 2: 59-60. 
37 MD 28: 689-90. 
38 FS 2: 58, my emphasis. 
39 FS 2: 59. 
40 A 7: 135; LBl 24: 42; R1690, R1709, R1821, and R2363. 
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it. But the evidence above indicates that understanding requires discursive distinctness, i.e., a 
distinctness arising from the use of concepts in judgments. 
Let us now use the proceeding to shed light on the notion of empirical cognition. Recall 
Kant’s claim from R2394 that ‘[w]hat I am acquainted with and understand, that I cognize’. 
From this we know acquaintance and understanding are jointly sufficient for cognition. If we 
take acquaintance and understanding to give rise respectively to clarity and distinctness, the 
passage from the Anthropology suggests that acquaintance and understanding are also jointly 
necessary for empirical cognition: ‘[d]istinctness alone makes it possible that an aggregate of 
representations [which aggregate is clearly represented] becomes cognition’ (A 7: 137-8, my 
italics). If my account is correct, then a subject has empirical cognition just in case she has a 
representation that is both clear and discursively distinct—i.e., distinct by means of logical or 
conceptual differentiation. Formulated with less jargon, this means that a subject empirically 
cognizes an object just in case she identifies that object or differentiates it from other things 
(whether correctly or not) through a capacity to become aware of and express judgments 
(whether correct or not). 
2.6 Kant’s Epistemological Paradigm 
This account shows the sense in which empirical cognition counts as an epistemic 
success. Namely, it can be described as “rational sensory discrimination”: we have empirical 
cognition insofar as we discriminate between objects given through the senses and insofar as 
those discriminations are based on judgments (and hence sensitive to reasons). The significance 
of this account is that it makes explicit Kant’s epistemological paradigm. For example, we can 
understand better why his paradigm is not knowledge in the sense of justified true belief. This is 
important for three reasons. First, many Kant scholars still misleadingly use the terms 
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“knowledge” and “cognition” interchangeably.41 Doing this is especially problematic if Kant 
scholars are to make themselves clear to non-specialists. Second, although some have explicitly 
asserted that cognition is not justified true belief or noted that his Wissen is more akin to the 
notion of knowledge,42 until recently hardly any have provided a detailed account of what 
cognition consists in.43 Third, an explicit and accurate account of cognition can help us avoid 
bringing false assumptions to bear on Kant, as we shall see in Section 3.4.  
                         
41 See, for example, recent entries in The Cambridge Companion to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, 
including the following: Hogan 2010: 26; Anderson 2010: 79; and, Guyer 2010. This mistake can be 
found even in more recent works, e.g., Guyer 2013: 495-8. 
42 See George 1981: 241; Hanna 2006: 6fn.; and, Van Cleve 2003: 95. For the notion of Wissen, see 
A820-1/B848-9. 
43 See Schafer forthcoming; and, Watkins and Willaschek forthcoming. 
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Chapter 3: The Transcendental Deduction's Starting Point and Kant’s Humean Problem 
With the last chapter’s account of Kant’s notion of empirical cognition, I show in this 
chapter how the transcendental deduction of the first Critique is most plausibly read as having as 
its fundamental assumption the thesis that we have empirical cognition, and I provide evidence 
that Kant understood Hume as granting this assumption. 
In Section 1, I outline the various ways in which the secondary literature has interpreted 
Kant’s starting point. In Section 2, I turn to the text of the A- and B-editions of the 
Transcendental Deduction and show that Kant’s fundamental assumption is that we have 
empirical cognition. In Section 3, I provide evidence—partly from the eighteenth-century 
German translation of Hume’s Enquiry—that Kant read and understood Hume as granting the 
assumption that we have empirical cognition. In Section 4, I defend the interpretation advanced 
here against an objection raised by Paul Guyer. 
3.1 The Problem: What is Kant's Starting Point? 
The transcendental deduction of the first Critique, at least in the A-edition, consists of 
two intertwined strands of argument (Axvi-ii). The first strand is the objective deduction, which 
aims to show that the categories—a priori concepts including “substance”, “cause”, and 
“effect”—have “objective validity”. This would show, in effect, that we are justified in applying 
them to objects of experience. The second strand is the subjective deduction, the purpose of 
which has been a matter of scholarly debate. I focus here on the objective deduction, which Kant 
takes to achieve the essential task of the transcendental deduction. Complicating matters is that 
Kant rewrote nearly entirely the Transcendental Deduction chapter for the B-edition. 
Nevertheless, this chapter generally focuses on what is common to both editions. 
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Both editions of the Transcendental Deduction chapter share a nearly-identical first 
section, On the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction in General (A84-94/B117-129). This 
section presents an explanation of the need for a transcendental deduction (A84-92/B117-124) 
and contains a subsection, Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories (A92-
4/B124-9). In the Transition, Kant clarifies as follows his argumentative strategy for showing the 
categories have objective validity. 
The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts therefore has a principle 
toward which the entire investigation must be directed, namely this: that they 
must be recognized as a priori conditions of the possibility of experiences 
(whether of the intuition that is encountered in them, or of the thinking) 
(A94/B126, my emphasis) 
According to the principle Kant presents here, the transcendental deduction’s task of 
demonstrating the categories’ objective validity can be accomplished if those concepts are shown 
to be a priori conditions for the possibility of experiences. He provides two routes by which a 
priori concepts can be shown to be a priori conditions of the possibility of experiences: to show 
they are a priori conditions for either the intuition or the thinking encountered in experiences. 
Neither of these routes pertains to intuition or thinking generally but to intuition or thinking 
encountered in possible experiences, i.e., to either the intuitive aspect or the conceptual aspect of 
experience. 
As stated at A87/B119-20, the concepts of space and time were given a transcendental 
deduction. This refers to the Transcendental Aesthetic, which can be understood as taking the 
first route suggested in the above passage: it begins with the intuitive aspect of our experience 
(its spatiotemporal character) and shows this is possible only if space and time are a priori forms 
of our intuition. In contrast, I suggest the transcendental deduction of the categories takes the 
second route mentioned in the above passage. It demonstrates the categories’ objective validity 
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by showing they are a priori conditions for the possibility of the thinking involved in our 
experiences. 
It is possible to interpret the transcendental deduction in another way: namely, that it 
demonstrates the categories’ objective validity by showing they are a priori conditions for both 
intuition and thought encountered in experience. This might be seen in Kant’s beginning with 
“unity of intuition” in the A-edition (A99) and in his footnote in the B-edition suggesting that the 
unity of intuition is made possible by the understanding or the faculty of thought (B160-1). Even 
if the categories are shown to be a priori conditions for the unity of intuition, the transcendental 
deduction of the categories should be taken as following the second route described in the 
passage at A94/B126. This is because Kant begins each edition’s transcendental deduction by 
arguing that the basic unity had by intuition is conceptual insofar as it is made possible by the 
understanding. From A98-100, Kant argues that intuition’s unity is made possible by the 
synthesis of apprehension, an activity of the understanding. Similarly, from B129-31 he argues 
that all combination of the manifold of intuition, and with it any unity it has, cannot come from 
intuition alone but requires the understanding. These passages suggest that Kant takes the second 
route insofar as he first argues that the unity of intuition encountered in experience is made 
possible by the understanding and then goes on to argue that this activity of the understanding 
requires the categories. Hence, the categories would apply universally to all intuition 
encountered in experience.44 
This raises an important interpretive question. Across all his formulations concerning the 
strategy of the transcendental deduction, it is clear Kant consistently assumes that we have 
experience and that this experience involves thought. Ultimately, he claims that all experience 
                         
44 I am thankful to both of my reviewers at the Kantian Review for pressing me to make my interpretation 
clearer on the matters discussed in this paragraph. 
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consists in the empirical cognition of objects.45 But it is not clear whether he argues that our 
experience is a cognition of objects or whether he assumes that it is such. Taking this to be an 
open question, there are two ways Kant can be interpreted on this issue: 
(I) Kant assumes experience in a weak sense, as involving thought but not cognition 
of objects. Accordingly, the principle of the transcendental deduction is that the 
categories are to be recognized as a priori conditions for the thought encountered 
in any possible experience. 
(II) Kant assumes experience in a stronger sense, as involving not merely thought but 
also cognition of objects. Accordingly, the principle of the transcendental 
deduction is that the categories are to be recognized as a priori conditions for the 
thought contained in any cognition of objects encountered in any possible 
experience.46 
There are representatives of both of these interpretations in the secondary literature. 
Let us first consider those who hold interpretation (I), who would likely take the latter 
passage quoted above (from A94/B126) as evidence that Kant assumes that all experience 
involves thought but not necessarily cognition. I take Kant to use the verb “to think” [denken] 
and all of its derivatives almost always to refer to conceptual mental activity or judgment.47 But 
in order for proponents to make sense of the latter passage above, they would likely be 
committed to interpreting “thought” more broadly as referring to any conscious or self-conscious 
                         
45 See B147; A 7: 141; R5661; and, MM 29: 804, 816. See also instances in which Kant claims that 
experience involves both concepts and objects: A93/B126 and MM 29: 804. 
46 For other ways of dividing up possible argumentative strategies or starting points of Kant’s 
transcendental deduction, cf. Guyer 1987: 84-5; Henrich 1976/1994 and, Van Cleve 2003: 74-6. 
47 See A68-9/B93-4, B428; FS 2: 59; LBl 24: 42; MM 29: 771, 834; MV 28: 448-50; and, R2142, R2287. 
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mental activity of rational beings.48 This allows such commentators to interpret Kant’s 
argumentative strategy in terms of consciousness or self-consciousness, yielding the following 
two variants of interpretation (I): 
(IA) Kant assumes experience in the weakest sense, and the principle of the 
transcendental deduction is that the categories are to be recognized as a priori 
conditions for the consciousness encountered in any possible experience.  
(IB) Kant assumes experience in a weak sense, and the principle of the transcendental 
deduction is that the categories are to be recognized as a priori conditions for the 
possibility of self-consciousness, transcendental apperception, or empirical self-
knowledge encountered in any possible experience. 
Shared alike by both (IA) and (IB) is the denial that Kant—at least when most persuasive—
assumes that our experience involves cognition of objects. Interpreters espousing (IA) include 
Norman Kemp Smith and Robert Paul Wolff.49 Some, however, interpret Kant’s text along the 
lines of (IB) or hold that it is the most promising strategy that Kant has at his disposal. This 
perhaps characterizes most interpretations of the transcendental deduction, including those of 
Henry Allison, Jonathan Bennett, Wolfgang Carl, Paul Guyer, and Dieter Henrich.50 
A minority of commentators hold interpretation (II), including Karl Ameriks, Patricia 
Kitcher, and H. J. Paton.51 There are several reasons that have caused most interpreters to reject 
(II). One troubling matter is whether an assumption of empirical cognition could be accepted by 
                         
48 For example, concerning the notion of thought in Kant’s discussion of apperception, Bennett writes 
parenthetically that “[d]espite the word ‘think’, Kant's concern here is with representations generally” 
(1966: 104). But it seems that the view that Kant uses “thought” in such a generic sense is gradually 
fading. See, for example, Longuenesse 1998: 65-7. 
49 Kemp Smith 1918: 168, 222-3; and, Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity 1963: 93-4, 147, 159. 
50 Allison 2004: 163; Bennett 1966: 100-7; Carl 1989b: 9-11; Guyer 1987; and, Henrich 1976/1994. 
51 Ameriks 1978: 273, 282, 283, 286-7; Ameriks 2000a: 45, 55-63; Ameriks 2000b: 6-7; Kitcher 2011: 
86, 89-90, 96-7; and, Paton 1936: 329-44, 571. 
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a Humean skeptic of some sort. Ameriks recognizes that assuming we have empirical cognition 
does not seems suitable for responding to various forms of skepticism, which other interpreters 
have held that Kant aimed to refute. Although Ameriks himself thinks that this is not a problem 
for (II), interpreters who see Kant as addressing skepticism are likely not to be satisfied with 
(II).52 Second, some proponents of interpretation (I) explicitly target and reject (II). For example, 
Guyer devotes Chapter 4 of his Kant and the Claims of Knowledge to showing the untenability of 
Kant’s versions of the deduction that assume we have knowledge or cognition of objects.53 
Likewise, Carl offers various reasons for taking Kant not to assume that experience consists in 
empirical cognition.54 
Thus, one of the central issues for interpreting Kant’s transcendental deduction is 
determining whether he argues that our experience is a cognition of objects or whether he 
assumes that it is such.55 I aim, then, to provide an account of cognition that shows how Kant 
takes Hume as conceding the assumption that experience consists in empirical cognition. 
Moreover, my account also allows us to see why Guyer’s primary objection to interpretation 
(II)—an objection to which Kitcher does not respond—is not well-founded. Recognizing that 
empirical cognition amounts to rational sensory discrimination also helps us see how Kant 
assumes in the transcendental deduction that our experience consists in empirical cognition. 
 
                         
52 For commentators who see Kant’s transcendental deduction as answering at least some form of 
skepticism, see the following: Bennett 1966: 101-2; Guyer 2008: 95-107; Forster 2008: 6-12, 21-32, 40-3; 
Kitcher 1995: 293-7; and, Wolff 1963: 55-6. 
53 Guyer 1987: 91-129. 
54 Carl 1989b. 
55 With regard to synthetic a priori cognition, Kant states pure mathematics and pure physics “are 
supposed to determine their objects a priori” (Bx), and hence both would count as bodies of synthetic a 
priori cognition. The Prolegomena’s analytic method assumes the actuality of such synthetic a priori (4: 
279; cf. 4: 263, 4: 276 fn.). I interpret the first Critique’s synthetic method as assuming only empirical 
cognition, and on this basis the supposed synthetic a priori cognition of pure mathematic and pure physics 
will later be shown to be actual. 
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3.2 Interpreting Kant’s Starting Points 
As we have seen, many prominent commentators have taken Kant’s fundamental starting 
point in the transcendental deduction to be consciousness or some form of self-consciousness, 
from which starting point he later derives that we have empirical cognition. In this section, I 
show that the text of both the A- and B-editions of the first Critique more plausibly supports 
interpreting Kant as starting with the more basic assumption that we have empirical cognition. 
Although Kant conceives of empirical cognition as having both consciousness and a form 
of self-consciousness (namely, transcendental apperception) as necessary conditions, his primary 
arguments in the Transcendental Deduction chapters begin with the assumption that we have 
empirical cognition.56 
3.2.1 A-Edition Evidence 
In the A-edition, Kant presents what seem to be two versions of the objective deduction, 
the so-called “argument from above” and “argument from below”. Let us consider each in turn. 
Kant begins the argument from above as follows: 
Now if we wish to follow the inner ground of this connection of representations 
up to that point in which they must all come together in order first to obtain 
unity of cognition for a possible experience, then we must begin with pure 
apperception. All intuitions are nothing for us [für uns nichts] and do not in the 
least concern us [gehen uns nicht im mindesten etwas an] if they cannot be taken 
up into consciousness, whether they influence it directly or indirectly, and 
through this alone is cognition possible. (A116, my italics) 
On a cursory reading, it might seem as if this passage supports interpreting Kant as starting from 
the assumption that we have self-consciousness, namely pure apperception. But that semblance is 
mistaken, for Kant claims ‘we must begin with pure apperception’ if we want to know what’s 
                         
56 Edgar 2010 interprets the transcendental deduction not as an argument but rather as an explanation. If 
that is indeed the best way to interpret the transcendental deduction, I would maintain that Kant attempts 
to explain the categories’ objective validity by means of an investigation starting with the fact that we 
have empirical cognition. 
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necessary for the ‘unity of cognition for a possible experience’. Kant claims that pure 
apperception is a necessary condition for cognition, and this suggests that he assumes we have 
cognition. This is reinforced by how he continues: intuitions must be ‘taken up into 
consciousness’ for cognition to be possible; otherwise, they ‘are nothing for us’. There is much 
evidence that representations being “nothing for us” or “nothing for me” means for Kant that 
they fail to count as cognition or objects of cognition. This is most explicit in a letter from 1789 
to Markus Herz: 
if intuitions (of objects of appearance) did not agree with these conditions, those 
objects would be nothing for us [für uns nichts], that is, not objects of cognition 
at all (Br 11: 51, my italics).57 
The ending of the argument from above also indicates that Kant’s starting assumption is that we 
have cognition: 
Now since this relation of appearances to possible experience is likewise 
necessary (since without it we could not obtain any cognition at all through them, 
and they would thus not concern us at all [sie uns mithin gar nichts angingen]), 
it follows that the pure understanding, by means of the categories, is a formal 
and synthetic principle of all experiences, and that appearances have a necessary 
relation to the understanding. (A119, my italics) 
Here, Kant parenthetically remarks that the relation of appearances to possible experience is 
necessary because otherwise neither would we have cognition nor would appearances concern us 
(presumably, Kant does not draw a distinction between not concerning us and being nothing for 
us). So again, the text indicates that Kant’s basic assumption is that we have empirical cognition. 
Kant begins his so-called ‘argument from below’ with the following: 
Now we will set the necessary connection of the understanding with the 
appearances by means of the categories before our eyes by beginning from 
beneath, namely with what is empirical. The first thing that is given to us is 
appearance, which, if it is combined with consciousness, is called perception 
(without the relation to an at least possible consciousness appearance could 
                         
57 Other uses of this or similar phrases can be found in numerous places, including A105, A111, A116, 
A119-20; B131-2; PRO 4: 336; UE 8: 249; R4634, R4681, R5461; N 23: 19. 
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never become an object of cognition for us [würde Erscheinung für uns niemals 
ein Gegenstand der Erkenntnis werden können], and would therefore be nothing 
for us [für uns nichts], and since it has no objective reality in itself and exists 
only in cognition it would be nothing at all). (A119-120, my italics) 
The argument from below seems to begin with the assumption that our experience consists in 
appearances, as Kant claims ‘[t]he first thing that is given to us is appearance’. Kant then notes 
that he is concerned with appearances insofar as they are combined with consciousness, i.e., with 
what he calls ‘perceptions’. Hence, this might further seem to support interpreting Kant as 
beginning with the assumption that we have consciousness. 
These semblances are misleading. Kant begins the argument from below with 
appearances or perceptions because his argumentative strategy is to assume we have empirical 
cognition, which itself requires perceptions.58 There are several reasons for preferring this 
interpretation. First, Kant’s parenthetical remark explains why perceptions—in the sense of 
appearances combined with consciousness—are worthy of being examined for his present 
purposes. An appearance without consciousness—i.e., one that is not a perception—would be 
‘nothing for us’ because it ‘could never become an object of cognition for us’. For this reason, 
appearances without consciousness are not of present interest. 
One might still take this passage as beginning with the assumption that we have 
perception. But if that were so, I can see no reason why Kant would have included this 
parenthetical remark. More importantly, better sense is made of how the arguments from above 
and from below cohere if we interpret Kant’s primary assumption as being that we have 
empirical cognition, rather than the assumption that we have consciousness or perceptions. For 
we already saw evidence that Kant begins the argument from above by assuming we have 
empirical cognition. And in beginning each of the arguments, he sets aside what is ‘nothing for 
                         
58 Cf. R2394, R2836, LW 24: 845-7, LJ 9: 64-5. 
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us’ to consider what is relevant for empirical cognition. Finally, with my interpretation of 
empirical cognition, we can see why Kant is able to offer both an argument from above and an 
argument from below. For on this interpretation, empirical cognition requires both a higher 
cognitive faculty for discriminating between objects (the understanding) and material given by a 
lower cognitive faculty (perceptions). This makes it possible for Kant to assume that we have 
empirical cognition and then to carry out on the basis of this assumption two arguments: one 
investigating the conditions for the higher cognitive faculty (the argument from above) and the 
other investigating the conditions for being given material from which that higher cognitive 
faculty can make discriminations of objects (the argument from below). 
If one were to interpret the argument from below’s primary assumption as being that we 
have perceptions, then it is hard to see how the arguments from above and from below are 
supposed to cohere. But if we take the assumption of perception as being based on the deeper 
assumption that we have empirical cognition, then a more unified account of the two arguments 
is possible. Hence, the argument from below’s appearance of assuming that we have 
consciousness or perceptions is explained by Kant’s concern with the necessary conditions of 
cognition, one of which is consciousness. 
So far, I have shown that the arguments from above and below are more plausibly read as 
beginning with an assumption of empirical cognition, rather than an assumption of self-
consciousness or consciousness. One could object to my reading of these passages by claiming 
that even if these passages show that Kant relies on the thesis that we have empirical cognition, 
Kant nevertheless arrives at this thesis by means of other more fundamental assumptions and 
argumentation. I, however, cannot find any place in the arguments from above or below in which 
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Kant offers an argument with the conclusion that we have empirical cognition based on the 
alternative assumptions of self-consciousness or consciousness.  
Consider first the possibility that in the A-edition Kant offers an argument for empirical 
cognition based on the assumption that we have consciousness. The best place to find such an 
argument would likely be the earlier subjective deduction. In fact, Robert Paul Wolff, who 
advances the interpretation that Kant’s fundamental assumption is that we have consciousness, 
finds that the subjective deduction is essential to understanding the transcendental deduction’s 
argument for the categories’ objective validity.59 But the subjective deduction does not begin 
with the assumption of consciousness. Kant’s first mention of ‘consciousness’ comes only in the 
third stage of the subjective deduction (A103), and this indicates that Kant did not assume in the 
earlier stages anything about consciousness. Furthermore, Kant introduces the subjective 
deduction as an investigation preparing the reader for the transcendental deduction’s ‘deep 
penetration into the primary grounds of the possibility of our cognition in general’ (A98, my 
emphasis). Thus, Kant’s primary concern in the subjective deduction is cognition and not 
consciousness. 
Consider now the possibility that the A-edition offers an argument for empirical 
cognition based on the assumption that we have some form of self-consciousness. This is 
implausible because Kant first introduces a notion of self-consciousness in his argument that we 
have transcendental apperception because it is a necessary condition for empirical cognition 
(A106-7). Hence, the assumption of cognition is more fundamental than one of self-
consciousness. Now it might be thought that the B-edition gives evidence to the contrary. I now 
                         
59 Wolff 1963: 80. 
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turn to that evidence and show that it can be plausibly read as indicating that Kant’s deeper 
assumption is that we have empirical cognition. 
3.2.2 B-Edition Evidence 
The following passage is often read as evidence that Kant’s starting point in the 
transcendental deduction is transcendental apperception:60 
The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise 
something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is 
as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or else at 
least would be nothing for me [für mich nichts]. (B131-2, my italics) 
It is often overlooked that Kant’s first proposition here—that the “I think” must be able to 
accompany all my representations—is supported by an argument. Kant’s argument is that this 
proposition must be true or else some of my representations ‘could not be thought at all’, and 
such representations would ‘be impossible’ or ‘at least would be nothing for me’. Although this 
argument blatantly seems to be about the nature of representations in general, or at least ‘my’ 
representations, I shall argue that it is better made sense of by interpreting Kant as assuming both 
that we have cognition and that cognition requires thought. 
Consider first the following claim from the above passage: if it is not necessary that the “I 
think” be able to accompany all my representations, then ‘something would be represented in me 
that could not be thought at all’. This means that Kant treats transcendental apperception as a 
necessary condition for thought,61 where ‘thought’ is to be understood for Kant—as evidenced 
by the earlier metaphysical deduction (A69/B94)—as a mental activity that applies concepts in 
judgments. 
                         
60 Allison 2004: 163; Bennett 1966: 100-7; Carl 1989: 17-9; Henrich 1976/1994: 71-4; and, Merritt 2009: 
63. 
61 Cf. A103-7; MM 29: 888-9. 
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Consider now Kant’s next claim: the representing of something in me without thought is 
equivalent to that representation’s being either ‘impossible’ or ‘nothing for me’. If we read this 
passage in isolation, then it seems that Kant refers here to either representations in general or 
representations in me. Neither interpretation is plausible. First, if we consider representations in 
general, then we must note that Kant himself describes animals as having representations but 
neither transcendental apperception nor thought.62 Hence, Kant holds that it is not only possible 
but actual that there are representations without thought. Of course such representations without 
thought might in some sense be ‘nothing for me’, but this would not ground an argument for the 
claim that it is necessary for “I think” to be able to accompany all my representations. Second, 
consider representations in me. Kant admits that human beings have unconscious 
representations, so this makes it likely that he holds it to be possible that a representation is in me 
without being thought.63 Perhaps then Kant means to talk about only those representations in me 
that are not ‘nothing for me’. But what exactly does that mean? As I have already pointed out 
above, there is evidence that Kant describes representations as ‘nothing for me’ when those 
representations are not part of cognition. This suggests, then, that the above passage ought to be 
taken as pertaining to cognition. 
Accordingly, let me now show how the passage can be made understandable by 
interpreting Kant as having in mind empirical cognition. Recall that Kant’s argument runs as 
follows. If it were not the case that the “I think” must be able to accompany my representations, 
then there would be a representation in me that could not be thought. But such a representation—
                         
62 For evidence that animals lack understanding or thought, see FS 2: 59-60; KU 5: 464; MD 28: 689-90; 
ML1 28: 276; MM 29: 878-9, 906-7; MV 28: 448-50. For evidence that they lack transcendental 
apperception, see A 7: 127 and MM 29: 878-9. 
63 This is suggested by A319-20/B376-7 and MD28: 702, and it is stated explicitly at A 7: 135 and MM 
29: 879-80. 
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one in me that could not be thought—is either impossible or nothing for me. On my 
interpretation, we can make sense of why Kant offers this disjunction. Namely consider whether 
the representation in question—the one in me but not able to be thought—counts as cognition or 
not. First, suppose this representation counts as a cognition. Such a representation is impossible, 
as my account of empirical cognition shows. For, insofar as empirical cognition requires 
discursive distinctness, it requires thought, i.e., judgments that apply concepts. Second, suppose 
the representation in question does not count as cognition. As we have seen, Kant describes 
representations as ‘nothing for me’ to indicate that a representation does not contribute to 
cognition. And accordingly, Kant states the same about the representation in question here: if it 
does not count as cognition, then it is nothing for me. 
As we have just seen, interpreting Kant as assuming we have cognition makes sense of 
his claim that a representation that is not thought is either impossible or nothing for me. On this 
interpretation, the opening of §16 aims to show that cognition has as its necessary condition 
transcendental apperception. Kant shows this by relying on the theses that cognition requires 
thought and that thought requires transcendental apperception. 
Given this reading of the opening of §16, we can understand better why it is preceded by 
the remarks of §15, in which Kant discusses ‘the possibility of a combination in general’. Kant 
discusses this because he is assuming that all our experience involves the combination of a 
manifold, and it is natural for him to make this assumption if he understands experience in terms 
of empirical cognition. For as interpreted here, empirical cognition requires bringing diverse 
representations together to compare, connect, and judge them. And if we understand Kant to be 
considering this type of combination, then we see why it is not a non sequitur for him to argue as 
follows: 
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Yet the combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to us 
through the senses, and therefore cannot already be contained in the pure form 
of sensible intuition; for it is an act of spontaneity of the power of representation, 
and, since one must call the latter understanding, in distinction from sensibility, 
all combination […] is an action of the understanding, which we would 
designate with the general title synthesis (B129-30, my italics). 
It might seem as if a combination of a manifold obviously does come to us through the senses 
sometimes, e.g., when I receive a diverse array of sensory impressions all at once in the same 
spatial field. But Kant is not referring to such minimal combination; rather, he is concerned with 
our capacity to represent things ‘as combined in the object’ (B130). And he is concerned with 
this insofar as he assumes we have cognition. For cognition requires we identify and differentiate 
objects on the basis of marks possessed by those objects. 
If the combination under concern in §15 is the one involved in cognition so understood, 
we can see why it requires ‘an act of spontaneity’ from the understanding. For cognition requires 
not merely the passive intake of representations but also the capacity to be aware of one’s 
grounds for discriminating objects, and this requires that a subject possess a faculty of 
understanding through which she can give and evaluate reasons for her judgments. Such acts of 
judgment come from the subject herself and hence are spontaneous rather than passive. 
The opening passages of §§15-6 are the strongest support for reading the B-edition’s 
deduction as beginning by assuming we have transcendental apperception. I have shown these 
passages are more plausibly read as providing an argument—or at least the outline of one—
moving from the assumption that we have empirical cognition to the thesis that transcendental 
apperception is required for cognition. 
3.2.3 Summary of the Textual Evidence for Kant’s Starting Assumption 
In this section, I have canvassed the passages in the text of the Transcendental Deduction 
chapters in which Kant indicates his starting assumptions for the objective deduction. Each such 
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passage is most plausibly read as indicating that Kant’s fundamental assumption is that we have 
empirical cognition, rather than some form of self-consciousness or consciousness. 
3.3 Cognition and the Humean Problem 
In this section, we are not concerned with what Hume actually thought but rather with 
how Kant understood Hume, whether correctly or not, and with how he might have taken himself 
to have responded to Hume. In the Prolegomena, Kant claims the first Critique is ‘the 
elaboration of the Humean problem in its greatest possible amplification’ (4: 261). Ultimately, 
Kant saw Hume as challenging not merely our knowledge of causality but the possibility of 
synthetic a priori cognition in general (4: 277). Accordingly, we can call “the Humean Problem” 
the question whether we have cognition of synthetic a priori principles that ground our 
experience. Synthetic a priori cognition expresses the transcendental conditions necessary for the 
possibility of experience.64 Given my interpretation of empirical cognition, synthetic a priori 
cognition expresses the conditions that make possible empirical cognition, i.e., that make 
possible rational sensory discrimination. Since the transcendental deduction is an essential part 
of Kant’s answer to the question of the possibility of synthetic a priori cognition, it seems he 
ought to have used premises he would have taken Hume to concede. 
There are reasons to think that Kant would have interpreted Hume as conceding that we 
have empirical cognition. It is known that Kant was more familiar with Hume’s Enquiry than the 
Treatise, despite some acquaintance with the latter via Beattie, Hamann, and Tetens.65 Despite 
this acknowledgment, little emphasis has been given in the secondary literature to the German 
translation of Hume’s Enquiry that Kant read. The German translation was edited by Johann 
                         
64 See Kant’s characterizations of synthetic a priori cognition or principles at A156-8/B195-7 and PRO 4: 
313. 
65 See Wolff 1960 and Beiser 2002: 45-7. 
 63 
Georg Sulzer and was based on the second edition of Hume’s work.66 The second edition’s title 
was Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding, and the translation of this title is 
noteworthy: Philosophische Versuche über die Menschliche Erkenntniß. The translated title 
replaces understanding (Verstand) with cognition (Erkenntnis), and this suggests the Hume read 
by Kant was expressly concerned with cognition. 
We have, moreover, reasons to think Kant read Hume as granting that we have empirical 
cognition. In Essay 4 of the Enquiry, Hume presents his skeptical challenge about causality. A 
key claim Kant would have read in the German translation is the following: 
Hume’s 1751 Original 1755 German Translation 
I SHALL venture to affirm, as a general 
Proposition, which admits of no Exception, 
that the Knowledge of this Relation of Cause 
and Effect is not, in any Instance, attain’d by 
Reasoning a priori; but arises entirely from 
Experience, when we find, that particular 
Objects are constantly conjoin’d with each 
other. (1751: 50) 
Ich will erkühnen, als einen allgemeinen 
Satz, welcher keine Ausnahme zuläßt, zu 
behaupten, daß diese Erkenntniß der 
Ursache und Wirkung in keinem einzigen 
Beyspiele, durch Vernunftschlüsse a priori 
erlanget werde; sondern gänzlich aus der 
Erfahrung herkomme, kraft deren wir finden, 
daß besondere Gegenstände beständig, einer 
mit dem andern vereiniget  sind. (1755: 68, 
my emphasis) 
Kant was often not a close reader of other philosophers’ texts, and I suggest passages such as the 
above could have been read by Kant as admissions by Hume that we have empirical cognition of 
cause and effect. Perhaps Kant might not have understood Hume’s use of “Erkenntnis” as 
equivalent to the strict sense of empirical cognition presented above. In whatever way Kant 
understood Hume to use the notion of cognition, passages such as the above match Kant’s 
understanding of Hume’s specific challenge about cognition. The Prolegomena states that Hume 
did not question whether the concept of cause is right, useful, or indispensable for cognition of 
nature (4: 258-9). Rather, the challenge is to determine the sources of our cognition in general, 
                         
66 For more information about the publication, editing, and translation of Hume’s Enquiry, see Kuehn 
2005: 106-7. 
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including that of cause and effect. The above passage suggests that this is Hume’s concern, since 
in it Hume denies that rational inferences a priori are the source of our cognition of cause and 
effect. Later, Hume extends this by claiming that the source of our experience of cause and effect 
is also not the understanding.67 Kant’s “Humean Problem”, then, is that our empirical 
cognition—particularly of cause and effect, but also more generally—does not have a priori 
sources in the understanding or reason. 
Kant’s assumption of empirical cognition is well-suited for responding to this challenge. 
This is because Kant likely understood Hume as granting each of the two components of my 
definition of cognition. Recall first that cognition requires a subject discriminate between 
objects. Throughout Hume’s presentation of his skeptical doubts, he admits our experience is of 
objects [Dinge or Gegenstände]. Of course, in using the term “objects”, Hume is not committed 
to the existence of anything mind-independent. Likewise, although for Kant empirical cognition 
is of objects, this does not mean that those objects are mind-independent. Hume also grants that 
objects of experience are connected and combined in time through laws of association. This 
would seem to require that such objects are identified and differentiated from one another, as 
occurs with Kant’s empirical cognition. This can be seen by considering Hume’s treatment of 
causality in terms of constant conjunction. Hume admits that we do find particular objects are 
constantly conjoined with others. For us to do this, we must recognize that the first set of objects 
are the same in some way, that the second set of objects are likewise the same in some way, and 
finally that the two sets of objects are different in some way. Thus, Hume’s analysis of causality 
requires that he grant us the ability to identify and differentiate objects, i.e., to be acquainted with 
objects or to represent them clearly. 
                         
67 1755: 78. 
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Hume also seems to be committed to holding that we can become aware of the judgments 
on the basis of which we treat objects as the same or different. This is a pretty minimal 
requirement. For it requires only that a subject be capable of judging why things seem to her to 
be the same or different, and it does not matter whether or not those judgments are correct, i.e., it 
does not matter whether a subject is justified. It would be implausibly extreme for Hume to deny 
that we have such capacities, and in fact he himself notes that we are capable of giving reasons 
for believing matters of fact.68 Hence, Hume also can be read as granting us the ability to 
understand objects or to represent them distinctly. 
We have good reason, then, to think Kant would have taken Hume to grant that we have 
empirical cognition. If this is correct, then we should take more seriously the possibility that the 
transcendental deduction is capable of responding to skeptical challenges, a reading that has been 
repeatedly challenged in Kant scholarship.69 My interpretation of empirical cognition and 
examination of Kant’s understanding of Hume provides evidence that the argument can respond 
to at least one particular skeptical challenge, “the Humean problem”. 
3.4 Response to Guyer 
To finish my case for interpretation (II), I respond in this section to an objection raised by 
Paul Guyer in Kant and the Claims of Knowledge and restated in his most recent essay on the 
transcendental deduction.70 As far as I can tell, no adherent of interpretation (II) has responded to 
this important objection. 
Guyer’s objection applies to both the metaphysical deduction by itself and to any version 
of the transcendental deduction beginning with the assumption that we have empirical cognition 
                         
68 1755: 67-8. 
69 Most notably by Ameriks 1978 and Engstrom 1994. 
70 Guyer 1987: 98, 128-9; 2010: 128. 
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of objects. It runs as follows: even if empirical knowledge or cognition requires some of the 
logical forms of judgment, it is not clear why it should require all the logical forms of judgment. 
More specifically, although the categorical form of judgment might be necessary for “[t]he 
possibility of empirical knowledge understood as combination of representations”, it is not clear 
why either the hypothetical or disjunctive forms of judgment are necessary for such 
knowledge.71 This is because the categorical form of judgment is necessary for “judgments 
which link particular representations which are not themselves judgments”, whereas “the 
hypothetical and disjunctive forms of judgment link only other judgments, not particular 
representations themselves”.72 
To see why Guyer’s objection is misguided, I shall first make clear how Guyer 
mistakenly assumes that cognition is something along the lines of justified true belief. Guyer 
takes empirical cognition as individuated in terms of individual judgments or propositions, i.e., 
he identifies cognition with a single judgment. But this is a mistake, as my account makes clear. 
As explained above, cognition need not be belief because cognition is primarily of objects rather 
than propositions or judgments. To be sure, cognition of an object requires that a subject make 
judgments, e.g., judgments of similarity or difference between objects, as well as of wherein 
similarities or differences lie. But cognition of an object ought not to be identified with any 
single judgment; rather, to cognize an object requires a plurality of interconnected judgments. 
For example, for my friend Victoria to cognize me, she must not only make a judgment such as 
“this is Curtis” but others such as “Curtis has freckles” and “that [other person or thing] is not 
Curtis because it does not have freckles”. Moreover, since cognition requires she be able to 
become aware of her reasons for identifying or differentiating things, she must link her judgment 
                         
71 Guyer 1987: 128. 
72 Ibid. 
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“this is Curtis” with judgments that provide her with such reasons, e.g., “this has freckles”, “this 
has brown hair, “that does not have freckles”, and so on. 
We can now see why Guyer’s objection is misguided. Guyer holds that, because they link 
judgments together rather than particular representations, it is not clear why hypothetical and 
disjunctive—unlike the categorical—forms of judgment are necessary for cognition. Guyer 
implicitly assumes cognition is to be identified with a single judgment that combines particular 
representations, which is a natural assumption to make if one is treating cognition as something 
like justified true belief. But cognition requires multiple interconnected judgments, and not just a 
single belief, let alone one that is true.73 Hence, Guyer is too quick in thinking the hypothetical 
and disjunctive forms of judgment are not necessary for cognition. 
I have only claimed that cognition requires judgments be linked with one another, and I 
have not shown why cognition requires judgments be linked specifically in hypothetical and 
disjunctive forms. But by showing this, Guyer’s critical thought becomes less of an objection and 
more of a demand for further explanation: given cognition requires judgments be linked to one 
another, why does cognition require judgments be linked by means of hypothetical and 
disjunctive forms?74 
3.5 Summary 
In this chapter, I hope to have accomplished three tasks: (i) to show that the text of the 
transcendental deduction is most plausibly read as using that assumption as its starting point; (ii) 
to clarify how an assumption of such cognition is one that Kant could have legitimately made in 
                         
73 This is so even if a single cognition is to be identified with a single judgment, as Kant affirms at 20: 
266. 
74 An answer to this question does not commit Kant to the absurd position that any particular use of a 
particular logical form of judgment always involves the application of the corresponding category. Henry 
Allison (2004: 150) and Béatrice Longuenesse (1998: 78) have explained why this objection of Guyer’s is 
mistaken. 
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responding to what he understands as the Humean Problem; and, (iii) to respond to Guyer’s main 
objection to the interpretation I have defended.  
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Chapter 4: The Subjective Deduction and Kant’s Copernican Revolution 
In the preface to the A-edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant distinguishes 
between subjective and objective sides of the transcendental deduction (Axvi-ii). The distinction 
between these two sides has remained obscure, as indicated by the lack of consensus in the 
secondary literature concerning the nature of the subjective deduction. My contributions here are 
twofold. First, I provide much-needed desiderata for a satisfactory interpretation of the subjective 
deduction. Second, I provide a new interpretation that meets these desiderata. Namely, the 
subjective deduction is an elucidation of the objective deduction’s starting assumption that our 
cognition requires thought or understanding, and this elucidation serves to help the reader to 
understand Kant’s Copernican Revolution—the hypothesis that objects must conform to our 
cognition rather than the other way around—as it applies to the faculty of understanding. This 
prepares the reader for Kant’s extension of this revolution in his objective deduction. 
4.1 Importance of Interpreting the Subjective Deduction 
The standard view of the subjective deduction identifies it with Kant’s discussion of the 
“threefold synthesis”, which can be understood roughly as ways in which the mind processes 
what is given to us through our senses. This activity is threefold insofar as it: 
(i) runs through and gathers together the representations of a manifold of intuition 
(“the synthesis of apprehension in the intuition”); 
(ii) reproduces (in accordance with rules of association) both past representations of 
present objects as well as past representations with which those objects are 
associated (“the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination”); and, 
(iii) brings representations under concepts for a cognitive subject to recognize both 
that the reproductions of representations are the same as what they reproduce and 
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that such representations are connected in certain ways (“the synthesis of 
recognition in the concept”). 
The threefold synthesis has a peculiar status in Kant scholarship. One the one hand, some 
scholars understand the threefold synthesis as crucial for Kant’s aims in the transcendental 
deduction. Despite Kant’s claim that the subjective deduction is inessential for showing the 
objective validity of the categories, some scholars hold it to be a more illuminating or persuasive 
argument than the objective deduction proper in either edition’s Transcendental Deduction 
chapter.75 Even more extreme, Nathan Bauer holds that Kant himself understood the discussion 
of the threefold synthesis as constituting the objective deduction rather than the subjective one.76 
On the other hand, most scholars downplay the importance of the threefold synthesis and 
the subjective deduction. For most examine primarily the B-edition’s Transcendental Deduction 
chapter, which contains no discussion of the threefold synthesis. Moreover, there is skepticism 
about the status of the threefold synthesis, as it seems to indulge in a “transcendental 
psychology”, the highly speculative nature of which transgresses Kant’s own critical spirit. 
Finally, recent scholarship has approached the subjective deduction and the threefold 
synthesis in provocative and interesting ways.77 Despite this, further work is still needed to 
provide a satisfying interpretation of the subjective deduction. I show why this is so in the next 
two sections, in which I first provide desiderata for a satisfactory interpretation of the subjective 
deduction and then show how the secondary literature fails to satisfy the desiderata. 
 
 
                         
75 See especially Wolff 1967. 
76 Bauer 2010. 
77 Most notably Dyck 2008. 
 71 
4.2 Desiderata for a Satisfactory Interpretation 
In the preface to the A edition, Kant writes the following concerning the Transcendental 
Deduction chapter: 
This inquiry, which goes rather deep, has two sides. One side refers to the objects 
of the pure understanding, and is supposed to demonstrate and make 
comprehensible the objective validity of its concepts a priori; thus it belongs 
essentially to my ends. The other side deals with the pure understanding itself, 
concerning its possibility and the powers of cognition on which it itself rests; 
thus it considers it in a subjective relation, and although this exposition is of 
great importance in respect of my chief end [Hauptzwecks], it does not belong 
essentially to it; because the chief question [Hauptfrage] always remains: “What 
and how much can understanding and reason cognize free of all experience? and 
not: “How is the faculty of thinking itself possible?” Since the latter question 
is something like the search for the cause of a given effect, and is therefore 
something like a hypothesis (although, as I will elsewhere take the opportunity 
to show, this is not in fact how matters stand), it appears as if I am taking the 
liberty in this case of expressing an opinion, and that the reader might therefore 
be free to hold another opinion. In view of this I must remind the reader in 
advance that even in case my subjective deduction does not produce the 
complete conviction that I expect, the objective deduction that is my primary 
concern would come into its full strength, on which what is said at pages [A] 92-
93 should even be sufficient by itself." (Axvi-ii) 
I shall now summarize the many interesting and odd claims made in the above passage 
concerning the subjective deduction. Kant writes that the objective deduction aims to 
demonstrate and make comprehensible the objective validity of the categories (Axvi-xvii). The 
subjective deduction, in contrast, aims to explain how the pure understanding or faculty of 
thought is possible. He claims that this latter aim is not essential for his chief goals, which are 
twofold: first, to demonstrate that the categories have objective validity; and, second, to show 
that they provide cognition only within the limited realm of experience. Kant then makes two 
remarks concerning the method or procedure of the subjective deduction. First, it is to be carried 
out by considering the understanding “subjectively”, i.e., by considering how the understanding 
rests on various powers of cognition. Second, he compares the subjective deduction to “the 
search for the cause of a given effect”, making it “something like a hypothesis”. 
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Kant then raises the concern that this might be received poorly. Namely, it might seem to 
the reader as if he is offering merely an opinion. As such, Kant recognizes that he might “not 
produce the complete conviction that [he] expect[s]”. On its own, Kant’s earlier admission that 
the subjective deduction is inessential for his chief goals makes it puzzling why he included it in 
the Transcendental Deduction chapter. But this additional remark makes its inclusion even more 
puzzling. If the subjective deduction might give the appearance of being merely hypothetical or 
an opinion, and if it is not essential for his purposes, then it seems that Kant would have been 
better off not including it. But Kant claims that these issues will be addressed, as he states that he 
will elsewhere show that the subjective deduction is not in fact hypothetical. Likewise he claims 
that A92-93 should suffice to ensure that the objective deduction “would come into its full 
strength”, thereby producing the requisite conviction in the reader. 
These are Kant’s only explicit remarks concerning the subjective deduction, so a 
satisfactory interpretation ought to make sense of them all, meeting the following desiderata: 
(D1) To clarify what it means to explain how a faculty, and specifically the 
understanding, is possible. 
(D2) To explain the sense in which the inquiry is “subjective” and count’s as (being a 
side of) a “deduction”. 
(D3) To specify Kant’s assumptions and method for carrying out the subjective 
deduction, and thereby to explain why the subjective deduction is (i) “like the 
search for the cause of a given effect”; (ii) “like a hypothesis”; and, (iii) 
something seeming like an opinion. 
(D4) To account for how Kant attempts to remedy the apparent problems resulting 
from the method described by the Third Desideratum. 
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(D5) To explain why the subjective deduction’s aim or goal is inessential yet 
nevertheless of interest to Kant in the Transcendental Deduction chapter. 
4.3 Outline of the Objective Deduction 
To set up my view of the subjective deduction, I need to explain how I interpret the 
objective deduction. I hold that Kant assumes for the objective deduction that all experience 
consists in empirical cognition of objects and that this requires thought from the faculty of 
understanding. Let me note the following two considerations in support of this perhaps 
contentious interpretation of the objective deduction. 
First, in the A edition, Kant clearly describes the objective deduction as assuming that our 
experience is one of objects: 
Passage A 
[C]oncepts of objects in general lie at the ground of all experiential cognition as 
a priori conditions; consequently the objective validity of the categories, as a 
priori concepts, rests on the fact that through them alone is experience possible 
(as far as the form of thinking is concerned). (A93/B126) 
Accordingly, he prefaces the argument of the threefold synthesis in the A edition, which 
argument seems to pertain to experience in a quite minimal sense, by describing what is 
necessary for cognition (A97).  
Second, in both editions, Kant presents his argumentative strategy for the objective 
deduction in the “Transition” section of the Transcendental Deduction chapter (a passage to 
which he refers the reader in his explicit remarks concerning the subjective deduction). Although 
I cannot go into detailed textual analysis here, I provide the following reconstruction of the 
argument outline provided in the Transition: 
(OD1) All experience—empirical cognition of objects—is possible only if the objects 
given by intuition are thought by means of concepts. 
 74 
(OD2) The categories are a priori conditions for the thought of the objects given by 
intuition.78 
(OD3) Therefore, the categories have objective validity. [OD1-OD2] 
4.4 Preview of My Interpretation 
Although my interpretation agrees with the standard view in identifying the discussion of 
the threefold synthesis as the subjective deduction, it is nevertheless original regarding its point. 
Namely, I argue that its point is twofold. First, it elucidates the objective deduction’s starting 
assumption that our cognition requires the faculty of the understanding. The subjective deduction 
elucidates this by showing that our cognitive relation to objects is made possible only by means 
of a spontaneous synthesis of representations carried out through conceptual and judgmental 
activities of the understanding. By means of this elucidation, Kant hopes to help his reader 
understand his Copernican Revolution as it applies to the faculty of understanding. This 
revolution was already illustrated in the Transcendental Aesthetic, but its scope there was limited 
to human sensibility and its pure intuitions of space and time. The transcendental deduction 
begins Kant’s extension of this revolution to the understanding and its concepts. The subjective 
deduction prepares the reader for Kant’s extension of this revolution in two ways. On the one 
hand, the subjective deduction shows why we ought not to take our thought or cognition as 
conforming to objects inasmuch as the objects of our cognition do not come prepackaged for 
thought and cognition. On the other hand, it shows why we must take objects as conforming to 
                         
78 See especially the following from A94/B126: “The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts 
therefore has a principle toward which the entire investigation must be directed, namely this: that they 
must be recognized as a priori conditions of the possibility of experiences (whether of the intuition that is 
encountered in them, or of the thinking). Concepts that supply the objective ground of the possibility of 
experience are necessary just for that reason.” 
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our thought and cognition inasmuch as the understanding is required to constitute objects for 
cognition by means of an epistemically prior spontaneous synthesis. 
This elucidation of the Copernican Revolution in the subjective deduction helps prepare 
the way for the objective deduction because the latter extends the Copernican Revolution by 
advancing the stronger claim that the synthesis required for constituting objects of cognition 
must involve a priori concepts, the categories. With my interpretation, we can see why Kant 
thought it helpful but inessential to include the subjective deduction in the A edition. Moreover, I 
shall suggest how §15 of the B-edition is meant to prepare the reader in a similar way as the A-
edition’s subjective deduction, showing that the Transcendental Deduction chapters of the two 
editions are more alike than commonly thought. 
4.5 Identification and Outline of the Subjective Deduction 
I now analyze a passage that outlines the subjective deduction, and with this analysis I 
demonstrate how the subjective deduction prepares the reader for the objective deduction by 
elucidating the latter’s starting point, (OD1) in my reconstruction above. 
After Passage A, which states that the objective deduction can be accomplished by 
establishing (OD2), in the A edition Kant immediately notes the need for an elucidation: 
Passage B 
But since in such a thought there is more at work than the single faculty of 
thinking, namely the understanding, and the understanding itself, as a faculty of 
cognition that is to be related to objects, also requires an elucidation of the 
possibility of this relation, we must first assess not the empirical but the 
transcendental constitution of the subjective sources that comprise the a priori 
foundations for the possibility of experience. (A97) 
This passage begins with the claim that objects cannot be thought merely through the single 
faculty of the understanding, presumably because the understanding cannot provide on its own 
the material for its thought. This leads to the need of a particular elucidation, namely one that 
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clarifies the possibility of the relation between objects and the understanding as a faculty of 
cognition.79 The passage goes on to suggest that this elucidation is to be achieved by an 
assessment, namely of the “transcendental constitution of the subjective sources that comprise 
the a priori foundations for the possibility of experience”. 
I suggest that we understand the subjective deduction as carrying out this assessment, 
thereby elucidating (OD1). I now provide textual support for this claim. As asserted in the A 
Preface, the subjective deduction concerns the powers of cognition and aims to explain how the 
faculty of thought is possible. On the basis of Passage B, I suggest that we understand this aim as 
equivalent to explaining how the faculty of thought is possible insofar as it is a faculty that 
contributes to cognition. The subjective deduction ought to explain, then, just how the 
understanding can relate cognitively to objects. 
The task referred to in Passage B is to be performed by an assessment of “the 
transcendental constitution of the subjective sources that comprise the a priori foundations for 
the possibility of experience” (A97). Again, we find here both remarks analogous to those in the 
preface as well as more specificity. The preface describes the subjective deduction both as 
subjective and as concerning the powers of cognition on which the understanding rests. And in 
accord with this in Passage B, we find that these two aspects are to be treated together, as the 
proposed assessment is concerned with subjective sources of experience. 
The paragraph immediately following Passage B outlines Kant’s account of the 
transcendental, subjective sources of cognition that make possible the faculty of thought’s 
contribution to cognition. It is worth spending some time with this paragraph because it will help 
us see the point of the later detailed discussion of the threefold synthesis. 
                         
79 Note that the categories are not explicitly mentioned here, suggesting that the required elucidation does 
not pertain particularly to the categories and their objective validity. 
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First, Kant begins the paragraph with an elucidation of the premise that cognition is “a 
whole of compared and connected representations”: 
Passage C: Sentence 1 
If every individual representation were entirely foreign to the other, as it were 
isolated and separated from it, then there would never arise anything like 
cognition, which is a whole of compared and connected representations. 
Second, Kant goes on to explain that the manifold of representations required for cognition 
requires not merely a contribution from our passive faculty of sensibility but also a contribution 
from our spontaneous faculty of understanding: 
Passage C: Sentence 2 
If therefore I ascribe a synopsis to sense, because it contains a manifold in its 
intuition, a synthesis must always correspond to this, and receptivity can make 
cognitions possible only if combined with spontaneity. 
Taking these first two sentences together, we see that cognition requires spontaneity. The next 
sentence explains that this spontaneity takes the form of a threefold synthesis: 
Passage C: Sentence 3 
This is now the ground of a threefold synthesis, which is necessarily found in all 
cognition: that, namely, of the apprehension of the representations, as 
modifications of the mind in intuition; of the reproduction of them in the 
imagination; and of their recognition in the concept. 
Hence, according to these first three sentences, cognition requires a spontaneity that takes the 
form of the threefold synthesis described later in the A edition’s Transcendental Deduction 
chapter. The fourth and last sentence adds that these three syntheses direct us to corresponding 
subjective sources of cognition, which are to provide the elucidation demanded in Passage B: 
Passage C: Sentence 4 
Now these direct us toward three subjective sources of cognition, which make 
possible even the understanding and, through the latter, all experience as an 
empirical product of understanding. 
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As we shall learn later in Kant’s text, these are intuition, imagination, and transcendental 
apperception. Likewise, as Passage B indicates, Kant will assess “not the empirical but the 
transcendental constitution of the subjective sources that comprise the a priori foundations for 
the possibility of experience” (A97). 
Passage C provides the following answer to Passage B. The elucidation of how the 
understanding has a cognitive relation to objects is that the understanding relates to objects by 
means of the three subjective sources and their corresponding syntheses. This might seem to 
come out of nowhere, as the earlier sentences of the passage do not mention the understanding. 
Yet this is implicit, for Kant has already associated the spontaneity of our faculties involved in 
cognition with the understanding: “the faculty for bringing forth representations itself, or the 
spontaneity of cognition, is the understanding” (A51/B75; Cf. A50/B74; A69/B93; A77/B102). 
Thus, this suggests that the spontaneity mentioned in the paragraph ought to be identified with 
the understanding. 
But note that Kant draws an additional conclusion in the Passage C’s fourth sentence. Not 
only is the possibility of the understanding explained, but also “all experience as an empirical 
product of understanding”. This makes sense if we acknowledge that by “experience” Kant 
means empirical cognition. The first two sentences make clear that the concern of the argument 
is empirical cognition in the sense of a whole of compared and connected representations given 
in a manifold of sensible intuition. Hence, what Kant outlines in this paragraph is an explanation 
of the necessary conditions for the possibility not only of the understanding but also of empirical 
cognition. 
To sum up Passage C, I offer the following as an outline: 
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(C1) Empirical cognition, or a possible experience, is a whole of compared and 
connected representations given in a manifold of sensible intuition. 
(C2) The representations of a manifold of sensible intuition, given through our 
receptive faculty of sensibility, can be compared and connected to produce 
empirical cognition only through the spontaneity of the understanding. 
(C3) This spontaneity of the understanding takes the specific form of a threefold 
synthesis, which is made possible by three corresponding a priori and 
transcendental subjective sources of cognition. 
(C4) The understanding’s cognitive relation to objects, as well as experience itself 
(empirical cognition) is made possible by three a priori and transcendental 
subjective sources of cognition. 
I have had two aims in spending so much time on Passage C. First, Passage C provides evidence 
concerning the issue of identifying the passage containing the subjective deduction. Despite 
Nathan Bauer’s recent rejection of identifying it with Kant’s detailed discussion of the threefold 
synthesis, he overlooks Passage C as a strong piece of evidence in support of doing so.80 Near 
the end of the paragraph, Kant states that we are pointed “toward three subjective sources of 
cognition, which make possible even the understanding”. This tells us that the task discussed is 
the same as that of the subjective deduction described in the preface. And from this we must 
infer that the subjective deduction is to be identified with the discussion of the threefold 
synthesis. For Passage C states that the task at hand is to be accomplished by considering the 
threefold synthesis and its grounds. The second reason I have spent so much time on Passage C 
                         
80 Bauer 2010. 
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instead of the later detailed discussion of the threefold synthesis is that we gain clarity for 
interpreting the point of the subjective deduction and how it relates to the objective deduction. 
4.6 The Point of the Subjective Deduction 
I shall now argue that the point of the subjective deduction is twofold. First, the 
subjective deduction elucidates the truth of the starting assumption of the objective deduction. 
Second, it prepares the reader for comprehending the objective deduction’s new way of 
conceiving the understanding in terms of the Copernican Revolution. 
4.6.1 Elucidation of the Starting Point of the Objective Deduction 
On my view, the objective deduction begins with the assumption that any possible human 
experience—to which he thinks even empiricists must admit—consists in an empirical cognition 
of objects, wherein objects are discriminated from one another by means of judgments and 
concepts. More simply put, the assumption is that our empirical cognition requires thought or the 
understanding. On my interpretation, the subjective deduction elucidates this starting point by 
addressing the question of how the faculty of thought is possible. As passage C indicates, this 
question is equivalent to the question of how it is possible for the understanding——the faculty 
responsible for concepts and judgments—to have a cognitive relation to objects. Kant’s 
subjective deduction answers this question by showing how it is not only possible, but in fact 
necessary for the possibility of any cognition whatsoever. This is indicated by how Kant ends 
Passage C. By making the understanding possible, he claim, the three subjective sources of 
cognition make possible “all experience as an empirical product of understanding”. This suggests 
an intimate connection between the subjective deduction and (OD1). For if all experience is an 
empirical product of the understanding—i.e., the faculty of thought—then, just as (OD1) asserts, 
all experience requires thought. 
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In my outline of Passage C, (C2) is essentially a stronger version of the objective 
deduction’s premise (OD1). (C2) is supported and elucidated by (C3) and (C4). Kant provides 
his case for (C3) in his discussion of the threefold synthesis. That passage supports (C2) by 
showing how specific syntheses attributable to the understanding are required for empirical 
cognition, namely the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition. In 
accomplishing (C4), Kant elaborates on the necessary conditions for those syntheses themselves, 
namely the subjective sources of intuition, imagination, and transcendental apperception. Hence, 
although the bulk of the work of the subjective deduction is carried out in (C3) and (C4), this is 
in service of showing why (C2)—and hence likewise the starting assumption of the objective 
deduction—is true. 
Hence, the discussion of the threefold synthesis not only elucidates how the 
understanding in general is necessary for cognition but also contributes to Kant’s overall case in 
the transcendental deduction that particular types of activity of the understanding are necessary 
for cognition as well. Namely, Kant holds that the thought or judgment required for empirical 
cognition cannot merely consist in or rest on mental activities of the understanding to which 
empiricists might admit, e.g., comparison, association, and abstraction. It is clear enough how the 
objective deduction is supposed to show that something more is required, namely it attempts to 
demonstrate that such experience is possible only by means of the categories’ role in constituting 
experience. But the subjective deduction too shows that something more is required, namely that 
empirical cognition requires that the understanding contribute a spontaneous threefold synthesis, 
where each form of synthesis has a corresponding subjective, a priori, and transcendental ground. 
But even if a strict empiricist is not onboard with these results of the subjective deduction, that is 
suitable for Kant’s purposes. For the subjective deduction is primarily an elucidation of rather 
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than an argument for the starting assumption of the objective deduction. For the objective 
deduction, all that Kant needs from a strict empiricist is the admission that some types of mental 
activity attributable to the understanding—e.g., such minimal activities as comparison, 
association, and abstraction—are necessary for cognitive experience. 
4.6.2 Elucidation of the Copernican Revolution 
So far, I have explained how the point of the subjective deduction is to elucidate the 
starting assumption of the objective deduction. Specifically, I have explained how it elucidates 
the manner in which the understanding relates to objects of cognition. But Kant’s elucidation in 
the subjective deduction goes further, for it helps prepare the reader to understand the radically 
new idea offered by the objective deduction. Kant begins the A edition’s transcendental 
deduction by noting that he has 
found it more advisable to prepare than to instruct the reader in the following 
four numbers, and only then to represent the exposition of these elements of the 
understanding systematically in the immediately following third section. (A98) 
I suggest that what Kant prepares the reader for is his application of the Copernican Revolution 
to the faculty of understanding. By “Copernican Revolution”, I mean Kant’s hypothesis that 
objects must conform to our cognition rather than the other way around (Bxx). The objective 
deduction exhibits the Copernican Revolution insofar as its main conclusion is that object must 
conform to a priori concepts of the understanding, the categories. The subjective deduction 
prepares the reader for thinking in terms of the objective deduction’s Copernican Revolution by 
setting aside the categories and showing how the understanding in general is something to which 
objects of cognition must conform. 
To clarify this thought, I draw on Melissa McBay Merritt’s helpful contrast between two 
different models of thinking. The “attention model of thinking” holds that thinking is “dependent 
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upon the existence of objects of […] attention” and merely “registers given content”.81 In 
contrast, the “synthesis model of thinking” holds that “thinking is an activity of synthesis, or 
combining representations”.82 This contrast is helpful for understanding Kant, but I’m not fully 
satisfied with Merritt’s account of it. For I think she is mistaken that the transcendental deduction 
offers an argument for a synthesis model of thinking in general. This is because Kant seems to 
assume without argument such a model of thinking in the Metaphysical Deduction (A76-9/B102-
5). 
Nevertheless, I believe that the subjective deduction offers an elucidation or argument for 
something similar to Merritt’s synthesis model of thinking, namely a radical synthesis model of 
cognition. By asserting that Kant’s model in the subjective deduction concerns radical synthesis, 
I mean that synthesis is something that does more than combine representations in judgments. 
And by asserting that it pertains to cognition rather than thought, I mean that the model indicates 
something important about the relation of thought to intuition. This radical synthesis model of 
cognition can be elucidated by contrasting it with what I shall call the “attend-and-judge model 
of cognition”. On this model, a subject cognizes when she observes objects, compares them, 
notices their similarities and differences, and then connects representations in judgments to 
express what she observes. On this conception, synthesis is required only at the level of 
judgment, and the syntheses that make judgment possible are attentive mental activities such as 
comparison, abstraction, and association. Importantly, this model treats the objects of cognition 
as prepackaged for us, and our mind needs only to attend to those objects to achieve a cognitive 
relation with them. 
                         
81 Merritt 2009: 65. 
82 Ibid. 66. 
 84 
But on the radical synthesis model of cognition presented in the subjective deduction, the 
objects of cognition do not come prepackaged for us such that cognition is produced by first 
attending to them and by then manipulating them in judgments. Rather, the object of cognition 
itself is something that is possible only by means of a spontaneous threefold synthesis, and this 
synthesis is an epistemic condition for our capacity to attend objects in a cognitively significant 
way. The subjective deduction elucidates the radical synthesis model of cognition by showing 
how cognition requires forms of synthesis in addition to that of judgment. For it is only by means 
of the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction that the diverse representations of a manifold 
of intuition can be gathered up and presented to the mind so that an act of judgment can be made 
upon those sensible contents. And the synthesis of recognition does more than combine 
representations in judgments, as it is by means of that synthesis that we also can represent 
something as an object (A104-106). 
Whether or not one accepts the subjective deduction’s particular synthetic activities of the 
understanding, they give us a sense of the way in which it could be the case that objects must 
conform to our cognition, i.e., the way in which the understanding constitutes objects of 
cognition. By seeing how that could be so, we are then in a better position to see how the 
objective deduction’s result could be true. For the objective deduction’s conclusion is that the 
categories have objective validity insofar as they provide rules for the a priori synthesis involved 
in producing cognition from a manifold of intuition. This conclusion clearly embodies the 
Copernican Revolution, but it is so abstract that it might not be clear how objects must conform 
to our thought. But in providing a detailed discussion of various ways in which the understanding 
constitutes objects of cognition, the subjective deduction prepares the reader for understanding 
this new way of conceiving the relationship between thought and its objects. 
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4.7 Meeting the Desiderata 
I explain now how my interpretation meets three of the interpretive desiderata, and I will 
return to (D3) and (D4) in Sections 7.5 and 7.6. 
4.7.1 Satisfying (D1) 
My answer to (D1) is that the subjective deduction’s primary aim of showing how the 
faculty of thought is possible amounts to an elucidation of the first premise of the objective 
deduction. In other words, the subjective deduction is an inquiry that explains how it is possible 
for the understanding to have a cognitive relation to objects. 
4.7.2 Satisfying (D2) 
To answer (D2), I must explain the sense in which Kant’s inquiry is subjective and a 
deduction. It is subjective because it explains how the understanding’s cognitive relation to 
objects is made possible by a threefold synthesis grounded on three a priori and subjective 
sources of cognition. In other words, the inquiry uncovers subjective conditions necessary for 
experience, and these conditions count as subjective insofar as they specify what a cognizing 
subject must be like. In contrast, the objective deduction uncovers objective conditions necessary 
for experience—the categories—and these conditions count as objective insofar as they specify 
what the objects of cognition must be like. 
Kant characterizes a deduction as an inquiry that concerns what is lawful, rather than 
what is a matter of fact, and such an inquiry “is to establish the entitlement or legal claim” of 
something (A84/B116). The subjective deduction is a deduction in this sense because it shows 
how the a priori subjective sources of imagination and transcendental apperception have a 
legitimate use or entitlement in making possible a subject’s empirical cognition. This applies 
only to the faculties of imagination and transcendental apperception because, given the argument 
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of the Transcendental Aesthetic, we already know that we have a faculty of pure intuition that 
makes experience possible. This explains in part, then, why Kant calls the Transcendental 
Aesthetic a transcendental deduction (A87/B119-120). 
4.7.3 Satisfying (D5) 
I conclude now by addressing (D5). On my interpretation, there are at least four reasons 
why the subjective deduction is inessential and four corresponding reasons why it is nevertheless 
of interest to Kant specifically within the Transcendental Deduction chapter. We have already 
seen the first two reasons why the subjective deduction is relevant within the Transcendental 
Deduction chapter. First, it elucidates the starting assumption of the objective deduction, and 
second it prepares the reader for comprehending the objective deduction’s Copernican 
Revolution. 
The third reason can be seen by considering Kant’s definition of the transcendental 
deduction as “the explanation of the way in which concepts can relate to objects a priori” 
(A85/B117). According to Kant, objects can be given to us only through our spatiotemporal 
intuition. The subjective deduction shows cognition can be generated out of this spatiotemporal 
intuition only by means of the understanding’s radical synthetic activities, which include its 
application of concepts to objects of intuition. Since such an application or relation of concepts 
to objects of intuition is necessary for any cognition independent of the particular contents of our 
spatiotemporal intuition, it counts as an a priori relation between concepts and objects. Thus, the 
subjective deduction explains part of what a transcendental deduction in general is supposed to 
explain. 
Finally, the fourth reason for Kant’s interest in the subjective deduction within the 
Transcendental Deduction chapter is that one of its steps shows that transcendental apperception 
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is one of the transcendental sources on which the cognitive relation of thought to objects rests. 
But the argument for this claim must also be an essential part of the objective deduction. For, put 
quite roughly, the objective deduction’s argument is that empirical cognition requires the 
categories because empirical cognition is grounded on transcendental apperception, which in turn 
is possible only by means of a priori synthesis through the categories. This means that the 
argument for transcendental apperception is shared by both the subjective and objective 
deductions. Since the two inquiries overlap in this significant way, this warrants Kant’s 
characterization of the transcendental deduction in the A edition’s preface as an inquiry with two 
sides (Axvi). 
Now that we have seen four reasons for Kant’s interest in the subjective deduction within 
the context of the Transcendental Deduction chapter, we should consider why it is nevertheless 
inessential. First, even though the subjective deduction clarifies the objective deduction’s starting 
point—that empirical cognition requires thought—this starting point is something that Kant takes 
to be an assumption. Kant makes its status as an assumption clear in his Transition to the 
deduction, and this is why in the A edition’s preface he refers the reader to A92-3. 
Second, even if the subjective deduction helps the reader comprehend the Copernican 
Revolution offered by the result of the objective deduction, this is not required for the soundness 
of the argument of the objective deduction. Rather, it is something that prepares the reader to 
understand that argument and its significance. 
Third, even though the subjective deduction fits Kant’s characterization of a 
transcendental deduction in general, it does not fit his characterization of the primary task of the 
latter: to show the objective validity of the categories. 
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Fourth, I asserted above that the subjective deduction contains an argument for 
transcendental apperception, and this might seem to make it essential for the objective deduction 
because such an argument is essential for the latter. But even if part of the subjective deduction 
is essential for the objective deduction, it still makes sense for Kant to claim that the overall task 
of the subjective deduction is inessential. For the overall task of the subjective deduction is to 
show what is required for the understanding to have a cognitive relation to objects, and not all of 
these requirements are appealed to in the objective deduction. 
4.8 Secondary Literature 
In this section, I discuss the secondary literature that identifies the subjective deduction 
with Kant’s discussion of the threefold synthesis. One scholar, Nathan Bauer, disputes this 
identification, and I have already addressed his view earlier in Section 4.5. My aim here is to 
show that the other interpretations of the subjective deduction fail to meet one or more of the 
interpretive desiderata. 
Patricia Kitcher and Andrew Brook both take its point to be fundamentally psychological 
in explaining how the understanding relates to its objects.83 My interpretation agrees in many 
ways with these, but the greater specificity of my account allows my account, unlike theirs, to 
answer (D5). Hua Terence Tai, following a suggestion of Kitcher’s, takes the subjective 
deduction’s goal to be to deduce transcendental apperception.84 Although I agree that something 
like a deduction for transcendental apperception is given in the subjective deduction, this cannot 
its sole point. For then it would not make sense for Kant to claim that it is inessential to the main 
purposes of the objective deduction. Thus, Tai’s account fails to satisfy (D5). 
                         
83 Kitcher 1990: 65, 91-116; Brook 1994: 105-21. 
84 Tai 1995. 
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Corey W. Dyck also takes the point to be psychological, but his account is much more 
specific and historical.85 Insofar as the subjective deduction uncovers three subjective sources of 
representations, Dyck takes the point to be rebut the Wolffian view that there is only a single 
representational force responsible for our cognition. I find this reading to be persuasive. But if 
the point of the subjective deduction is solely what Dyck’s account holds, there is no clear reason 
why Kant would have taken the Transcendental Deduction chapter to be the proper place for the 
argument Dyck finds. So even if Dyck is correct, his account needs to be supplemented by an 
interpretation that answers (D5), such as mine. 
Wolfgang Carl argues that the subjective deduction assumes that we have transcendental 
apperception and aims to show with this assumption that concepts and thought are required for 
experience.86 But as I have indicated above, the Transition section provides strong reason to 
think that Kant assumes that concepts and thought are required for experience. Moreover, in both 
versions of the Transcendental Deduction chapter, we find that Kant argues in the opposite 
direction. At A106-107, Kant argues for transcendental apperception by explaining how it is the 
“transcendental ground” for the syntheses of the understanding. Likewise, in the B edition Kant 
claims that “[t]he I think must be able to accompany all my representations” because “otherwise 
something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all” (B131-132, my 
emphasis). Even if Carl had an alternative reading of these passages, his account would still fail 
to meet (D5). For on Carl’s account the subjective deduction is necessary for establishing a 
premise of the objective deduction. This fails to make sense of Kant’s claim that the subjective 
deduction is inessential. 
                         
85 Dyck 2008: 152-79. 
86 Carl 1989: 3-20. 
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Most recently, Henry E. Allison has emphasized that the subjective deduction aims to 
explain how the understanding is possible, which explanation is carried out by an investigation 
into the three subjective sources that make it possible.87 Allison views this as important for the 
transcendental deduction because it would “explain how a real use of the understanding is 
possible”, i.e., a use that contributes to cognition of objects of possible experience.88 Although I 
agree with these claims, Allison too has trouble with satisfying (D5). For he claims that the 
subjective deduction is not essential to answering the objective deduction’s “chief question” 
[Hauptfrage], namely, “What and how much can understanding and reason cognize free of all 
experience?” (Axvi).89 Allison correctly points out that this is the chief question for the first 
Critique as a whole, and not just for the objective deduction. Recognizing this, Allison interprets 
the A-edition’s Preface as asserting that, unlike the objective deduction, the subjective deduction 
is not essential for answering the chief question. This seems correct so far, but Allison then states 
that the “the subjective side of the Deduction is an indispensable complement to its objective 
side”.90 This additional claim, however, seems to make Allison’s interpretation inconsistent: if 
the subjective deduction is indispensable for completing the objective deduction, and if the latter 
is indispensable for answering the chief question of the first Critique, then the subjective 
deduction also would have to be indispensable for answering the chief question of the first 
Critique. This inconsistency is easily avoided if we interpret the subjective deduction not as an 
indispensable complement to the objective deduction, but rather as a mere complement. And on 
my interpretation, it complements the objective deduction primarily by elucidating the latter’s 
initial premise or starting point. 
                         
87 2015: 201. 
88 Ibid.: 203. 
89 Ibid.: 199. 
90 Ibid., my emphasis. 
 91 
4.9 The Subjective Deduction in the B-Edition 
Nowhere in the B-edition does Kant mention a subjective deduction, but Kant’s remarks 
in §15 can be read as preparing the reader in a manner similar to the A edition’s subjective 
deduction. In §15, he begins the B-edition’s transcendental deduction with an argument for the 
thesis that combination—something required for empirical cognition—cannot come from the 
senses: 
[T]he combination (conjunction) of a manifold in general can never come to us 
through the senses, and therefore cannot already be contained in the pure form 
of sensible intuition (B129-30) 
He argues for this claim as follows: 
[f]or [combination] is an act of the spontaneity of the power of representation, 
and since one must call the latter understanding, in distinction from sensibility, 
all combination, whether we are conscious of it or not […] is an action of the 
understanding, which we would designate with the general title synthesis in 
order at the same time to draw attention to the fact that we can represent nothing 
as combined in the object without having previously combined it ourselves 
(B130) 
In brief, Kant’s argument is that the understanding is required for combination because it is 
responsible for an act of spontaneity. Interpreting this in light of my account of the subjective 
deduction in this chapter, we can understand Kant’s point to be that the senses do not provide us 
with prepackaged objects inasmuch as the senses do not ensure that a bundle of representations is 
represented as combined. Instead, we ought to treat objects as conforming to our cognition, i.e., 
we ought to take the activity of the understanding as what makes it possible for us to represent 
combination as such. If this reading is correct, then the B-edition’s transcendental deduction 
begins by offering brief elucidations of the A-edition’s subjective deduction’s two primary 
points. First, §15 elucidates the starting point of the objective deduction with a brief argument 
that the understanding is necessary for empirical cognition insofar as the latter requires a 
spontaneous synthesis for its combination. Second, it also prepares the reader for the 
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transcendental deduction’s extension of the Copernican Revolution to the understanding; for it 
briefly suggests that “we can represent nothing as combined in the object without having 
previously combined it ourselves” (B130). 
4.10 Conclusion 
In conclusion, I interpret the subjective deduction as showing how it is possible for the 
understanding to have a cognitive relation to objects, and the point of this is to elucidate the 
objective deduction’s starting assumption and to prepare the reader for the objective deduction’s 
Copernican Revolution.  
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Chapter 5: The Empirical Threefold Synthesis and Transcendental Sources of Cognition 
In the previous chapter, I began my interpretation of the subjective deduction by carrying 
out the following tasks: (i) providing desiderata for a satisfactory interpretation of the subjective 
deduction; (ii) analyzing the key passages in which Kant characterizes the subjective deduction’s 
overall aims; (iii) arguing that the subjective deduction has the twofold aim of elucidating the 
starting point of the objective deduction and of expanding the Copernican Revolution to the 
understanding; and, (iv) explaining how my account meets some of the interpretive desiderata. In 
this chapter, I begin interpreting the details of the subjective deduction by presenting Kant’s 
argument for an empirical threefold synthesis carried out on the basis of three subjective sources 
of cognition. In Kant’s text, he also argues in various places for a pure threefold synthesis 
grounded on a priori subjective sources of cognition. Given the special difficulties that Kant 
himself recognizes in arguing for pure syntheses, I shall delay an interpretation of that until the 
next chapter. Overall, however, I hope that the previous chapter and the ones following are 
mutually reinforcing. The previous chapter should provide a framework for the ones that follow, 
and the latter chapters should provide further evidence for the overall interpretation of the 
subjective deduction’s aims. 
Before proceeding, it will be useful to summarize some of the results offered in the 
previous chapter. To begin, recall that I interpret the objective deduction as follows: 
Objective Deduction Argument Outline  
(OD1) All experience—i.e., empirical cognition—is possible only if intuition is thought 
by means of concepts. 
(OD2) The categories are a priori conditions for the thinking encountered in possible 
experience, i.e., for the thinking of intuition by means of concepts. 
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(OD3) Therefore, the categories are a priori conditions for all experience, and so have 
objective validity. [OD1-OD2] 
On my interpretation, the objective deduction begins with (OD1) as a starting assumption, so its 
main task is to offer a demonstration of (OD2). But the subjective deduction offers what I have 
called an “elucidation” of (OD1) by showing how the understanding has a cognitive relation to 
objects of experience. Recall the following outline of the subjective deduction’s procedure: 
Subjective Deduction Outline 
(SD1) Empirical cognition, or a possible experience, is a whole of compared and 
connected representations given in a manifold of sensible intuition. 
(SD2) The representations of a manifold of sensible intuition, given through our 
receptive faculty of sensibility, can be compared and connected to produce 
empirical cognition only through the spontaneity of the understanding. 
(SD3) This spontaneity of the understanding takes the specific form of a threefold 
synthesis, which is made possible by three corresponding a priori and 
transcendental subjective sources of cognition. 
(SD4) The understanding’s cognitive relation to objects, as well as experience itself 
(empirical cognition) is made possible by three a priori and transcendental 
subjective sources of cognition. 
The subjective deduction begins with the assumption (SD1), viz., that we have empirical 
cognition. I have already discussed this assumption at length in the previous chapters. Unlike 
(OD1), (SD1) does not mention anything about the understanding’s role for empirical cognition. 
(SD2) advances that the understanding necessarily has a cognitive relationship to objects, and 
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(SD3) explains what makes possible that relationship. On this basis, the main aim of the 
subjective deduction, (SD4), can be asserted. 
Kant does not, and perhaps cannot, proceed to carry through the above outline—based on 
Section 4.5 above—linearly. This is because showing that empirical cognition requires the 
spontaneity of the understanding, asserted by (SD2), and showing that it requires a threefold 
synthesis, asserted by (SD3), ultimately amount to the same task in Kant’s procedure. 
Furthermore, carrying out (SD3) is not needed for Kant to advance (OD1), which does not refer 
to these a priori sources of cognition. This means that the subjective deduction goes beyond what 
he needs to elucidate the truth of (OD1). I explained in the last chapter that this further endeavor 
is to be understood as preparing the reader for the transcendental deduction by providing an 
elucidation of how the Copernican Revolution applies to the understanding. More fundamentally, 
the subjective deduction as a whole is inessential for Kant’s main purpose because Kant needs 
only to assume (OD1) and not argue for it. Nevertheless, the subjective deduction is obviously 
relevant and crucial for Kant’s aims in the transcendental deduction as a whole, which concern 
the a priori requirements of empirical cognition. In fact, we shall see that some arguments of the 
subjective deduction are shared by the objective deduction, such that the two deductions overlap. 
Or, to use Kant’s description, there are two sides of the transcendental deduction. So later on I 
shall attempt to make clear which parts of the subjective deduction overlap with the objective 
deduction. 
Before getting into the details of Kant’s subjective deduction, it will help to consider two 
passages that frame the subjective deduction, one preceding it and one following it. These not 
only give us a sense of what to expect but also prove useful for clarifying what exactly Kant 
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means by “a priori and transcendental subjective source of cognition”. Here are the two 
passages: 
There are, however, three original sources (capacities or faculties of the soul), 
which contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience, and cannot 
themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind, namely sense, 
imagination, and  apperception. On these are grounded 1) the synopsis of the 
manifold a priori through sense; 2) the synthesis of this manifold through the 
imagination; finally 3) the unity of this synthesis through original apperception. 
In addition to their empirical use, all of these faculties have a transcendental one, 
which is concerned solely with form, and which is possible a priori. We have 
discussed this with regard to the senses in the first part above, however, we 
will now attempt to understand the nature of the two other ones. (A94-5) 
The possibility of an experience in general and cognition of its objects rest on 
three subjective sources of cognition: sense, imagination,  and  apperception; 
each of these can be considered empirically, namely in application to given 
appearances, but they are also elements or foundations a priori that make this 
empirical use itself possible. Sense represents the appearances empirically in 
perception, the imagination in association (and reproduction), and 
apperception in the empirical consciousness of the identity of these 
reproductive representations with the appearances through which they were 
given, hence in recognition. (A115) 
It is important to note first of all that the three subjective sources are sense, imagination, and 
apperception. Thus, although much of what Kant discusses in the subjective deduction is directed 
at the threefold synthesis of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition, each of these syntheses 
is ultimately grounded on sense, imagination, and apperception, respectively. As we shall see 
later, the latter are “transcendental grounds” of the threefold synthesis, and this terminology is 
suggested by Kant’s claim in the former of the two passages above that the three sources have 
not only an empirical use but also a transcendental one. That is, each of the three subjective 
sources is transcendental insofar as it makes empirical cognition possible. Kant also claims that 
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this transcendental use “is possible a priori”. As we shall see in this chapter, showing that a 
subjective source is transcendental does not entail that it is also a priori.91 
5.1 Preliminaries 
Before seeing the details of the subjective deduction, it will be helpful to have a summary 
of Kant’s own titles and sectioning of the main body of the subjective deduction, viz., the Second 
Section of the Transcendental Deduction chapter. Then, three preliminary remarks are needed to 
frame Kant’s investigation. 
5.1.1 Kant’s Division of the Text 
The subjective deduction is presented in the A-edition’s Second Section, titled “On the a 
priori grounds for the possibility of experience”.92 Given my interpretation so far, “a priori 
grounds” likely refers to the three subjective sources with which the subjective deduction is 
concerned and which Kant goes on to refer to in their transcendental roles as “transcendental 
grounds”: (pure forms of) sense, (transcendental) imagination, and (pure) apperception. 
The Second Section begins with five paragraphs before a “Preliminary reminder”. The 
first four of these paragraphs summarize various claims from the Metaphysical Deduction as 
well as some of the remarks from the Transition concerning Kant’s argumentative strategy. The 
fifth and last paragraph presents the outline of the subjective deduction, which I discussed in 
detail in the previous chapter. 
                         
91 Cf. Kant’s discussion of the relationship between the transcendental and the a priori at A56/B80. My 
point here is not that the subjective deduction explicitly draws a contrast between the transcendental and 
the a priori; rather, it is that drawing such a contrast will help clarify for us what he is up to. 
92 The Third Section is titled “On the relation of the understanding to objects in general and the possibility 
of cognizing these a priori”. I interpret this title to refer to the two tasks to be undertaken in the objective 
deduction: while “the relation of the understanding to objects in general” refers to the task of showing that 
the understanding’s categories have objective validity by relating to objects of empirical cognition, “the 
possibility of cognizing these a priori” refers to the task of showing that we have synthetic a priori 
cognition through the categories. 
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The remainder of the Second Section consists in a “Preliminary reminder” followed by 
four numbered subsections: “1. On the synthesis of apprehension in the intuition”, “2. On the 
synthesis of reproduction in the imagination”, “3. On the synthesis of recognition in the 
concept”, and “4. Provisional explanation of the possibility of the categories as a priori 
cognitions”. The first three of these numbered subsections contain most of the subjective 
deduction, but as I have already claimed and will support further, the subjective and objective 
deductions overlap with respect to what Kant writes about apperception. Thus, the third of these 
numbered subsections also contains part of the objective deduction. Similarly, the fourth 
numbered subsection contains material relevant to both the objective and the subjective sides of 
the deduction. 
5.1.2 The Preliminary Reminder 
Kant’s “Preliminary reminder” consists of the following: 
The deduction of the categories is connected with so many difficulties, and 
necessitates such deep penetration into the primary grounds of the possibility 
of our cognition in general, that in order to avoid the long-windedness of a 
complete theory and nevertheless not to omit anything in such a necessary 
inquiry, I have found it more advisable to prepare than to instruct the reader in 
the following four numbers [i.e., the four numbered sections I mentioned 
above], and only then to represent the exposition of these elements of the 
understanding systematically in the immediately following third section. For 
this reason the reader should until then not be deterred by the obscurity that is 
initially unavoidable in a path that is thus far entirely unexplored, but which 
will, as I hope, be completely illuminated in that section. 
The most important points to note here are Kant’s claims 1) that he is not presenting a complete 
theory; 2) that he is not omitting anything; 3) that in virtue of the difficulty of the task along with 
(1) and (2) he has “found it more advisable to prepare than to instruct the reader” with the four 
numbered subsections; 4) that the Third Section will present “the exposition of these elements of 
the understanding systematically”; and, 5) that the unavoidable obscurity of the Second Section 
is supposed to be illuminated in the Third Section. 
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Given that Kant writes of “the deduction of the categories”, (1) and (2) presumably refer 
to the transcendental deduction as a whole, not just one or the other of the subjective or objective 
deductions. This makes it surprising that Kant advances (1) because it threatens the status of the 
objective deduction. Even worse, it seems that he contradicts (1) by also asserting (2). 
Nevertheless, the apparent contradiction between (1) and (2) is likely best resolved by 
understanding (2) as meaning that he will not be omitting anything essential. Furthermore, (1) 
likely refers not to the transcendental deduction’s incompleteness with regard to showing that the 
categories have objective validity, but rather to the Transcendental Deduction chapter’s 
incomplete account of how the categories relate to intuition. Such a complete account requires at 
least the rest of Transcendental Analytic. 
Claim (3) can be understood in light of the interpretation of the subjective deduction 
advanced in the previous chapter. Part of the “preparation” consists in giving the subjective 
deduction, which will help elucidate the first premise of the objective deduction and will show 
how the Copernican Revolution can be extended to the understanding. But given that the 
subjective and objective deductions overlap in the third subsection of the Second Section and 
that subsection four of the Second Section also contains materials pertaining to the objective 
deduction, part of the preparation must consist in remarks that go beyond accomplishing the 
subjective deduction. All of this preparation is for the heart of the objective deduction, referred 
to by (4). 
Given the many obscurities within the Second Section of the Transcendental Deduction 
chapter, (5) might just refer to the general preparatory and elucidatory nature of the Second 
Section. But as I shall argue in Section 7.2 below, this claim might also refer especially to one 
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specific issue that arises within the subjective deduction, viz., the lack of a proof or 
demonstration for one of the subjective deduction’s key theses. 
5.1.3 Kant’s General Remark 
After the Preliminary Reminder, Kant begins his first numbered subsection, but even this 
contains a further preliminary remark whose scope includes all of the subjective deduction. In 
Kant’s own words, it is a “general remark on which one must ground everything that follows”: 
Wherever our representations may arise, whether through the influence of 
external things or as the effect of inner causes, whether they have originated a 
priori or empirically as appearances — as modifications of the mind they 
nevertheless belong to inner sense, and as such all of our cognitions are in the 
end subjected to the formal condition of inner sense, namely time, as that in 
which they must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relations. (A98-9) 
Put more briefly, Kant’s claim here is that all our representations are “subjected to the formal 
condition of inner sense, namely time”.  This is a claim that Kant makes elsewhere.93 The basic 
thought is that there are two types of objects that we can cognize: objects of inner sense—i.e., 
our own representings insofar as they are taken as objects—and objects of outer sense—i.e., 
objects that appear external to us in space, as well as in time. This claim serves as a premise for 
‘everything that follows’ in two senses. First, when taken with other premises, it will entail that 
any empirical cognition had through a manifold of our sensible intuition requires a synthesis of 
apprehension. Since the synthesis of apprehension presupposes the need for the following two 
syntheses of reproduction and recognition, the claim grounds the overall argument for the 
threefold synthesis. Second, the claim will again be appealed to explicitly in the specific 
arguments for each of the three syntheses. Hence, “everything that follows” includes both the 
overall argument for the threefold synthesis and the specific arguments for each of the three 
syntheses. 
                         
93 A34/B51, A138/B177, A142/B181, A155/B194. 
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5.2 The Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition 
With these preliminaries out of the way, we can now consider the argument of the 
subjective deduction, which begins with the aforementioned synthesis of apprehension in 
intuition.94 
5.2.1 The Representation of a Manifold of Intuition 
Kant begins as follows: 
Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be 
represented as such if the mind did not distinguish the time in the succession of 
impressions on one another; for as contained in one moment, each 
representation can never be anything other than absolute unity. (A99, 
translation slightly modified) 
Kant does not make explicit here why it must be the case that “[e]very intuition contains a 
manifold in itself”, rather than some single sensible representation. But recall that in Kant’s own 
outline of the subjective deduction (explained in Section 4.5 above), he describes it as concerned 
with cognition as a whole of compared and connected representations. Obviously, multiple 
representations, i.e., a manifold, is required for genuine comparison and connection.95 Hence, 
Kant’s opening premise is that empirical cognition requires intuition that contains a manifold of 
representations in itself. 
It is crucial to note that although Kant makes an inference from this initial premise, he 
does so by stating that the manifold be “represented as such”. That is, the cognitive subject must 
represent the manifold of intuition as manifold, i.e., be aware that she is presented with a 
multiplicity of elements. Hence, Kant’s first premise is more precisely formulated as holding that 
empirical cognition requires that every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which manifold is 
                         
94 Other detailed discussions of the synthesis of apprehension can be found in Allison 2015: 206-12, 
Brook 1994: 125-7, Longuenesse 1998: 36-8, and Paton 1936: 359-363. 
95 This also makes sense on my account of empirical cognition as rational sensory discrimination: in order 
for a subject to make identifications or differentiations, she must be presented with multiple things. 
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represented as such. Furthermore, Kant’s argument also appeals to a manifold whose multiple 
elements are successively presented in time, i.e., a diachronic manifold, rather than a manifold 
whose multiple elements are presented simultaneously, i.e., a synchronic manifold.96 Thus, the 
first premise of the argument here can be formulated as follows: 
(A1) Empirical cognition requires intuition that contains a diachronic manifold in itself, 
which is represented as manifold. 
Even if it is clear that Kant begins with this premise, Kant’s text here does little to answer two 
questions. First, why are we concerned with a manifold that is represented as such? Second, why 
are we concerned with a diachronic rather than a synchronic manifold?97 With regard to the first 
question, it is not clear that cognition considered merely as “a whole of compared and connected 
representations” would require representing a manifold as such. With regard to the second 
question, it seems quite possible that one could represent simultaneously a whole of compared 
and connected spatial representations given all at once. So, it seems that there is no reason that 
Kant should limit his focus to diachronic manifolds. 
Let us consider these questions in reverse order. It might be thought that an answer to the 
second question could be given by appealing to Kant’s initial “general remark” that all our 
representations belong to inner sense and are thus subjected to time. Henry Allison makes such 
an appeal in responding to roughly the same question.98 With the general remark noted, he 
answers the question by distinguishing “between a manifold being given successively and being 
                         
96 Kant later reiterates the view that the manifold of intuition at issue for apprehension is diachronic: “The 
apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive. The representations of the parts succeed 
one another. Whether they also succeed in the object is a second point for reflection, which is not 
contained in the first.” (A189/B234, cf. A198/B243; cf. R5661) 
97 The only discussions of this latter, but crucially important, question in Anglophone scholarship I can 
find are in Allison 2015: 208 (who also notes much older French- and German-language scholarship on 
the issue) and Brook 1994: 126-7. 
98 2015: 208. 
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given as successive”, and he argues that only the former but not the latter is entailed by the 
general remark.99 That is, in claiming that a manifold need not be given as successive, I take it 
that Allison means that empirical cognition in general does not require a representation of 
something diachronic, so that Kant’s argument is applicable to even synchronic manifolds. 
Allison’s view is that, according to the general remark, even a synchronic manifold must be 
given successively, and this requires a temporal process of the mind—e.g., of running through 
and holding together the manifold items—in order for the mind to compare and connect 
representations. 
Although I agree that the general remark is important for resolving the issue at hand, 
more needs to be said beyond what Allison states. For the general remark requires merely that a 
synchronic manifold be presented at some time, successive to other representations and 
succeeded by still others. In other words, it is consistent with the general remark that a merely 
synchronic manifold of intuition be presented to the mind, just so long as this manifold is 
presented at some moment in time. All that this would require is that what is given successively 
are three things: the representations preceding the manifold, the manifold, and those following 
the manifold; but this does not require that the representations of the manifold of intuition are 
themselves given successively. But if this is so, it is not clear that the mind must engage in 
successive acts to represent the synchronic manifold considered merely by itself. 
What will help resolve this issue is a proper understanding of what is required for 
cognizing such a synchronic manifold, as opposed to the mere representing of it. Empirical 
cognition is the discrimination of sensory objects on the basis of normative reasons. Such a 
discrimination, however, cannot be achieved by the mere presentation of a synchronic manifold 
                         
99 Ibid. 
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to the cognitive subject. This is because the senses are passive and therefore do not present data 
to the mind in which representations are already processed as compared, connected, identified, or 
differentiated. Thus, if two geometric figures are contained in a synchronic manifold of intuition, 
the mind must at some point carry out mental acts of distinguishing them from their background 
as geometric figures, identifying them as geometric figures of particular sorts, differentiating 
them from each other, and doing so on the basis of a normative reason accessible to the cognitive 
subject. Furthermore, even supposing that in our everyday experience we sometimes can be 
presented with a synchronic manifold in which we immediately identify or differentiate its 
elements on the basis of normative reasons, this is possible only because of previous experience 
in which similar representations were processed.100 In this last example, even though the 
cognitive subject is in one sense given a synchronic manifold that is cognized immediately, what 
makes this cognition possible is that this synchronic manifold is part of an even greater manifold 
of intuitive representations, and this latter manifold must be diachronic. In Allison’s terms, the 
manifold of intuition must be given as successive. Thus, we can see that, in light of my account 
of empirical cognition, Kant has good reasons for advancing (A1).101 
Let us now consider why a manifold needs to be represented as manifold in order for 
empirical cognition to be possible. This can also be clarified by my account of empirical 
                         
100 In this connection we can consider Kant’s claim that even the categories, despite their a priori status, 
are not innate but acquired (MM 29: 763, ML2 28: 542-3). I take it that this means their application 
requires that a cognitive subject have a succession of experiences in time before being able to use the 
categories. 
101 Brook offers a similar view, arguing that “in order to distinguish different representations in 
simultaneous intuitions, we have to use the more discriminating kind of synthesis that Kant called 
recognition in a concept” (1994: 126). I agree that ultimately, even my proposed answer to the question 
entails that further syntheses of the mind, including reproduction and recognition, are required. But 
Brook’s point is ultimately true for any manifold of intuition, including not just synchronic but also 
diachronic manifolds. More problematically for Brook’s response is that Kant’s claim in the opening 
sentence of the subjective deduction is that we must distinguish the time in any manifold of intuition, and 
appealing to the later synthesis of recognition does not explain why Kant holds this view. 
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cognition as rational sensory discrimination. For a rational sensory discrimination to be made, a 
cognitive subject must, on the basis of normative reasons, either identify something or 
differentiate things from each other. The mere capacity to identify or differentiate things does not 
require that a subject represent a manifold as such. For example, a computer program can 
identify a string of code within a manifold of code without having a representation of the 
manifold of code as being a manifold. Rather, it is because rational sensory discriminations are 
made on the basis of reasons that a cognitive subject must represent a manifold of intuition as 
manifold. Namely, any reason that a cognitive subject might be able to give for identifying or 
differentiating things must appeal to a plurality of representations, including both representations 
of the things identified or differentiated and representations of wherein those things are alike or 
dissimilar. A normative reason, then, is a representation of a manifold as manifold. 
5.2.2 The Mind’s Distinguishing of Time 
Now that we have the first part of the first sentence analyzed, we can consider the first 
argument that Kant himself presents in the passage. Recall that the first sentence in full runs as 
follows: 
Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be 
represented as such if the mind did not distinguish the time in the succession of 
impressions on one another; for [denn] as contained in one moment, each 
representation can never be anything other than absolute unity. (A99) 
Kant’s inference in this sentence is from (A1) to the following conclusion (C): 
(C) Empirical cognition requires distinguishing the time in the succession of 
impressions on one another (presumably these impressions are the representations 
in the manifold). 
This conclusion means that the distinguishing of time is necessary for empirical cognition to 
represent a diachronic manifold as manifold. As indicated by the word “for” [denn], Kant makes 
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this inference by advancing the claim that “as contained in one moment, each representation can 
never be anything other than absolute unity”. This is a particularly opaque assertion, even for 
Kant, because the notions of “one moment” and “absolute unity” are not elaborated upon. 
In attempting to tease out an understanding of Kant’s opaque assertion, several 
interpreters hold that Kant maintains that it is possible for a representation to be contained in one 
moment and be an absolute unity.102 But this fails to make intelligible the opaque assertion’s 
context within the argument for (C). For consider what would be the case if time were not 
distinguished in the succession of impressions on one another. In that case, we could consider 
each of the representations of a manifold of intuition only “as contained in one moment”. That is, 
any representation would not be related in time to any other representations. This can clue us in 
to what it would mean for such a representation to be an “absolute unity”. Recall from above that 
a cognitive subject’s representations can be related to one another only by means of time. So if 
each of the representations of a manifold of intuition is not related in time to any other 
representations, then it would not be related at all to any other representations. Hence, no such 
representations could be united to one another. This means that each such representation could 
constitute only a unity with itself, i.e., in Kant’s terms “can never be anything other than absolute 
unity”. 
Accordingly, by “absolute unity” in this context, I understand Kant to mean something 
that constitutes a unity without being dependent on—and hence, in one sense, relative to—
anything else. Furthermore, in claiming that a representation “can never be anything other than 
absolute unity”, I understand Kant to mean that such a representation can constitute merely or 
only an absolute unity, and so cannot also constitute a unity with other representations. Based on 
                         
102 See Allison 2015: 208-12 for an example and a discussion of several views, along with Kitcher 1990: 
149. 
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the analysis above, we can conclude that if time were not distinguished in the succession of 
impressions on one another, then none of those representations—each being contained in one 
moment and constituting merely an absolute unity—could be related to one another by a 
cognitive subject. But it is clear that cognition requires that representations be related to one 
another, whether cognition be rational sensory discrimination or a whole of compared and 
connected representations. It follows that, if cognition is to be possible, time must be 
distinguished in the succession of impressions on one another. 
Accordingly, we can formulate Kant’s argument as follows: 
(A1) Empirical cognition requires intuition that contains a diachronic manifold in itself, 
which is represented as manifold. 
(A2) If time were not distinguished in the manifold of intuition, then each of the 
representations in the manifold of intuition would be contained in one moment. 
(A3) If a representation were contained in one moment, then it would be nothing other 
than absolute unity, i.e., it would constitute merely a unity all by itself without 
being dependent on anything else. 
(A4) Representations that are nothing other than, i.e., merely, absolute unities cannot 
be united with or related to one another. 
(A5) If time were not distinguished in the manifold of intuition, then it would not be 
possible for the mind to relate to one another each of the representations 
contained in the manifold of intuition. [from A2-A4] 
(A6) If the mind could not relate representations to one another, then it could not 
represent those representations as manifold, and so it could it have empirical 
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cognition involving an intuition containing a diachronic manifold in itself, which 
is represented as manifold. 
(C) Empirical cognition requires distinguishing the time in the succession of 
impressions on one another. [A1, A5, A6] 
Going forward, what is most important here is the starting assumption (A1) and the conclusion 
(C). That is, what Kant has established so far is that empirical cognition requires: 
(i) an intuition that contains a diachronic manifold in itself; 
(ii) the representation of this diachronic manifold as manifold; and,  
(iii) the distinguishing of time in the succession of the representations in the manifold 
of intuition. 
5.2.3 The Empirical Synthesis of Apprehension 
With these results, Kant’s next step is to argue for the synthesis of apprehension. He 
writes: 
Now in order for unity of intuition to come from this manifold (as, say, in the 
representation of space), it is necessary first to run through and then to take 
together this manifoldness, which action I call the synthesis of apprehension, 
since it is aimed directly at the intuition, which to be sure provides a manifold 
but can never effect this as such, and indeed as contained in one 
representation, without the occurrence of such a synthesis. (A99) 
This passage indicates another requirement of empirical cognition in addition to (i)-(iii), namely: 
(iv) the manifold of intuition must be represented as a unity. 
Just as the requirement for representing intuition as manifold follows from Kant’s account of 
empirical cognition, so too the requirement for representing it as united is required by that 
account of cognition. In terms of my interpretation of empirical cognition, when a cognitive 
subject makes a rational sensory discrimination, she must do so on the basis of normative 
reasons. This means that the cognitive subject not only must have a representation of a single 
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thing that she discriminates but also a single or united representation of how that thing is similar 
or dissimilar to other things. 
Let us consider an example that will help us with the above point and throughout our 
discussion of Kant’s subjective deduction. Suppose I visit a pet shelter holding my cat Bella with 
several other cats, and I take myself to have discriminated her as distinct from the other cats. 
Empirical cognition requires that I have made this discrimination on the basis of a normative 
reason, i.e., a rationale that I could offer if I asked why I made my discrimination. Suppose in 
this case that I discriminate what I take to be Bella by noticing a cat with a distinctive white spot 
of fur on its forehead. Thus, the possession of this distinctive spot is my normative reason for my 
discrimination. Now both my identification of Bella and my normative reason for that 
identification could be faulty: it could be that Bella no longer has the distinctive spot and some 
other cat has one, thereby making my discrimination incorrect; and it could be that the color of a 
cat’s fur changes often enough to make this basis for discrimination a faulty one. Whether or not 
the discrimination is correct and whether or not the normative reason is a good one, my 
identification of what I take to be Bella counts as an empirical cognition. 
Now consider how in this case a diachronic manifold of intuition must be represented 
both as manifold and as united. There must be manifold representations both diachronically, e.g., 
various representations of Bella and her parts over time, and synchronically, e.g., representations 
of multiple cats and their parts at the pet shelter. As we have already seen above, in order to have 
available a normative reason for discriminating Bella, these manifold representations must be 
represented as manifold. For example, in order to have a normative reason I must have separate 
representations of Bella earlier in time, Bella later in time, her parts earlier in time, her parts later 
in time, other cats and their parts, and so on. The further point now is that I must also represent 
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manifold representations as united in order to have available a normative reason for 
discriminating Bella. There must be a minimal unification of diachronic representations and a 
representation of that unity as such. For example, my normative reason must represent as a unity 
the earlier representations of Bella and her parts along with later representations. Likewise, there 
must be a minimal unification of synchronic representations and a representation of that unity as 
such. For example, my normative reason must unite together the multiple representations of cats 
at the cat shelter in order to identify or differentiate the cats. 
More abstractly, insofar as empirical cognition requires a sensory discrimination based on 
normative reasons, a cognitive subject’s normative reason must represent a manifold of intuition 
both as manifold and as a unity. Therefore, even if a manifold of intuition could perhaps be given 
without being united, a subject can have cognition through what is given to her only if she 
represents those manifold representations as minimally united. 
Given requirements (i)-(iv), we can see why the synthesis of apprehension in intuition is 
required for empirical cognition. According to the above passage, the synthesis of apprehension 
in intuition is the act of running through and taking together the manifoldness [Mannigfaltigkeit] 
provided by the manifold of intuition. The cognitive subject’s mind must run through the 
manifoldness of intuition in order to meet requirements (ii) and (iii); for without running through 
the various representations, the cognitive subject could neither represent the manifold of intuition 
as manifold nor distinguish the time in the succession of those various representations. Likewise, 
the cognitive subject’s mind must take the representations together in order to meet requirement 
(iv); if the mind only were to run through the representations but not bring them together, then 
there would be no overall unity for the subject to represent. Put all together, the running through 
of representations makes for the possibility of a representation of a manifold as such and the 
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taking of those representations together makes for the possibility of representing that manifold as 
a unity. 
Hence, in addition to the receptivity of being given a manifold of sensible intuitions, 
empirical cognition requires that there be at least this one form of spontaneous action on the part 
of the mind itself, namely, a synthesis through which that manifold is apprehended as manifold 
in a united intuition. Kant defines a synthesis as “the action of putting different representations 
together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition” (A77/B103), 
and this indeed characterizes the mind’s action here.103 Kant calls this the synthesis one of 
“apprehension” because “it is aimed directly at the intuition” (A99). I take it that Kant’s thought 
with this naming is based on the literal meaning of “apprehend”: to grasp or seize physically. 
Just as a physical grasping directly touches the object(s) grasped, so too the synthesis of 
apprehension directly works on intuition. As we shall see, this directness of the synthesis of 
apprehension distinguishes it from the syntheses of reproduction and recognition, which operate 
only indirectly upon intuition via the direct activity of the synthesis of apprehension. 
5.2.4 The Pure Synthesis of Apprehension and Its Transcendental Ground 
So far, Kant takes the above argumentation to suffice to establish that empirical cognition 
requires a synthesis of apprehension. Recall from the introduction of this chapter that the 
subjective deduction must further show two things about this synthesis. First, it must show that it 
is exercised a priori. Second, a transcendental ground of the synthesis needs to be identified. 
Kant carries out the first of these two tasks by arguing that we have a pure or a priori 
synthesis of apprehension: 
                         
103 Cf. the following description of synthesis: “Only the spontaneity of our thought requires that this 
manifold first be gone through, taken up, and combined in a certain way in order for a cognition to be 
made out of it. I call this action synthesis” (A77/B102). 
 112 
Now this synthesis of apprehension must also be exercised a priori, i.e., in regard 
to representations that are not empirical. For without it we could have a priori 
neither the representations of space nor of time, since these can be generated 
only through the synthesis of the manifold that sensibility in its original 
receptivity provides. We therefore have a pure synthesis of apprehension. (A99-
100) 
Kant’s argument here relies on the results of the Transcendental Aesthetic, namely that we have 
a priori intuitions of space and time. Recall that at A94-5, Kant claimed that “[w]e have 
discussed [the a priori use of a faculty] with regard to the senses in the first part above, 
however, we will now attempt to understand the nature of the two other ones.” (A94-5). In the 
Transcendental Aesthetic, he argued that space and time are pure or a priori forms of our sensible 
intuition, through which we can have a priori mathematical cognition. Thus, sense, considered as 
a source of our representations of space and time, has already been shown to be an a priori 
subjective source of cognition. 
Since space and time are represented by us as unities of a manifold of points and instants, 
respectively, we can apply Kant’s earlier argument concerning the representation or cognition of 
something as manifold and as united. Namely, they require the action of running through and 
taking together manifold representations, i.e., they require a synthesis of apprehension. But since 
space and time are pure or a priori representations, this synthesis of apprehension must itself be 
pure and a priori. 
Kant ends here his discussion of the synthesis of apprehension in order to move on to the 
synthesis of reproduction. Thus, he does not explicitly identify the transcendental ground, and 
hence the subjective source, of the synthesis of apprehension. But recall that he identifies this at 
A94-5 and A115 with sense. To understand this, consider what source of representations is 
required for the activity of representing something both as manifold and as unity, which activity 
is carried out in the form of the synthesis of apprehension. It is clear that the representations of 
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space and time are required here, as they provide the most fundamental forms of manifold 
representations (points and instants) that are united (in the wholes of space and time). Thus, the 
transcendental ground for the synthesis of apprehension is sense insofar as it has the pure forms 
of space and time. 
5.3 The Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination 
We have seen much obscurity in Kant’s discussion of the synthesis of apprehension, but 
things do not get any easier. To understand the details of his discussion of the synthesis of 
reproduction, it is helpful to consider where he intends to end up. Accordingly, I shall begin by 
summarizing the final conclusions Kant asserts. 
5.3.1 Three Conclusions 
The final paragraph of the subsection runs as follows: 
The synthesis of apprehension is therefore inseparably combined with the 
synthesis of reproduction. And since the former constitutes the transcendental 
ground of the possibility of all cognition in general (not only of empirical 
cognition, but also of pure a priori cognition), the reproductive synthesis of the 
imagination belongs among the transcendental actions of the mind, and with 
respect to this we will also call this faculty the transcendental faculty of the 
imagination. (A102) 
Kant advances here three conclusions. First is the thesis that the synthesis of apprehension is 
“inseparably combined with” the synthesis of reproduction. This might mean one of two things: 
a) if the synthesis of apprehension is to produce empirical cognition, then the synthesis of 
reproduction must also occur; or, b) the synthesis of apprehension all on its own presupposes the 
synthesis of reproduction. It is common for interpreters to advance (b), which is a natural reading 
if we look ahead and see that Kant holds that the synthesis of reproduction “would be in vain” 
without the synthesis of recognition (A103). Interpretation (b) would thus hold that each 
synthesis has as its necessary condition the next one, setting aside the issue of how each might 
contribute to empirical cognition: the synthesis of apprehension presupposes that of 
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reproduction, which in turn presupposes the synthesis of recognition. Alternatively, I suggest that 
interpretation (a) makes better sense of Kant’s argument. As we have already seen, I have shown 
that Kant’s extremely obscure opening sentence of the subsection on the first synthesis is made 
intelligible if we understand Kant as presupposing that we heave empirical cognition with the 
aim of investigating what makes it possible. Furthermore, we shall see that Kant’s argument for 
holding that the synthesis of apprehension requires the synthesis of reproduction works only if it 
is supposed that the synthesis of apprehension is supposed to produce empirical cognition. 
The second sentence of the above passage provides a brief argument for the passage’s 
second conclusion, namely, the thesis that “the reproductive synthesis of the imagination belongs 
among the transcendental actions of the mind”. The reproductive synthesis of the imagination is 
transcendental insofar as it is necessary for the possibility of empirical cognition. Kant’s brief 
argument here is easy enough to summarize if we recall what Kant purported to have achieved in 
the previous subsection. As argued in the previous subsection, the synthesis of apprehension is 
transcendental insofar as it is necessary for the possibility of empirical cognition. But if this 
thesis is joined with the previously stated conclusion that the synthesis of apprehension is 
inseparably combined with the synthesis of reproduction, then the second conclusion that follows 
is that the synthesis of reproduction is transcendental by likewise being necessary for the 
possibility of any cognition. The success of this argument depends crucially, therefore, upon 
Kant’s case for the first conclusion. 
The third conclusion given in the above passage is that we have a “transcendental faculty 
of imagination”. As we shall see Kant’s analysis of the synthesis of reproduction shows that such 
a synthesis must be carried out by what Kant calls “imagination”. Accordingly, the imagination 
is the transcendental ground of the synthesis of reproduction, and it is therefore one of the 
 115 
subjective sources of cognition that is the concern of the subjective deduction. Insofar as Kant 
shows the imagination makes possible empirical cognition by means of an empirical synthesis of 
reproduction, it is clear that Kant is warranted in calling it transcendental. 
But recall that Kant’s ultimate aim is to show that the three subjective sources of 
cognition are not merely transcendental in this way but also a priori, i.e., they furnish a priori 
representations for the synthesis of reproduction to be exercised a priori. In the above paragraph, 
Kant does not mention these further claims, although he does imply them earlier in his discussion 
of the synthesis of reproduction. As we shall see, however, this is a particularly vexing issue. But 
before we come to that, let us first consider what exactly the synthesis of reproduction does and 
how Kant attempts to establish that it is inseparably combined with the synthesis of 
apprehension. 
5.3.2 The Need for a Synthesis of Reproduction 
Kant begins this subsection with the following sentence: 
It is, to be sure, a merely empirical law in accordance with which 
representations104 that have often followed or accompanied [begleitet] one 
another are finally associated [vergesellschaften] with each other and thereby 
placed in a connection [Verknüpfung] in accordance with which, even without 
the presence of the object [die Gegenwart des Gegenstandes], one of these 
representations brings about [hervorbringt] a transition of the mind to the other 
in accordance with a constant rule. (A100) 
Just as Kant began the previous subsection with an obscure first sentence, so too he continues 
here by bringing in several considerations whose relevance is quite opaque. The crucial notion 
here is that of association, but nothing in the previous subsection (let alone anything else that 
                         
104 I read Kant’s initial use of the term “representations” here as referring to what is represented rather 
than the act of representing. The relevance of this will be considered in a later section. 
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came before in the Critique) made any reference to that notion. Our first task, then, is to work 
out what Kant means by association and why Kant is concerned with it.105 
First, it is necessary to specify what is associated. What are associated are 
“representations that have often followed or accompanied one another”. Thus, representations 
that are contiguous in time or space are associated with one another.106 Second, it is necessary to 
specify what sort of connection there is between associated representations. Kant describes 
association as not merely putting contiguous representations into any sort of connection, but 
more specifically into “a connection in accordance with which, even without the presence of the 
                         
105 Kant offers his most helpful and succinct characterization of association in the Anthropology: “The law 
of association is this: empirical ideas that have frequently followed one another produce a habit in the 
mind such that when one idea is produced, the other also comes into being” (7:176). Other discussions of 
association include: R5203, R5619, Brief 11:52; AF 25: 511-4; ML1 28:236, MM 29:883, ML2 28:585, 
and MD 28:674. Given that Kant, as I have held, includes Hume as an interlocutor in the transcendental 
deduction, one might be tempted to think that Kant’s mention of association (via the Germanic verb 
“vergesellschaften” at A100 and the more frequently used Latin-based noun “Assoziation” at A112-3, 
A115, A116, A121-5.) is a direct reference to Essay III of Hume’s Enquiry. But although the final edition 
of Hume’s Enquiry that we usually read both has “Of the Association of Ideas” as the title for Essay III 
and uses the word “association” three times, this version of the Enquiry was not the one read by Kant. 
Kant read a German translation of the Enquiry that was based on Hume’s second-edition text. In the 
second edition, Hume’s title for Essay III is “Of the Connexion of Ideas”. Likewise, the word 
“association” does not appear a single time therein, but instead Hume consistently uses the word 
“connexion” throughout. Furthermore, the notion of “association” could not have been introduced to Kant 
via the German translation of the Enquiry, which consistently translates “connexion” as “Verknüpfung”. 
Thus, unless the sparse translations of Hume’s Treatise contain any mentions of association, it is doubtful 
that Kant’s references to association in the A-edition of the first Critique directly refer to Hume. 
Elsewhere, however, Kant does describe Hume as appealing to association (B127, PRO 4:258). 
Nevertheless, there is good reason to think that Kant’s mentions of association indirectly refer to Hume. 
For, Kant carefully read Tetens’s Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre 
Entwickelung [Philosophical Essays about Human Nature and its Development], which contains several 
mentions of “Association” and “Ideenassociationen” in its discussion of Hume on the concept of a causal 
connection (in “Section IV: On the concept of a causal connection” of the “Fourth Essay: On the Power of 
Thought and on Thinking”, 313, 316-7, 318, 320, 322, 323). Tetens treats association as a lawful 
connection—that is, based on a law of the mind—of representations (impressions or ideas), and the 
faculty he holds responsible for such connections is the imagination. But in presenting his principles of 
connection or association, Hume identifies not only imagination but also memory as playing a role in the 
association of ideas. Tetens does not mention memory, and Kant follows him in not mentioning a role for 
memory in making associations. Finally, the primary case of such an association is between things that 
temporally succeed one another, e.g., cause and effect. 
106 In addition to contiguity, Hume’s Enquiry specifies two additional principles of connection or 
association: resemblance and cause or effect. 
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object, one of these representations brings about a transition of the mind to the other in 
accordance with a constant rule”. Since this description is quite complex, we may break it up into 
parts so as to characterize association as an act of the mind that i) takes up contiguous 
representations; ii) places those representations in a connection in virtue of which the mind 
makes a transition from one representation to another, even if the object is not present; and, (iii) 
this transition occurs in accordance with a constant rule. 
In the following sentence, Kant describes the constant rule of (iii) as a “law of 
reproduction”. This helps shed light on the relationship between association and reproduction. 
Since the constant rule mentioned is what guides the mind in making a transition from one 
representation to another representation associated with the first, it is the transition of the mind 
that counts as reproduction.107 And since this transition is required for there to be association, 
reproduction is a necessary condition for association. And since this reproduction must operate in 
accordance with a constant rule, a law of reproduction is necessary for association. 
Kant moves on after this first sentence to elaborate—in the remainder of the first 
paragraph and the start of the second paragraph—on the necessary conditions for (iii), i.e., the 
necessary conditions for a law of reproduction. But this still leaves unclear why and how exactly 
reproduction in general, whether it has a law or not, is involved in empirical cognition. That is, 
we might want to know the cognitive role played by association involving (i) and (ii). In the 
second half of the second paragraph, Kant describes some examples that illustrate more 
concretely what the synthesis of reproduction does to contribute to cognition, just before he 
presents the earlier-discussed concluding remarks of the final paragraph. 
Kant’s illustrations run as follow: 
                         
107 Kant discusses reproduction at several other places, including MD 28:674, ML2 28:585, MM 29:884, 
ML1 28:236, MV 28:448-50, Loses Blatt B 12 (23:18-20). 
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Now it is obvious that if I draw a line in thought, or think of the time from one 
noon to the next, or just [auch nur] want to represent a certain number to myself, 
I must necessarily first grasp [fassen] one of these manifold representations after 
another in my thoughts. But if I were always to lose the preceding 
representations (the first parts of the line, the preceding parts of time, or the 
successively represented units) from my thoughts and not reproduce them when 
I proceed to the following ones, then a whole representation would never, and 
none of the previously mentioned thoughts, not even the purest and most 
fundamental representations of space and time, be able to arise. (A102)108 
For all three examples, Kant claims that “[he] must necessarily first grasp one of these manifold 
representations after another in [his] thoughts” (A102), which grasping activity is clearly 
performed via the synthesis of apprehension. Kant’s next sentence asserts that if the synthesis of 
apprehension is carried out without any reproduction of representations, then no “whole 
representation” could arise, e.g., the whole representations of “a line in thought”, of “the time 
from one noon to the next”, or of “a certain number”. Recall that the synthesis of apprehension 
was required for empirical cognition in order to represent a manifold of intuition both as 
manifold and as a unity. The synthesis of reproduction is necessary for the production of 
something further: a whole representation.109 Recall that Kant’s characterization of cognition 
given just before the subjective deduction states that cognition is a whole of compared and 
connected representations.110 Thus, in this way, the synthesis of reproduction is a necessary 
condition for empirical cognition. 
This summary of Kant’s view prompts several questions. First, what is it to have a whole 
representation, over and above a representation of a manifold of intuition as a unity? Second, 
                         
108 I have modified the translation slightly. Notice that of the three examples, the first and third concern a 
priori representations: drawing a line in thought, which is an a priori spatial-geometrical representation, 
and representing a certain number to oneself, which is an a priori temporal-arithmetical representation. 
But the second example, thinking of the time from one noon to the next, is empirical in character. Thus, 
despite the surrounding material, the second example indicates that Kant is not merely concerned here 
with a priori representation or cognition—pace Allison 2015: 215-6—but also empirical cognition. 
109 As we shall see, the synthesis of reproduction is not sufficient; for the synthesis of recognition is also 
necessary. 
110 Kant also asserts the necessity of a whole representation for cognition at R5221, MM 29: 800. 
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why is this required for empirical cognition? Third, why is a synthesis of reproduction necessary 
for producing a whole representation? 
With regard to the first question, recall that the synthesis of apprehension makes possible 
a united representation, so a whole representation must involve something more. The basic idea 
is that, whereas representations that form a unity might not have any further connections to one 
another besides being brought together, representations that form a whole must bear further 
connections to one another. An illustration of this thought can be found in the Metaphysik 
Mrongovius: 
All objects of experience have their nature, for without this no experience is 
possible. Experience is not an aggregate of perceptions, but rather a whole of 
perceptions connected according to a principle. Consequently there must be a 
principle in every thing, according to which the perceptions are connected and 
this is — nature. (29: 934) 
A mere aggregate counts as a unity, but it does not count as a whole in the sense that Kant is 
concerned with in analyzing experience or empirical cognition: a unity of representations that are 
connected to one another in regular ways. 
One might object that the quoted passage does not fully support this way of 
distinguishing between a unity and a whole. For perhaps Kant is not drawing a distinction 
between an aggregate and a whole in general but rather between an aggregate and a whole, the 
representations of which are connected according to a principle. This objection is bolstered by 
another passage found in Metaphysik L1 (28: 266).111 According to this passage, a whole 
                         
111 Although this claim is made in the context of a discussion of the simplicity of the soul, the point here 
seems to be more general. Here is the passage in full: “One and precisely the same simple thought can 
take place only in one simple subject. For if the parts of the representations should be divided among 
many subjects, then each subject would have only one part of the representation, therefore no single 
subject would have the whole representation. But for the whole representation to be wholly in a subject, 
all parts of the representation must also be in the one subject. For if they are not connected together in the 
one subject, then the representation is not whole.” 
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representation must be a representation in which parts of a representation are connected together 
in one thing, and this means that a whole representation requires only that various partial 
representations be connected together into one, but not that they be connected according to a 
principle. Thus, I suggest that we understand a unity as the mere joining together of manifold 
representations into one representation and a whole representation as a unity whose partial 
representations bear connections to one another besides that of being united. 
Although the direct textual support so far for this reading is somewhat weak, we shall see 
that this reading will help us make sense of both why the synthesis of apprehension suffices for 
forming a unity but not a whole representation and why the synthesis of reproduction is required 
for constructing a whole representation. 
We can see why Kant is concerned with a whole representation, rather than a merely 
united one, by considering again that Kant is attempting to explain what is necessary for 
empirical cognition. Specifically, a whole representation is required for a cognitive subject to 
have a normative reason for making sensory discriminations. To count as a normative reason, a 
representation must represent both the thing(s) identified or differentiated and the mark(s) in 
virtue of which that thing is (or those things are) identified or differentiated. For as Kant claims 
in several Reflexionen, “[w]e cognize things only through marks” (R2279, R2281; cf. R2282-8), 
and this is because a mark is “[a] partial representation [that is] a ground of cognition for the 
whole representation” (R2282). But to represent a mark (or marks) as a ground for identifying or 
differentiating a thing (or things) requires not merely representing conjointly the mark(s) and the 
thing(s). In order for a mark to be a partial representation that is a ground of empirical cognition, 
i.e., a basis for a normative reason for sensory discrimination, it must have some connection to 
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whatever is discriminated, and this connection must be something more than that of being united 
in an aggregate with the thing discriminated. 
As an example, consider again my rational sensory discrimination of Bella at the pet 
shelter. Recall that I discriminate her on the basis of the distinctive white spot of fur on her head. 
In this case, the ground of my cognition, i.e., my normative reason, is a mark that is a part of a 
larger whole, namely it is a part of Bella. Thus, in order to have a normative reason for making 
rational sensory discriminations, i.e., in in order to have empirical cognition, one must have a 
whole representation in which representations are connected in determinate ways. 
We have just seen why having a whole representation is necessary for empirical 
cognition. Given this explanation, we can see why Kant is concerned in this context with 
association. In order for a cognitive subject to have a whole representation in which marks are 
represented that can serve as normative grounds for cognition, there must be association. This is 
because the representation of a normative reason is itself a connection of multiple representations 
allowing for the mind to make a transition from one representation, e.g., a white spot on a cat’s 
head, to another, e.g., Bella. 
Unlike with the synthesis of apprehension, Kant does not give a direct characterization of 
the synthesis of reproduction. But on the basis of the above interpretation, we may offer one on 
his behalf. First, note that a synthesis of reproduction must do something more than merely 
reproduce representations, viz., it must synthesize or put together representations in some way. 
Thus, the synthesis of reproduction is the putting together of a whole representation by means of 
reproduction, which is carried out on the basis of laws of association, in order to bring back past 
representations in connection with each other or with present representations. 
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5.3.3 The “Inseparable Combination” 
We can see finally why the synthesis of apprehension must be supplemented by the 
synthesis of reproduction. The synthesis of apprehension does not suffice for establishing 
associations or whole representations. Recall that the synthesis of apprehension grasps a 
diachronic manifold—in which manifold representations are given successively in time through 
inner sense—by running through and taking together the manifold representations. This allows 
for the manifold of intuition to be represented both as manifold and as a unity, but only insofar as 
they are originally given in succession, i.e., sensed. But a whole representation is one that 
requires past representations to represent marks that serve as grounds for discriminating 
something. For these past representations to contribute to forming a whole representation, they 
must be reproduced. But since the senses are passive, the representations in a manifold of 
intuition do not reproduce themselves, and so it is necessary that reproduction be carried out 
through an active or spontaneous synthesis. Hence, there must be a synthesis of reproduction. 
Thus runs Kant’s argument for his conclusion that “[t]he synthesis of apprehension is 
therefore inseparably combined with the synthesis of reproduction” (A102). I take it that Kant’s 
claim that they are “inseparably combined” is meant to emphasize that the two syntheses are not 
to be understood as two temporally distinct operations; rather, these syntheses necessarily occur 
jointly in the operation of the mind that produces empirical cognition. 
5.3.4 Imagination as the Transcendental Ground of the Synthesis of Reproduction 
Finally, this synthesis of reproduction requires that the imagination be a second 
transcendental source of cognition. Kant does not make clear how this is so, but it becomes 
clearer when we consider his definition of the imagination. In the B-Deduction, Kant defines the 
imagination as “the faculty for representing an object even without its presence in intuition” 
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(B151). Since reproduction produces a representation of what was once present in intuition but is 
now no longer so, it is clear that this must occur through the faculty of imagination. Since 
imagination must ground any reproduction, and since cognition requires a synthesis of 
reproduction, it follows that the imagination is a transcendental source of cognition in that it 
makes possible the synthesis of reproduction necessary for cognition. Although Kant holds that 
the imagination is also a priori or pure, there are many difficulties with his argument for that 
further view. We will return to them in Chapter 7. 
5.4 The Synthesis of Recognition in the Concept 
Kant next aims to show that yet another synthesis is required for empirical cognition, the 
synthesis of recognition, and he will go on to show that this synthesis must be grounded on 
another subjective source of cognition, what he calls “apperception”. In this section, we consider 
that subjective source of cognition only empirically, what Kant calls “empirical consciousness”, 
and we shall return to its a priori status in Chapter 6. 
5.4.1 Why the Synthesis of Recognition Is Necessary for Empirical Cognition 
Kant begins by noting that, just as the synthesis of apprehension presupposes that of 
reproduction in order to produce empirical cognition, so too the synthesis of reproduction 
presupposes another synthesis: 
Without consciousness that that [das] which we think is the very same as what 
we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations 
would be in vain.112 For it [es, i.e., that which we think] would be a new 
representation in our current state, which would not belong at all to the act 
through which it had been gradually generated, and its manifold [das 
Mannigfaltige derselben, i.e., the manifold of the new representation in our 
current state] would never constitute a whole, since it would lack the unity that 
only consciousness can obtain for it. (A103) 
                         
112 In light of what I argued in Section 3.2.1, it is notable that this is Kant’s first use of the term 
“consciousness” in the A-deduction. 
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Without using the term itself, Kant begins this passage by describing recognition, characterized 
as a “consciousness that that which we think is the very same as what we thought a moment 
before”. Unfortunately, Kant is clear about neither what is recognized nor the sense in which 
something is recognized as the same. 
Kant goes on to offer an example that sheds some light on both of these issues. 
If, in counting, I forget that the units that now hover before my senses were 
successively added to each other by me, then I would not cognize the generation 
of the multitude through this successive addition of one to the other, and 
consequently I would not cognize the number; for this concept consists solely in 
the consciousness of this unity of the synthesis. (A103) 
Before explicating this example, it should be noted that it is somewhat misleading for Kant’s 
main aim, since it describes neither an example of empirical cognition nor an example in which 
empirical reproduction is involved. Nevertheless, the example can apply to empirical cognition 
insofar as the act of recognition involved in counting is similar to the one involved in empirical 
cognition. Kant is clear in the counting example that what is recognized is not any of the 
numbers, i.e., not the cognized objects. Rather, cognition of a counted number requires that one 
must remember or recognize “that the units that now hover before my senses were successively 
added to each other by me” (my emphasis). That is, what is recognized is the act of synthesis, 
which is in this case an act of successive addition. Kant elaborates this point by claiming that the 
concept of the counted number “consists solely in the consciousness of this unity of the 
synthesis” (my emphasis). Kant’s thought is that consciousness of the unity of the synthesis is a 
consciousness that there is one synthesis—viz., successive addition—that has been carried out 
throughout the process of generating the counted number.113 In other words, consciousness of the 
                         
113 As Allison observes, the type of recognition involved is not one in which two things are represented as 
(numerically) identical (2015: 218-9). 
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unity of the synthesis just is a recognition of there being one and the same synthesis throughout 
the entire process of generating the counted number. 
In his preview summary of the threefold synthesis, Kant had already claimed that original 
apperception—which grounds the synthesis of recognition—is responsible for the unity of 
synthesis, specifically the synthesis of reproduction through imagination (A94). Much later in 
the A-edition’s Transcendental Deduction chapter, Kant indicates why the synthesis of 
reproduction needs a unity and how the synthesis of recognition provides such a unity: 
if representations reproduced one another without distinction, just as they fell 
together, there would in turn be no determinate connection but merely unruly 
heaps of them, and no cognition at all would arise; their reproduction must thus 
have a rule in accordance with which a representation enters into combination 
in the imagination with one representation rather than with any others. (A121) 
As we saw earlier, the synthesis of reproduction is necessary for producing connections between 
the representations of a cognized manifold of intuition. But such connections would not be 
determinate if reproduction were not guided by a rule. Thus, although the synthesis of 
reproduction on its own suffices for producing connections, it does not suffice for producing 
determinate connections, which Kant indicates is necessary for cognition. What is further 
necessary is a rule that guides the synthesis of reproduction, and this rule is provided by a 
concept. 
After presenting the counting example, Kant indicates the need to appeal to concepts: 
The word “concept” itself could already lead us to this remark. For it is this one 
consciousness that unifies the manifold that has been successively intuited, and 
then also reproduced, into one representation. […] [O]ne consciousness [i.e., the 
empirical consciousness of recognition] must always be found […] without that 
concepts, and with them cognition of objects, would be entirely impossible 
(A103-4). 
Kant’s point here is that a concept provides for the unity of the whole process of synthesizing a 
manifold of intuition in order to produce cognition. The above passage does not make clear how 
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this is so, and Kant moves on to discuss the meaning of the expression “an object of 
representations”. But after that detour (the importance of which will be discussed in Section 6.3), 
Kant returns to the topic of how cognition requires concepts: 
All cognition requires a concept, however imperfect or obscure it may be; but as 
far as its form is concerned the latter is always something general, and something 
that serves as a rule. (A106) 
I suggest that Kant’s thought is that a concept makes possible a consciousness that a 
representation is the same as what came before—i.e., makes possible recognition—by providing 
a rule that serves two purposes or functions: 1) a rule that governs or guides the synthesis of 
reproduction in order to produce determinate connections; and, 2) a rule that enables a cognitive 
subject to represent those determinate connections as marks or as normative reasons.114 
My account of empirical cognition as rational sensory discrimination makes clear the 
need for both of these functions of concepts to be fulfilled. Rational sensory discrimination 
requires that a cognitive subject have a representation of a normative reason for her identification 
or differentiation of things. As we have seen, such a representation must portray connections 
between the thing(s) identified or differentiated, and Kant describes these connections as marks. 
But the representation of a connection would not be a ground for discrimination if it did not 
represent a determinate connection between the mark and the thing(s) discriminated; otherwise 
the connection would not be reliable or constant and could not be intelligibly represented as 
grounding a normative reason for discrimination. The connections made by the synthesis of 
reproduction can be made determinate if they are made in accordance with rules that serve to 
make the connections reliable or constant. Thus, concepts serve the first of the two functions 
given above insofar as they serve as rules of synthesis. 
                         
114 This distinction is indebted to, but not identical with, one made by Longuenesse 1998: 46-50. 
 127 
But the representation of a normative reason must not only represent determinate 
connections but also represent marks as normative reasons. A mark is either a concept of a thing 
or a part of a thing (R2282), or more generally “a partial representation, which as such is a 
ground of cognition” (R2286). If the mark is a concept of the discriminated thing, then the 
discriminated thing is connected to the mark in virtue of being subordinated under the latter.115 
In order for a cognitive subject to represent a normative reason, not only must she have a 
representation of a mark as part of a whole, but also she must be able to represent a mark as a 
ground for her sensory discrimination. This is captured by Kant’s statement that “the 
understanding can make no use of […] concepts than that of judging by means of them” 
(A68/B93). That is, a concept contributes to representing a normative reason by being used 
within a judgment. Put simply, normative reasons just are judgments, representations in which 
concepts are subsumed under other concepts. 
Returning to our example, if I discriminate Bella on the basis of representing the 
distinctive white spot on her head, this representation would not count as a normative reason 
unless it served as a ground of cognition. For example, I must be able to cite or express it as a 
normative reason if I am asked for the basis of my sensory discrimination. For Kant, the 
representation that serves this function is a judgment—e.g., “Bella has a distinctive white spot on 
her forehead”—and this judgment deploys a mark that is conceptualized, viz., “distinctive white 
spot on her forehead”.116 
                         
115 For more on this notion of subordination in Kant, see A 7: 138 and LB 24: 108. 
116 The appeal to judgment allows Kant to avoid restricting empirical cognition to what we directly 
observe. For example, suppose that I were to tell a friend to go to the pet shelter to pick up Bella and that, 
because the friend has never seen Bella, I tell the friend about the distinctive spot of fur. In this case, 
when the friend discriminates and identifies a cat as Bella—again, whether correctly or not—he does so 
on the basis of a mark that is a concept, “having a distinctive white spot of fur on the head”, which 
concept is a partial concept of his whole concept of “Bella”. In this way, my friend can be said to have 
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Each of the two uses of concepts involves recognition. Insofar as a concept is a rule of 
synthesis (the first function of concepts), it guides the process of generating a representation of a 
reliable or determinate connection over time, and this involves a synthesis of recognition because 
there must be a consciousness of one and the same synthesis that produces a determinate 
connection. Insofar as a concept is a rule of judging (the second function of concepts), it enables 
one to represent a reason for discrimination, and this involves a synthesis of recognition because 
there must be a consciousness that the marks contained in the concept are the same marks found 
in the sensible object(s) discriminated. 
With these two functions of rules, we are now in a position to understand Kant’s two 
reasons for asserting that if the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction were to take place 
without recognition, it “would be in vain” (A103), i.e., not contribute to empirical cognition.117 
His first reason is that without a synthesis of recognition, an unrecognized reproduced 
representation “would not belong at all to the act through which it had been gradually generated” 
(A103). The synthesis of recognition enables a cognitive subject to use concepts as rules for 
synthesis by means of which she recognizes or is conscious of the unity of the synthesis of 
reproduction. Thus, without the synthesis of recognition, there would not be such a 
consciousness of the unity of the synthesis, i.e., reproduced representations would not be 
guaranteed to be related in rule-governed connections. In that sense, they “would not belong at 
all to the act through which [the reproduced representation] had been gradually generated”. And 
as I argued above, determinate or rule-governed connections are necessary for empirical 
cognition insofar as a normative reason represents such connections. Thus, without the synthesis 
                         
empirical cognition even though the ground for his discrimination is not something that he directly 
observed. 
117 Allison treats this phrase in the same way (2015: 218). 
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of recognition insofar as it involves the use of concepts as rules for synthesis, the earlier 
syntheses would be in vain insofar as they would not produce cognition. 
Kant’s second reason that the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction would be in 
vain without a synthesis of recognition is that the manifold of a reproduced representation 
“would never constitute a whole, since it would lack the unity that only consciousness can obtain 
for it” (A103). The synthesis of recognition enables a cognitive subject to use concepts as rules 
for judging, by means of which she recognizes marks of things as normative reasons. Thus, 
without the synthesis of recognition, a reproduced representation could not be relied upon to 
represent a normative reason, and hence it could not be represented as part of a whole 
representation, viz., a judgment, in which a mark is represented as a ground for discrimination. 
Thus, without the synthesis of recognition insofar as it involves the use of concepts as rules for 
judging, the earlier syntheses could not produce empirical cognition and would in that sense be 
in vain. 
5.4.2 Empirical Consciousness as the Transcendental Ground of Recognition 
Insofar as the empirical synthesis of reproduction deploys concepts, it is not possible 
through the passivity of the senses; rather, it must be carried out by the active or spontaneous 
understanding. For earlier in the Metaphysical Deduction, Kant asserted: 
Concepts are […] grounded on the spontaneity of thinking, as sensible 
intuitions are grounded on the receptivity of impressions. (A68/B93) 
For each spontaneous synthesis of the understanding, Kant identifies a subjective source as its 
ground. The subjective source that grounds the empirical synthesis of recognition is, as Kant 
summarizes later, “apperception in the empirical consciousness of the identity of […] 
reproductive representations with the appearances through which they were given” (A115). It is 
important to emphasize that although Kant identifies the source as apperception, the argument so 
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far has not yet referred us to pure apperception. Rather, all that is required for the empirical 
synthesis of recognition is empirical consciousness. Insofar as the faculty of apperception makes 
empirical cognition possible—by providing the empirical consciousness required for the 
empirical synthesis of recognition—the faculty can be considered to be transcendental. But as 
we shall consider in Chapter 6, Kant thinks that transcendental apperception is also pure, but that 
will take us beyond empirical synthesis to pure synthesis. 
5.5 Summary 
To conclude this chapter, I offer a brief summary of the roles played by each of the parts 
of the empirical threefold synthesis. I then shall take a step back and reflect on what sort of 
investigation Kant is engaged in. Finally, I shall state what still needs to be accomplished by 
Kant. 
The synthesis of apprehension runs through a diachronic manifold of intuitive 
representations and takes them together, and in so doing the mind can represent the manifold of 
intuitive representations as manifold (in virtue of the act of running through the representations) 
and as united (in virtue of taking together all those representations). Representing the manifold 
of intuition as manifold and as united is necessary for empirical cognition because in order for a 
cognitive subject to have normative reasons for her sensory discriminations, she must have a 
representation that unites the manifold things of which she makes discriminations. 
But the representation of a united manifold still does not suffice for a cognitive subject to 
have normative reasons. This is because those normative reasons must not merely represent the 
discriminated things together at once but also represent the marks in virtue of which the things 
are discriminated. Accordingly, the cognitive subject must have a whole representation in which 
marks are connected to objects. In order for this to happen, the synthesis of apprehension must be 
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accompanied by the synthesis of reproduction. The latter synthesis generates this whole 
representation both by creating copies of past representations that the mind has associated with 
the manifold representations contained in the united manifold represented through the synthesis 
of apprehension and by combining these copied representations with the representations with 
which they are associated. 
But again, the twofold synthesis of apprehension and of reproduction would not suffice 
for the representation of a normative reason, and hence empirical cognition, if it were not carried 
out with a synthesis of recognition. This is because the representation of determinate connections 
between things, required for a whole representation, can be determinate only if those connections 
are made by the mind in accordance with a rule. Thus, concepts as rules of synthesis are needed 
for representing determinate connections. But concepts as rules of judging are also needed for 
representing determinate connections or marks as normative reasons and hence as communicable 
to others. Thus, a cognitive subject can represent a normative reason only if she forms a 
judgment in which the discriminated thing(s) and marks are conceptualized. 
As should be clear, I have relied heavily on my interpretation of empirical cognition to 
make sense of Kant’s arguments for the empirical threefold synthesis. More specifically, I have 
shown how each part of the threefold synthesis is necessary for empirical cognition insofar as the 
latter requires that sensory discriminations be made on the basis of normative reasons. Namely, a 
cognitive subject would not be able to represent normative reasons for her sensory 
discriminations if her mind did not perform the threefold synthesis. This, I believe, helps us to 
understand better the nature of Kant’s investigation of the mind’s cognitive faculties. Many 
commentators have balked at what seems to be the abstract psychological theorizing that fails to 
be informed by any empirical investigation. Strawson famously described the transcendental 
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deduction as “an essay in the imaginary subject of transcendental psychology”.118 This charge 
seems particularly apt of Kant’s theory of the threefold synthesis. But I think that this worry 
loses its force if we recognize that Kant is concerned not so much with explaining the conditions 
for the possibility of representations in general as with making clear what is necessary for 
representing normative reasons. That is, Kant’s inquiry is primarily epistemological, and it 
engages in psychological theorizing only to the extent that it is needed for making intelligible the 
representation of normative reasons. 
That is surely not the last word on that subject, but I have also not yet stated my last word 
on Kant’s subjective deduction. For the subjective deduction aims to identify three 
transcendental and a priori subjective sources of cognition, along with the a priori syntheses 
based on each. In discussing the synthesis of apprehension, I have already indicated how the 
Transcendental Aesthetic provided Kant with the resources for identifying our sensibility as an a 
priori subjective source of cognition, on the basis of which an a priori synthesis of apprehension 
is carried out. Likewise, we have seen that the faculty of imagination’s empirical synthesis of 
reproduction and empirical consciousness’s (or empirical apperception’s) synthesis of 
recognition are necessary for empirical cognition. To that extent, the imagination and empirical 
consciousness are transcendental faculties. But we have not yet seen why there must be either an 
a priori synthesis of reproduction or an a priori synthesis of recognition, and hence why we must 
have a priori faculties of imagination and apperception. This is because Kant’s arguments for 
these further views are exceedingly complex. In the next chapter, I present Kant’s argument for 
apperception as an a priori subjective source of cognition. I do so prior to discussing the 
                         
118 1966: 32. 
 133 
imagination’s a priori status because Kant’s argument for pure imagination crucially relies on his 
theory of pure apperception. Thus, we shall return to the imagination in Chapter 7.  
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Chapter 6: Transcendental Apperception as an A Priori Subjective Source of Cognition 
In the previous chapter, we saw how an empirical synthesis of recognition is necessary 
for empirical cognition, and we saw that that this empirical use is grounded on empirical 
consciousness. But to complete his aim in the subjective deduction, Kant needs to uncover the 
pure subjective source of cognition that grounds a pure synthesis of recognition and thereby 
makes possible a cognitive connection between the understanding and objects. It might seem as 
if the answer should be obvious based on a parallelism with the synthesis of apprehension. Just 
as the synthesis of apprehension in intuition is grounded on the subjective source of pure 
intuition, so too the synthesis of recognition in the concept might seem to be grounded on the 
subjective source of pure concepts, viz., the pure understanding. And since the Metaphysical 
Deduction was supposed to show that we do have pure concepts and a pure understanding, it thus 
might seem as if there is no further task to carry out. 
But these semblances are incorrect. The parallel with the synthesis of apprehension 
cannot work because the aim of the subjective deduction is to identify three subjective sources of 
cognition that make possible the understanding’s cognitive relationship to objects, and so the 
understanding cannot be one of those sources. Likewise, the Metaphysical Deduction cannot 
suffice for the subjective deduction’s task because the mere fact that we possess a priori concepts 
does not guarantee that they have a cognitive relation to objects. Instead of attempting to identify 
the subjective source of pure concepts, Kant’s procedure is to try to identify the capacity that 
enables a cognitive subject to recognize by means of concepts. 
This, then, calls for a revision in how we view the earlier subjective sources. The 
subjective deduction does not aim to identify the sources for various types of representations; 
rather, the task is really to identify the sources for activities (i.e., syntheses) that use those 
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different types of representations. The former task would be redundant with other parts of the 
Critique: the Transcendental Aesthetic, the Metaphysical Deduction, and the Schematism each 
investigate how, respectively, our faculties of sensibility, understanding, and imagination provide 
pure representations. Accordingly, in identifying the pure subjective source of cognition for the 
synthesis of recognition, the task is to determine the source, not of concepts, but rather the a 
priori source or capacity that enables the mind to recognize by means of concepts in order to 
bring unity to the combined synthesis of apprehension and reproduction.119 
In this chapter, I show why Kant thinks that merely empirical consciousness does not 
suffice for the synthesis of recognition, but that what is needed is not only a form of a priori 
consciousness but also self-consciousness. Kant calls this “transcendental apperception”. 
Accordingly, this chapter presents Kant’s argument for transcendental apperception as the 
ground of the synthesis of reproduction. 
6.1 The Overall Argument for Pure Apperception 
Kant’s strategy to show that transcendental apperception is a pure subjective source of 
cognition is most clearly outlined in the following passage, which follows a discussion of how a 
concept represents a “necessary reproduction of the manifold of given intuitions”: 
Every necessity has a transcendental condition as its ground. A transcendental 
ground must therefore be found for the unity of the consciousness in the 
synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions, hence also of the concepts of 
objects in general, consequently also of all objects of experience, without which 
it would be impossible to think of any object for our intuitions; for the latter is 
                         
119 A parallel is easy enough to make with the synthesis of reproduction: the imagination enables the 
activity of reproduction by being “the faculty for representing an object even without its presence in 
intuition” (B151). But it is harder to see how a parallel with the synthesis of apprehension could work. 
Since the senses are supposed to be a passive faculty, it seems that all they could do to enable the activity 
of apprehension is to be a source of representations that are united manifolds, viz., space and time. 
Perhaps this difficulty accounts for Kant’s opaque references to the senses being responsible for a 
“synopsis”, which seems to grant them with an active and not merely passive role. For more on the notion 
of synopsis, see Allison 2015: 201. 
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nothing more than the something for which the concept expresses such a 
necessity of synthesis. (A106) 
After this passage, Kant goes on to argue that the necessity of a concept, insofar as it is a rule 
legislating necessary reproduction, has transcendental apperception as its transcendental ground. 
Since transcendental apperception is an a priori faculty, this amounts to showing that 
transcendental apperception is the pure subjective source of cognition that makes possible the 
synthesis of recognition. Schematically, the argument runs as follows: 
1) The synthesis of reproduction is carried out by means of a concept that represents 
the necessary reproduction of the manifold of given intuitions (this is the element 
of necessity of “the unity of the consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of 
all our intuitions”). 
2) This necessity is possible only if grounded on transcendental apperception. 
3) Transcendental apperception is the pure subjective source that makes possible the 
synthesis of reproduction. 
In what follows I consider each premise in turn. Before doing so, I shall note a few reasons why 
this argument is of further importance beyond its contribution to the subjective deduction. 
First, Kant’s argument here is, on my interpretation, one that is shared with the objective 
deduction. Namely, Kant begins by assuming that we have empirical cognition involving 
thought, i.e., judgments made by means of concepts. The above argument shows that 
transcendental apperception is a necessary condition for the understanding’s use of concepts for 
empirical cognition. And this is a crucial move for the objective deduction because Kant will go 
on to argue that transcendental apperception itself is possible only if the categories apply to 
objects of experience, i.e., have objective validity. Second, although Kant elsewhere (in the 
“argument from above” at A117, in the “argument from below” at A121-2, and in the B-
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deduction at B131-2) presents similar arguments or considerations to show that empirical 
cognition presupposes transcendental apperception, none are as detailed or as illuminating as the 
argument presented in the subsection concerning the synthesis of recognition. Accordingly, our 
present task will shed light on one of the crucial steps of the objective deduction. Third, we shall 
see further reason to think that my account of empirical cognition is significant, for that account 
helps clarify the present argument under consideration. 
6.2 The Structure of Kant's Discussion of the Synthesis of Recognition 
In the subsection on the synthesis of recognition, we seem to find a patchwork of 
discussions that are hard to follow. I have managed so far to avoid discussing these complexities. 
But it is now suitable to give a layout of the subsection to clarify my approach in explaining 
Kant’s support for Premises 1 and 2. The subsection can be roughly split up into the following 
parts: 
α) Paragraph 1: presents the need for the synthesis of recognition. 
β) Paragraph 2: links concepts with the synthesis of recognition and gives a brief 
account of what concepts are. 
γ) Paragraphs 3-5: shift to an explanation of the expression “an object of 
representations”. 
δ) Paragraph 6: picks up where β seemed to leave off, namely by describing, in light 
of γ, how cognition requires concepts. 
ε) Paragraphs 7-9: present an argument for transcendental apperception as the 
ground of the necessity pertaining to concepts, and consequently as a necessary 
condition for cognition. 
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ζ) Paragraphs 10-11: conclude the subsection by laying out how transcendental 
apperception is the source of an a priori synthetic unity, and this further 
determines the object of our representations (thereby following up on γ). 
In explaining the empirical synthesis of reproduction, I appealed already to α, β, and δ, but I 
largely skipped γ. That discussion of “an object of representations” is dense and likely serves 
several purposes, but in the next section I focus on how it supports Premise 1 by showing how 
concepts involve an element of necessity. Then, in the following section I examine ε and various 
resources Kant has at his disposal for supporting Premise 2. 
6.3 Premise 1 
In the third through fifth paragraphs of the subsection on the synthesis of recognition, 
there are roughly five main theses Kant advances about the meaning of “an object of 
representations”: 
(i) an object of our representations “must be thought of only as something in general 
= X” (A104); 
(ii) the thought of such an object involves necessity insofar as the object is regarded 
as not being determined merely “at pleasure or arbitrarily” (A104); 
(iii) this necessity is made possible insofar as our representations of the object 
“necessarily agree with each other in relation to it [auf diesen, i.e., the object or 
“Gegenstand”], i.e., they must have that unity that constitutes the concept of an 
object” (A104-105); 
(iv) this unity is “nothing other than the formal unity of the consciousness in the 
synthesis of the manifold of representations” (A105); and, 
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(v) to produce such a unity, this synthesis of the manifold of intuition must be carried 
out “in accordance with a rule that makes the reproduction of the manifold 
necessary a priori and a concept in which this manifold is united possible” (A105) 
Most important for present purposes is (v), and it is clear that what provides the rule mentioned 
therein is a concept. Recall from the previous chapter that the synthesis of recognition in a 
concept is necessary for empirical cognition because a concept serves as a rule in two ways. 
First, as a rule of synthesis, a concept generates a whole of determinate connections between 
representations, specifically between the thing(s) discriminated and their mark(s). Second, as a 
rule of judging, a concept is a subject’s means of representing a mark as a normative reason for 
her sensory discriminations. For our present purposes, what needs to be clarified further is the 
manner in which concepts involve a kind of necessity, viz., how a concept represents a 
“necessary reproduction of the manifold of given intuitions” (A106). 
This necessity is something involved with all concepts, not just a priori ones. This is 
shown in δ, just before Kant discusses apperception directly, with an example of the empirical 
concept of body: 
All cognition requires a concept, however imperfect or obscure it may be; but as 
far as its form is concerned the latter is always something general, and something 
that serves as a rule. Thus the concept of body serves as the rule for our cognition 
of outer appearances by means of the unity of the manifold that is thought 
through it. However, it can be a rule of intuitions only if it represents the 
necessary reproduction of the manifold of given intuitions, hence the synthetic 
unity in the consciousness of them. Thus in the case of the perception of 
something outside of us the concept of body makes necessary the representation 
of extension, and with it that of impenetrability, of shape, etc. (A106) 
Kant does not make it clear here that he is referring to an empirical concept of body, but this is 
entailed by his treatment of the concept as containing the mark of impenetrability, which Kant 
claims elsewhere to be empirical (B5, A173/B215). Insofar as a manifold of intuition is cognized 
by means of this empirical concept, the concept “represents the necessary reproduction of the 
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manifold of intuitions” (A106). The necessity here is a conditional one: if something is cognized 
as a body, then a cognitive subject must represent that thing as extended, impenetrable, having 
shape, etc. Some of what is necessarily reproduced are the marks analytically contained in the 
concept, such as extension, impenetrability, and shape (A8/B12). But some of what is necessarily 
reproduced are marks that are synthetically entailed by the concept but not analytically contained 
in the concept, i.e., not part of the concept’s meaning.120 For example, if a cognitive subject 
holds that all bodies have weight, then she must reproduce the concept of weight in representing 
something as a body, even though the concept of weight is not analytically contained in the 
concept of body (A8/B11-2). Accordingly, the reproduced representations must display those 
combinations, features, or marks that are both necessary for something to count as a body and 
necessary insofar as we hold them to be constantly conjoined with (but not analytically contained 
in) the concept.121 
Furthermore, this conditional necessity is a normative necessity, and this point is essential 
for Kant’s Premise 2. It is not merely a logical necessity because part of what is necessitated is 
the use of marks that are not analytically contained in the concept.122 But it is also not a causal 
necessity because Kant holds that a cognitive subject’s use of concepts via the understanding is 
spontaneous, i.e., not causally determined by a source independent of the subject (A68/B93).123 
By a “normative necessity” I mean roughly the following: something is normatively necessary if 
and only if it is required for a cognitive subject to be epistemically responsible.124 A 
                         
120 My discussion here is indebted to Allison 2015: 221-6 and Keller 1999: 51. 
121 This form of necessity also means that some marks are necessarily not reproduced, e.g., those marks 
that it would be contradictory to join. 
122 Cf. Allison 2015: 226. 
123 Cf. Allison 2015: 221-2. 
124 Allison’s closest attempt to characterize directly normative necessity appeals to the notion of 
“epistemic right”, but that seems too weak for necessity (2015: 268; cf. 365, 442). Allison also rightfully 
notes the connection between normative necessity and universal validity as discussed in the Prolegomena, 
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reproduction of representations is normatively necessary insofar as a cognitive subject would not 
be epistemically responsible (or even worse, would be epistemically unintelligible) if she did not 
perform that reproduction. Two examples can illustrate this. First, consider a cognitive subject 
who fails to reproduce the mark of extension in deploying the concept of body. Since extension 
is analytically contained in the concept of body, either it would be epistemically unintelligible to 
say that she deployed the concept of body or she would be epistemically irresponsible in 
deploying that concept. Second, consider a cognitive subject who holds the synthetic proposition 
that all bodies have weight. It is normatively necessary that she reproduce the mark of weight 
when she deploys the concept of body, and if she does not do so, she is epistemically 
irresponsible. This means only that she necessarily reproduces the mark of weight, not that she 
always has to be conscious or aware of the mark of weight when using the concept of body.125 
6.4 Premise 2 
Let us now consider Premise 2, the thesis that transcendental apperception is the 
transcendental ground of the necessary reproduction of concepts just discussed. The essential 
features of the faculty of pure or transcendental apperception are provided in the following 
passage:126 
All possible appearances belong, as representations, to the whole possible self-
consciousness. But from this, as a transcendental representation, numerical 
identity is inseparable, and certain a priori, because nothing can come into 
cognition except by means of this original apperception. (A113) 
                         
but that latter notion will not directly help us to define normative necessity because Allison himself notes 
that the two notions do not share the same meaning but instead merely reciprocally imply each other 
(Allison 2015: 295). 
125 Nevertheless, as we shall see, if she uses the concept, she must be able to become conscious of it. 
126 Note that sometimes Kant uses “apperception” to denote things other than faculties, e.g., mental acts. 
Cf. Kitcher 2006: 186-96. 
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There are three main features that characterize transcendental apperception. First, it is what 
makes possible a form of self-consciousness, on which empirical consciousness in concept use is 
grounded. Second, it also involves the cognitive subject’s numerical identity, and I shall argue 
that Kant’s view is that transcendental apperception makes possible a form of self-consciousness 
through which a subject is conscious of its own numerical identity. Third, this consciousness of 
the numerical identity of the self cannot be empirical but instead a priori. In what follows, I shall 
show how each is necessary for grounding the normative necessity of the synthesis of 
reproduction, and so is necessary for empirical cognition. 
6.4.1 Self-Consciousness from Normativity 
First, let us consider why the synthesis of recognition requires the possibility of self-
consciousness. I will argue that Kant holds that concepts contribute to a cognitive subject’s 
cognition only insofar as she is conscious of the normative standards according to which those 
concepts are to be applied, and that this in turn requires that it be possible for her to become 
conscious of herself. 
Recall that the cognitive subject under consideration by Kant is one that not merely 
reproduces and recognizes representations in accordance with concepts but also on the basis of 
the rules that concepts provide. What needs to be explained is how a cognitive subject is able to 
recognize something as instantiating a concept that contains a normative necessity. Whether 
intuition instantiates a concept is not something that is simply read off intuition on its own 
because intuition by itself is non-conceptual. Thus, some additional faculty is needed for 
recognizing things as instantiating concepts, and this faculty must be sensitive to the normative 
standards supplied by concepts. This does not require that the subject always be explicitly 
conscious of those rules, but it rather requires a “sensitivity” to rules’ normative standards. By a 
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“sensitivity to rules’ normative standards”, I mean that a cognitive subject is sensitive to rules’ 
normative standards if she is capable of becoming conscious of and applying those normative 
standards in making sensory discriminations, e.g., in discovering that a concept had been applied 
incorrectly or without warrant. In other words, a cognitive subject must be able to evaluate 
whether things possess features warranting the application of a concept or not. This, I suggest, is 
how we are to make sense of Kant’s description of a cognitive subject’s understanding as 
“spontaneous”: it does not merely have sense content presented before it, but it also is capable of 
evaluating whether a concept applies to something in virtue of the concept’s rules.127 Since, as 
Kant claims, concepts are to be used by the understanding only for judgment, the application of a 
concept can always be expressed in the form of a proposition, and so we can also understand the 
cognitive subject as one that is sensitive to reasons that ground possible judgments. 
So far, I have shown why the type of consciousness involved in the synthesis of 
recognition is what might be called a “normative consciousness”, i.e., one sensitive to normative 
standards for applying concepts and making judgments. Having such normative consciousness, I 
suggest, is what provides Kant reason to think that possible self-consciousness grounds or makes 
possible the synthesis of recognition. 
Although not directly stated in the text, which is opaque concerning why Kant brings in 
self-consciousness, one line of reasoning for this view runs as follows. To be conscious of a 
concept’s rule as a normative standard requires that a cognitive subject apprehend her own 
conceptual activity as spontaneous, i.e., not causally necessitated. That is, she must be able to 
recognize that a concept does not apply itself, and hence recognize the possibility of misapplying 
                         
127 Cf. Keller 1999: 11. 
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a rule. To be conscious of the possibility of misapplying a rule requires consciousness that 
something misapplies the rule. As Kant writes in a Reflexion: 
One does not turn directly from error toward truth, but first to consciousness of 
one’s ignorance and suspension of judgment. (R2269 16: 292) 
Since the application or misapplication of a rule is spontaneous, this means that what could 
misapply a rule could not be represented as something in intuition. Rather, it must be oneself that 
applies or misapplies a rule, and a consciousness of the possibility of misapplying a rule thus 
requires self-consciousness. That is, one must be conscious of one’s own capacity to make 
judgments, evaluate reasons for them, and revise them if necessary. In considering a possible 
judgment, I consider implicitly whether I should adopt it. Furthermore, insofar as I can use my 
judgments to make further inferences, I treat them as mine, in the sense that I take them up and 
do something with them.128 
It is important to note that Kant’s view is that this self-consciousness is one that is 
necessarily possible. It is not necessary that one always actually be self-consciousness when 
using concepts or making judgments. Kant’s view leaves open the possibility that a cognitive 
subject can make a judgment without actual self-consciousness. Nevertheless, it is necessary that 
such a subject be able to become self-conscious, insofar as she must be able to consider how she 
made that judgment with respect to normative standards. Otherwise, that subject would not have 
made the judgment on the basis of rules. 
 
 
                         
128 Here, I agree with Keller, who writes: “At least some implicit consciousness of self is built into the 
normative commitment that a judger takes on for her-, him-, or itself. To judge is to place oneself in the 
space of reasons and thus to take on a commitment to offer reasons for what one judges to be the case. 
But this means that, in making a judgment, the judger implicitly takes her-, him-, or itself to be not just 
conforming to rules but also tacitly or overtly obeying rules” (1999: 7). 
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6.4.2 Self-Consciousness of Numerical Identity 
It is fairly straightforward why there must be a numerically identical subject of 
representations. The subjective deduction begins with an examination of what is necessary for a 
single cognitive subject to represent a manifold of representations as a whole of compared and 
connected representations. For both those manifold representations and their processing by the 
threefold synthesis to be cognitively relevant for that cognitive subject, there must be a single 
subject of all those representations. Of course, Kant emphasizes, especially in his discussion of 
the Paralogisms, that this subject must not be understood as a substance or as possessing personal 
identity, but is rather to be taken as merely “the constant logical subject of thinking” (A350) and 
its numerical identity is a “logical identity of the I” (A363). 
But transcendental apperception requires not only that there be a numerically identical 
subject, but also that a cognitive subject must be able to become conscious of herself as 
numerically identical.129 As Kant puts it in the B-Deduction, “it is possible for [a subject] to 
represent the identity of the consciousness in [a manifold of given representations] itself” 
(B133). In the A-Deduction, he writes that there must be a “standing or abiding self in [the] 
stream of inner appearances” (A107). This is because, as we have seen in the subjective 
deduction, empirical cognition arises out of a manifold of representations, and concepts are 
essential for synthesizing determinate connections among them. Insofar as thought employs 
concepts, it involves a function, which Kant defines as “the unity of the action of ordering 
                         
129 To be sure, there is much contention in the secondary literature concerning this point. For a 
perspicuous overview and discussion of this and related issues, see Allison 2015: 121-9. But a discussion 
of that secondary literature would draw us away from seeing how transcendental apperception—whether 
it requires either a numerically identical subject or also a consciousness of a numerically identical 
subject—is a pure subjective source of cognition. 
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different representations under a common one” (A68/B93, my emphasis). Thus, a cognitive 
subject must be able to become conscious of all of these representations together or collectively. 
So, insofar as a cognitive subject is to be normatively sensitive to how she synthesizes 
representations together, she must be conscious of her own numerical identity across all of her 
acts of representing. For example, consider a cognitive subject who is committed to the judgment 
that all bodies have weight and who later cognizes an object by means of the concept of body. 
For such a cognitive subject to be normatively sensitive to the concept of body as necessarily 
united with that of weight, she must be capable of becoming aware not only of herself as 
spontaneous in applying the concept of body but also as committed to the judgment that unites 
the concepts of body and weight. But for her to take herself as genuinely committed to that 
judgment requires that she must represent herself as numerically identical in making that 
judgment and in applying the concept of body in cognizing an object. 
6.4.3 Apperception as A Priori 
So far, I have explained why concepts’ normative necessity requires the possibility of 
both self-consciousness and self-consciousness of a numerically identical cognitive subject. To 
explain each of these points, the text of first Critique unfortunately does not offer much by way 
of explicit argumentation. Thankfully, the text has more to offer regarding why transcendental 
apperception must be not merely empirical but a priori. For Kant argues that a merely empirical 
consciousness is insufficient for the possible consciousness of one’s own numerical identity. He 
writes: 
The consciousness of oneself in accordance with the determinations of our state 
in internal perception is merely empirical, forever variable; it can provide no 
standing or abiding self in this stream of inner appearances, and is customarily 
called inner sense or empirical apperception. That which should necessarily 
be represented as numerically identical cannot be thought of as such through 
empirical data. There must be a condition that precedes all experience and makes 
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the latter itself possible, which should make such a transcendental 
presupposition valid. (A107) 
Kant’s argument here does not aim to show that all possible self-consciousness is a priori, but 
only that which is the transcendental ground of the synthesis of recognition. Kant expresses two 
ways in which empirical self-consciousness, which he calls “inner sense” and “empirical 
apperception”, is deficient to ground the synthesis of recognition. First, it fails to provide a 
“standing or abiding self”. Second, empirical data do not suffice to account for the necessity that 
a subject be able to represent itself as numerically identical. I suggest that ultimately these 
amount to the same reason for why empirical consciousness is deficient: insofar as empirical data 
do not suffice for representing oneself as numerically identical, this means that a standing or 
abiding self cannot be represented. But as we just saw in the previous subsection, such a 
representation of numerical identity is essential to the self-consciousness that transcendental 
apperception affords. Hence, our present task is to determine why Kant holds that empirical data 
do not suffice for representing oneself as numerically identical. 
Kant characterizes cognition as a priori if it is independent of—but not necessarily 
temporally prior to—all experience insofar as it neither has as its source particular contents of 
experience nor requires a particular experience to be produced (B1-B2). A representation of 
numerical identity based on empirical data would be one that requires particular experience, and 
so it would have to be evaluated whether given empirical data provide evidence that warrants a 
judgment that there is such an identity, e.g., that the various mental episodes in question fit 
together in a single causal history of a subject. A representation of numerical identity on this 
basis, though, is not guaranteed; for, it is possible that the empirical data do not warrant such a 
representation.  
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But the possible self-consciousness of numerical identity that grounds the synthesis of 
recognition is one that must be valid in all experience. For, insofar as it grounds the necessity of 
concept application in the synthesis of recognition—which is necessary for any possible 
empirical cognition, i.e., experience—that self-consciousness cannot depend on the particular 
contents of any particular empirical cognition or experience. In other words, a cognitive subject 
must be able to represent itself as numerically identical no matter the particular content of its 
experience, and this requires that the possible self-consciousness be a priori. 
6.4.4 Summary of the Argument for Transcendental Apperception 
To sum up, concepts’ necessary reproduction of the manifold of given intuitions 
presupposes an a priori self-consciousness of one’s numerical identity, i.e., presupposes 
transcendental apperception. First, a possible self-consciousness is presupposed because the 
thought or judgment involved in all cognition involves an element of normative necessity, and 
this normativity requires that a cognitive subject be able to become conscious of itself as 
thinking those representations. Second, since the use of concepts involves bringing multiple 
representations together, this form of self-consciousness must involve an awareness of oneself as 
numerically identical across all those representations. Third, this form of self-consciousness must 
also be a priori because, if it were based on particular contents of experience, then a cognitive 
subject would not be guaranteed to be aware of something numerically identical. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Kant’s argument for transcendental apperception, recall, runs as follows: 
1) The synthesis of reproduction is carried out by means of a concept that represents 
the necessary reproduction of the manifold of given intuitions. 
2) This necessity is possible only if grounded on transcendental apperception. 
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3) Transcendental apperception is the pure subjective source that makes possible the 
synthesis of reproduction. 
We have now seen what can support Premises (1) and (2). But it is important to see that Premise 
(1) can be made more general: 
1)* The use of concepts in judgments for empirical cognition involves a normative 
necessity. 
It is important to see this because the B-edition’s transcendental deduction does not explicitly 
appeal to the synthesis of reproduction. Nevertheless, as I argued above in Section 3.2.2, the B-
edition provides an argument for transcendental apperception, and this argument operates on the 
assumption that empirical cognition requires judgment or thought. Premise (1)* thus helps fill in 
why judgment or thought is supposed to require transcendental apperception. 
Although outside the scope of this dissertation, Kant uses transcendental apperception to 
make a key move in the objective deduction of the categories. We can see how by filling out the 
previously-given Objective Deduction Argument Outline: 
Transcendental Deduction Argument Outline  
(OD1) All experience—i.e., empirical cognition—is possible only if intuition is thought 
by means of concepts. 
(OD2) This thought by means of concepts presupposes transcendental apperception. 
(OD3) Transcendental apperception is possible only if an a priori synthesis through the 
categories is applied to the contents of experience. 
(OD4) Therefore, the categories are a priori conditions for all experience, and so have 
objective validity. [OD1-OD3] 
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In this chapter, I have shown how Kant can support (OD2), but (OD3) is a crucial step in both 
editions (A108-10, B133-43). I shall conclude this chapter by suggesting a rough, schematic way 
for reading Kant’s support of (OD3). 
For Kant, empirical cognition requires multiple interrelated judgments (see Section 3.4 
above). Hence, a cognitive subject’s consciousness of itself with respect to one judgment 
requires its consciousness of itself as committed to other judgments that are inferentially 
connected to the first judgment. However, these inferential connections between judgments must 
themselves be capable of being expressed as judgments, and insofar as these inferential 
connections pertain to judgments of objects, they must capable of being expressed as synthetic 
judgments. That is, these inferential connections amount to a synthetic unity, one that is made 
possible through the subject’s own acts of judgment. However, given that it is an a priori 
necessity that a subject be able to become conscious of itself in any act of judgment, and given 
that any act of judgment presupposes a synthetic unity of the sort just described, it follows that 
this synthetic unity must itself be grounded a priori. That is, there must be an a priori element in 
all synthetic judgments in order to ensure that there are synthetic inferential connections between 
those judgments. For only such an a priori synthetic unity can ensure that it is a priori intelligible 
for a subject to take its judgments as an inferentially connected whole that informs any 
individual judgment, and only the latter can ensure the possibility of a subject’s a priori self-
consciousness with respect to each of its judgments. In other words, transcendental apperception 
demands an a priori synthesis through the act of judgment itself. Kant takes the categories to be 
the logical forms of judgment insofar as they provide rules for a priori synthesis, i.e., the logical 
forms of judgment are the basis of the necessary synthetic inferential connections of all possible 
judgment. Hence, insofar as experience requires that any manifold of intuition be thought, and 
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thus subject to transcendental apperception, it follows that the categories must apply to any given 
manifold of intuition insofar as they provide rules for all a priori synthesis that occurs through 
the logical forms of judgment.  
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Chapter 7: The A-Edition on Imagination as an A Priori Subjective Source of Cognition 
In Chapter 5, we saw how empirical cognition requires an empirical threefold synthesis 
based on three transcendental subjective sources of cognition: the senses, imagination, and 
empirical consciousness or apperception. Recall that it is a further step to show why each 
subjective source also has a pure or a priori form. The Transcendental Aesthetic shows that our 
sensibility provides an a priori manifold of intuition, so this shows that the senses count as a pure 
subjective source of cognition. In Chapter 6, I skipped imagination to show why Kant thinks that 
transcendental apperception is a pure or a priori subjective source of cognition insofar as it 
makes possible the synthesis of recognition in the concept. In the present chapter, I shall return to 
the imagination. Kant’s argument that it is a pure subjective source of cognition is quite 
complex, and I shall explain how some of this complexity makes sense of Kant’s cryptic remarks 
about the subjective deduction in the A-edition’s preface. To begin, I shall return to Kant’s 
discussion of the synthesis of reproduction, in which Kant explains his argumentative strategy 
for showing that the imagination is a pure subjective source of cognition. 
7.1 The Necessity of Empirical Regularities 
Recall that Kant describes association as involving a constant rule in accordance with 
which the mind makes a transition from one representation to another. At first in his discussion 
of the synthesis of reproduction, Kant claims that it is “a merely empirical law” that the mind 
makes particular associations (A100). The empirical law Kant has in mind is a psychological 
one, and his point is that it is contingent and due to empirical factors—both the mind’s inputs 
and empirical-psychological makeup—that the mind associates some representations rather than 
others. 
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But as is no surprise, Kant does not think that empirical factors are the whole story. He 
leads into describing the non-empirical factors with the following elaboration on what it means 
for the mind’s associations to be “in accordance with a constant rule”: 
This law of reproduction, however, presupposes that the appearances themselves 
are actually subject to such a rule [the constant rule in accordance with which 
the mind makes a transition between associated representations],130 and that in 
the manifold of their representations an accompaniment or succession takes 
place according to certain rules; for without that our empirical imagination 
would never get to do anything suitable to its capacity, and would thus remain 
hidden in the interior of the mind, like a dead and to us unknown faculty. (A100) 
As we saw in Section 5.3.2 above, association requires that there be some reliable, specifiable 
relationship between the associated representations because otherwise the mind’s passing 
between representations would be a mere play. But Kant’s further point in the passage quoted 
above is that this constant rule must be applicable not merely to our representations but also to 
appearances. The distinction here becomes clear if we recall two things. First, Kant defines an 
appearance as “[t]he undetermined object of an empirical intuition” (A20/B34, my emphasis). 
Second, Kant uses the term “representation” sometimes to refer to the act of representing 
something and at other times to denote the thing that is represented. His point in the above 
passage, then, is that the constant rule of association applies not merely to our acts of 
representing but also to the things that we represent, i.e., appearances. 
Kant goes on to offer several examples to support the claim that appearances themselves 
are subject to a rule: 
If cinnabar were now red, now black, now light, now heavy, if a human being 
were now changed into this animal shape, now into that one, if on the longest 
                         
130 It is important to note here the sense in which Kant takes the appearances to be “themselves” subject to 
rules. I take it that the claim is not that these rules for appearances are independent of all spontaneous 
activity of the mind. Rather, it is that these rules are independent of and prior to that spontaneous activity 
of the mind that reproduces. The importance of this remark will become clearer when we later see Kant’s 
account of how there can be a guarantee that appearances are subject to such rules; for, Kant’s account is 
that the mind itself is responsible for such rules. 
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day the land were covered now with fruits, now with ice and snow, then my 
empirical imagination would never even get the opportunity to think of heavy 
cinnabar on the occasion of the representation of the color red; or if a certain 
word were attributed now to this thing, now to that, or if one and the same thing 
were sometimes called this, sometimes that, without the governance of a certain 
rule to which the appearances are already subjected in themselves, then no 
empirical synthesis of reproduction could take place. (A100-101) 
After the examples, Kant repeats his claim that reproduction requires that appearances, the 
objects that we represent, must be subject to a constant rule. We can see why this is so by 
considering what an empirical law of reproduction is. An empirical law of reproduction counts as 
a law in virtue of carrying out reproduction on the basis of a rule that expresses a regular 
connection between acts of representing, and it counts as empirical in virtue of that regular 
connection’s being derived from what is represented in experience. It follows that if there were 
no regularities in what is experienced, e.g., if cinnabar had no stable properties, the mind could 
not derive any rule from experience. In such a case, reproduction could still be carried out, but it 
would not be reproduction on the basis of an association and would not genuinely synthesize 
representations. 
Earlier in Section 5.3, we saw that it is possible for the synthesis of reproduction to 
contribute to empirical cognition only if our representations (our mental acts of representing) are 
associated and reproduced in accordance with rules. In this section so far, we have seen that the 
latter, i.e., association and reproduction in accordance with rules, is possible only if appearances 
(what we represent) are in themselves subject to rules. 
7.2 Kant’s Promissory Note for an a Priori Ground 
At this point in the argument, Kant’s discussion concerns only what is empirically the 
case. Namely, what is required for the synthesis of reproduction to occur is that there be 
empirical regularities of what is given to us in experience, e.g., that cinnabar have stable 
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properties. But the importance of this point is that it leads Kant to claim further that such 
empirical regularities are possible only through an “a priori ground”: 
There must therefore be something that itself makes possible this reproduction 
of the appearances by being the a priori ground of a necessary synthetic unity 
of them. (A101) 
This might come as a shock to the reader, since it seems that the discussion, examples, and 
argument so far have only shown that empirical regularities or rules are necessary, and nothing a 
priori seems to be on the table. Kant himself claims that the rule on which the synthesis of 
reproduction operates “is, to be sure, a merely empirical law” (A100). To get a grasp on the 
above surprising claim, it will help first to specify what Kant means by the “synthetic unity of 
appearances”. As we saw above, in order for what is represented to be subject to rules of 
reproduction, the manifold things that the mind represents must have regular or constant 
connections among each other. This is presumably what Kant’s expression “synthetic unity of 
appearances” refers to, viz., the appearances forming not just any unity but one in which they 
have constant or regular connections to one another. Thus, we can formulate Kant’s claim in the 
previously quoted passage as follows: since a synthetic unity of appearances is necessary for the 
mind to acquire an empirical law for reproducing appearances, then there must be an a priori 
ground for this synthetic unity of appearances. Recall that in his discussion of the normative 
necessity pertaining to concepts, Kant claims that “[e]very necessity has a transcendental 
condition as its ground” (A106). Hence, it seems that Kant’s thought here is that there must be a 
transcendental and a priori condition for the necessity that there be a synthetic unity of 
appearances.131 
                         
131 Kant does not claim in the above passage that the necessary synthetic unity of appearances is itself a 
priori but rather grounded on something a priori. So we can just take this to refer to how appearances are 
necessarily united with one another by being accompanied and succeeded in accordance with rules, rules 
which at this point might only be empirical. 
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Even if this last claim seems doubtful, Kant’s argument need not depend on it. For 
skipping a sentence that we shall soon come back to, Kant goes on to assert the following 
conditional claim: 
Now if we can demonstrate that even our purest a priori intuitions provide no 
cognition except insofar as they contain the sort of combination of the manifold 
that makes possible a thoroughgoing synthesis of reproduction, then this 
synthesis of the imagination is grounded even prior to all experience on a priori 
principles […] (A101, translation slightly modified, my emphases) 
It is worth clarifying three things about this conditional claim. First, the antecedent of the above 
conditional claim is a promissory note insofar as the antecedent concerns whether “we can 
demonstrate” the thesis that our pure intuitions lead to cognition only if they contain the right 
sort of combination that makes possible the synthesis of reproduction. Henceforth, I will refer to 
the antecedent as the “Promissory Note”. The promissory nature of Kant’s claim here helps make 
more palatable Kant’s earlier claim that there must be such an a priori ground. This is because 
that earlier claim should be treated as merely problematic, i.e., as not something that has been 
demonstrated but rather as something which would be true if Kant can make good on his 
Promissory Note. 
Second, the antecedent here does not state “if we can demonstrate that our pure intuitions 
provide cognition only if they are subject to a synthesis of reproduction” but rather “if we can 
demonstrate that our pure intuitions provide cognition only if they contain a combination that 
makes possible a synthesis of reproduction”. It is important to note that the antecedent is not the 
former because Kant goes on after the above claim to provide examples of how cognitions 
through pure intuitions—viz., drawing a line in thought or representing a certain number to 
oneself—require a synthesis of reproduction. But Kant’s discussion of the examples does not 
indicate anything about how our pure intuitions contain a combination that makes synthesis of 
reproduction possible. Thus, the examples do not constitute any sort of support for the 
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antecedent.132 Kant’s reference here to “a combination that makes possible a synthesis of 
reproduction” is initially very opaque. But in context of the A-edition’s Transcendental 
Deduction chapter as a whole, it is clear that this phrase refers to what Kant later calls “affinity”, 
which roughly amounts to an objective correlate of association. That is, whereas association is a 
connection of representations in a cognitive subject, affinity is a combination or connection in 
one or more objects. And insofar as there is an affinity that “makes possible a synthesis of 
reproduction”, this affinity can be called “transcendental affinity”. Hence, the antecedent 
promises to demonstrate that there is such a transcendental affinity, from which the consequent is 
supposed to follow. 
Third, the consequent of the conditional is the thesis that the synthesis of reproduction, 
which is carried out by the imagination, is grounded on a priori principles. In other words, the 
consequent holds that there are not merely empirical laws of reproduction but also a priori laws 
of reproduction. Furthermore, this seems to be connected to the above claim that there must be 
an a priori ground of the synthetic unity of appearances: this a priori ground is just whatever it is 
that provides the mind with a priori principles or laws of reproduction. 
As already noted above, Kant does not follow the Promissory Note with any sort of 
grounds for the antecedent but instead offers illustrations of how reproduction is required for 
cognition through our pure intuitions, and it is left open whether that reproduction must operate 
in accordance with a priori laws. Kant also has not written anything earlier that straightforwardly 
demonstrates the antecedent, even if some of what came earlier might offer resources that Kant 
could use. The closest that Kant comes to supporting the antecedent—but which still clearly does 
not amount to a demonstration of it—is in the sentence we skipped (it appears just after Kant 
                         
132 Pace Allison 2015: 215-6. Nevertheless, Allison does recognize the status of the conditional claim as a 
promissory note of sorts. 
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asserts that there must be an a priori ground for the necessary synthetic unity of appearances and 
just before the Promissory Note): 
One soon comes upon this [the a priori ground of a necessary synthetic unity of 
appearances] if one recalls that appearances are not things in themselves, but 
rather the mere play of our representations, which in the end come down to 
determinations of the inner sense. (A101) 
Kant appeals here to his Transcendental Idealism, the view asserted in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic that objects of experiences are appearances and not things in themselves. It is unclear 
how this invocation of Transcendental Idealism is supposed to help.133 For the time being, I 
suggest that Kant’s appeal to Transcendental Idealism should be understood as the suggestion 
that Transcendental Idealism will help us in understanding how appearances can be conditioned 
by a priori rules. 
We might wonder what the significance of the Promissory Note is and why Kant wants to 
establish the consequent of the conditional claim. Kant gestures at its significance in how he 
concludes the sentence containing the conditional claim and Promissory Note: 
[…] one must assume a pure transcendental synthesis of this power [i.e., of the 
imagination, as the source of the synthesis of reproduction], which grounds even 
the possibility of all experience (as that which the reproducibility of the 
appearances necessarily presupposes). (A101-2, my emphasis) 
Without making good on the Promissory Note, it is not yet shown, according to the above 
passage that the imagination’s synthesis of reproduction operates on the basis of a priori 
principles. This is of significance because, without a demonstration of this claim, it can only be 
assumed that there is a pure transcendental synthesis of the imagination. Ultimately, this 
assumption amounts to the consequent of the conditional claim. For the imagination carries out a 
pure transcendental synthesis of reproduction (the assumption) if and only if there are a priori 
                         
133 But as we shall see later in Section 8.7 below, there is in fact a connection between Transcendental 
Idealism and issues relating to the Promissory Note. 
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principles according to which the imagination carries out that synthesis (the consequent of the 
conditional). The significance of this comes to light if we recall Kant’s procedure concerning the 
synthesis of apprehension. For recall that after Kant had shown that the senses are transcendental 
subjective source of cognition insofar as they make possible empirical cognition, he then 
explains how the senses are a pure or a priori subjective source by bringing in the results of the 
Transcendental Aesthetic. Put more generally, showing that a synthesis is transcendental is not 
sufficient on its own to show that it is also pure. With respect to the synthesis of reproduction, 
Kant’s discussion so far has shown only that the imagination is a transcendental subjective 
source of cognition. But he has not yet shown that it is also a pure subjective source, and doing 
so is necessary for completing the subjective deduction. 
7.3 Transcendental Affinity and its Significance 
The Promissory Note states that a demonstration of transcendental affinity will entail that 
the imagination is a pure subjective source of cognition. Before considering Kant’s attempted 
demonstrations for transcendental affinity, it will be helpful to clarify further what transcendental 
affinity is and why its importance goes beyond completing the subjective deduction. 
Kant defines an affinity of the manifold—whether empirical, a priori, or transcendental—
as “[t]he ground of the possibility of the association of the manifold, insofar as it lies in the 
object” (A113) and as the “objective ground of all association of appearances” (A122). In 
claiming that an affinity “lies in the object” or is an “objective ground”, Kant does not mean that 
it pertains to things in themselves. Instead, I suggest that we understand an affinity to be a 
connection between what is represented, whereas an association is a connection between acts of 
representing. Insofar as an affinity pertains to objects of representations it is “objective”, and 
insofar as an association pertains to a cognitive subject’s mental acts of representing it is 
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“subjective”. Although an affinity can be merely empirical, Kant holds that there is also a 
“transcendental affinity”, which he defines as “a thoroughgoing connection according to 
necessary laws” (A113-4). What makes this more than an empirical affinity is that it connects the 
objects of representations by means of necessary laws, in contrast to an empirical affinity whose 
connections are merely contingent rules. This suggests that a transcendental affinity is also a 
priori, and this point is reinforced by Kant’s claim that “the empirical affinity is the mere 
consequence” of transcendental affinity (A114). Hence, although he did not use the term, Kant 
clearly was referring to transcendental affinity in his earlier discussion of the synthesis of 
reproduction. For it is both what “makes possible [the] reproduction of appearances by being the 
a priori ground of a necessary synthetic unity of them” (A101) and “the sort of combination 
[contained in our purest a priori intuitions] of the manifold that makes possible a thoroughgoing 
synthesis of reproduction” (A101). The latter characterization comes from Kant’s Promissory 
Note, and it is what needs to be demonstrated to show that the imagination is an a priori 
subjective source of cognition. Hence, the completion of the subjective deduction requires 
demonstrating that there is a transcendental affinity. 
The demonstration of transcendental affinity, furthermore, is crucial for Kant to extend 
the results of the objective deduction. In one version of the objective deduction, the so-called 
“argument from above” in the A-edition (A116-9), Kant’s main thesis is that transcendental 
apperception is possible only if there is an a priori synthesis that produces a synthetic unity for 
“the manifold in all possible intuition” (A117) or of any possible appearance. For present 
purposes, I shall not examine Kant’s argument for that thesis, which is probably the most crucial 
argument within the objective deduction, for he goes on to argue that the a priori synthesis must 
occur by means of the categories, which thereby legitimizes their application to any possible 
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appearance. In his discussion of transcendental affinity, Kant similarly appeals to transcendental 
apperception in order to establish that there is a synthetic unity of some sort. He summarizes that 
argument as follows. 
But we can never encounter [affinity] anywhere except in the principle of the 
unity of apperception with regard to all cognitions that are to belong to me. In 
accordance with this principle all appearances whatever must come into the 
mind or be apprehended in such a way that they are in agreement with the unity 
of apperception, which would be impossible without synthetic unity in their 
connection, which is thus also objectively necessary. (A122) 
The synthetic unity mentioned here is between appearances “in their connection” (A122). 
Although the argument from above is said to pertain to any manifold of intuition and to any 
possible appearance, Kant never mentions within it anything about the connection between 
appearances.134 Recall that a connection between appearances is precisely what characterizes 
transcendental affinity: 
All appearances therefore stand in a thoroughgoing connection according to 
necessary laws, and hence in a transcendental affinity. (A113-4) 
But transcendental affinity grounds not just any connection between appearances, but 
specifically a lawful connection: 
There must therefore be an objective ground [i.e., which Kant goes on to identify 
as an affinity], i.e., one that can be understood a priori to all empirical laws of 
the imagination, on which rests the possibility, indeed even the necessity of a 
law extending through all appearances (A122, my emphases). 
                         
134 In the argument from above, Kant’s scope is described in various terms: “connection of 
representations” (A116), “possible experience” (A116), “all intuitions” (A116), “all representations that 
can ever belong to our cognition” (A116), “all the manifold of our representations” (A116), “the unity of 
the manifold in a subject” (A116), “the manifold in all possible intuition” (A116-7), “the connection of 
the manifold” (A118), “all objects of possible experience” (A118), “all possible appearances” (A119), 
“all objects of the senses” (A119), “all appearances as data for a possible experience” (A119), 
“appearances” (A119). Naturally, Kant uses all these phrases for different purposes and in different 
contexts. Nevertheless, those differences are not relevant for noticing that this list does not contain any 
mention of a connection between appearances. 
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The essential point here is that Kant is concerned with two different kinds of synthetic unity: a 
synthetic unity of a manifold of intuition of any appearance, and a synthetic unity of the 
connection between all appearances. The argument from above focused on showing that the 
former type of synthetic unity is made possible by the categories, and thereby shows that the 
categories apply to any object of experience. But even if the categories apply to any appearance’s 
manifold of intuition, it is not guaranteed to apply to appearances for which we are not given a 
manifold of intuition. For example, there are some appearances that are “remote”, including for 
example, those that are too far away or too minuscule to be sensed directly, as well as parts of a 
directly sensed object that are not directly sensed (e.g., sides of a cube that are outside of my 
perspective).135 
If Kant’s argument from above has shown that the categories apply to any appearance 
whose manifold we are given, it would not yet be demonstrated that the categories apply to an 
object we represent “even without its presence in intuition” (B151), i.e., an object whose 
representation requires the faculty of imagination. This is a problem if Kant wants to say that we 
have synthetic a priori cognition through the categories of all appearances, including remote ones 
whose representation requires the imagination. If it were shown, however, that we have cognition 
of synthetic a priori laws that connect all possible appearances (whether near or remote), then the 
categories could legitimately be said to apply to all appearances. 
Accordingly, the significance of demonstrating transcendental affinity is that it leads to 
Kant’s following thesis: 
Thus we ourselves bring into the appearances that order and regularity in them 
that we call nature, and moreover we would not be able to find it there if we, 
or the nature of our mind, had not originally put it there. For this unity of 
                         
135 I borrow the term “remote” from Kant’s discussion of transcendental affinity, which he describes as 
applying to “all appearances (near or remote)” (A123). 
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nature should be a necessary, i.e., a priori certain unity of the connection of 
appearances (A125) 
In other words, the demonstration of transcendental affinity contributes to Kant’s support for the 
thesis that the cognitive subject legislates a priori laws of nature. And this thesis, also asserted in 
the B-edition’s Transcendental Deduction chapter (cf. B163-5), is stronger than the objective 
deduction’s primary stated aim of demonstrating the categories’ objective validity. For even if 
the categories are necessarily and hence legitimately applied to objects of experience, that is 
consistent with the categories being used in making possible empirical cognition of only given 
appearances, e.g., empirical cognition of a particular empirical change as being the effect of a 
particular empirical cause. But if the categories are not used merely in that way and are further 
the basis of a priori laws of nature, then this means that they are used not only for empirical 
cognition but also for synthetic a priori cognition of all appearances, e.g., that every possible 
alteration in experience is an effect of some cause. 
There are three arguments for transcendental affinity found across the two editions of the 
first Critique. In the A-edition Transcendental Deduction chapter, one is presented in his 
subsection “Provisional explanation of the possibility of the categories as a priori cognitions” at 
A112-4 and another is presented in his so-called “argument from below” at A121-3. Since the 
former is part of his “provisional explanation” and since the latter is obviously more fleshed out, 
I shall focus on the latter argument. But as we shall see, the A-edition’s basic argument for 
transcendental affinity is unsatisfying. In the next chapter, I shall show that, even though it has 
not been obvious to commentators, Kant in fact returns to this issue in the B-edition’s 
Transcendental Deduction chapter. Whether or not successful, the B-edition does at least address 
one main weakness of the A-edition’s argument for transcendental affinity. 
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7.4 The A-Edition's Attempt to Fulfill the Promissory Note 
After the “argument from above”, in which Kant attempts to offer an objective deduction 
of the categories’ objective validity, Kant’s “argument from below” returns to the task of the 
subjective deduction, viz., by attempting to show that the imagination is a pure subjective source 
of cognition. The reason Kant returns to the task after the argument from above is that his 
argument for transcendental affinity crucially relies on what the argument from above 
demonstrates about transcendental apperception. Before getting to that matter, I first provide a 
general outline of the argument from below and then consider each of its steps in turn. 
The argument from below begins with “perception”, which Kant defines as an 
appearance combined with consciousness, and which Kant states is a necessary condition for 
empirical cognition (A119-20). It then presents an argument that such perception, and hence 
empirical cognition, requires both apprehension and reproduction, the latter of which makes 
possible an association of appearances (A120-2). That argument is largely similar to the one I 
presented earlier in Section 5.3, so we need not go into the details of it here. Finally, the 
argument from below goes on to explain why a transcendental affinity is needed for grounding 
the associability of appearances. 
The first step is to assert that if there were no transcendental affinity, then it would be 
contingent whether appearances are associable: 
But now if this unity of association did not also have an objective ground, so 
that it would be impossible for appearances to be apprehended by the 
imagination otherwise than under the condition of a possible synthetic unity of 
this apprehension, then it would also be entirely contingent whether appearances 
fit into a connection of human cognitions. For even though we had the faculty 
for associating perceptions, it would still remain in itself entirely undetermined 
and contingent whether they were also associable (A122). 
This first step is straightforward enough given both Kant’s definition of transcendental affinity 
and his treatment of the a priori as interchangeable with the necessary. Since transcendental 
 165 
affinity is defined as an a priori ground for association, it is a necessary condition for the 
possibility of association. Without such an a priori ground, then it would be merely contingent 
whether association is possible. 
Kant’s second step is more contentious. He argues that if perception were not associable, 
then a cognitive subject would not have transcendental apperception, i.e., would not be able to 
become aware of her numerical identity across representations: 
and in case [perceptions] were not [associable], a multitude of perceptions and 
an entire sensibility would be possible in which much empirical consciousness 
would be encountered in my mind, but separated, and without belonging to one 
consciousness of myself, which, however, is impossible. For only because I 
ascribe all perceptions to one consciousness (of original apperception) can I say 
of all perceptions that I am conscious of them. (A122) 
Since association just is the mind’s connections between its various acts of representing, the lack 
of associability of acts of representing, such as perceptions, would mean that the mind would fail 
to connect those acts of representing in any way. But if the mind does not connect those acts in 
any way, then it does not even connect them as belonging to one consciousness. Thus, a lack of 
associability of acts of representing entails that the mind could not become aware of its own 
numerical identity across its acts of representing. Since transcendental apperception just is the 
necessity of the possibility that the cognitive subject become aware of its own numerical identity, 
this means that the lack of associability entails that transcendental apperception is not possible. 
From the first two steps, Kant concludes: 
There must therefore be an objective ground, i.e., one that can be understood a 
priori to all empirical laws of the imagination, on which rests the possibility, 
indeed even the necessity of a law extending through all appearances, a law, 
namely, for regarding them throughout as data of sense that are associable in 
themselves and subject to universal laws of a thoroughgoing connection in 
reproduction. I call this objective ground of all association of appearances their 
affinity. (A122) 
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The conclusion is that there must be a transcendental affinity, an a priori objective ground of 
association that legislates a law for connecting universally all appearances. This conclusion 
presumably is supposed to follow from the earlier two steps in virtue of transcendental 
apperception’s being a necessary condition for empirical cognition. Accordingly, when Kant said 
in the earlier passage that it is “impossible” for acts of representing not to belong to one 
consciousness, this is true if we are considering empirical cognition: if we have empirical 
cognition, then it is impossible for us not to have transcendental apperception. But according to 
the first two steps, if there were no affinity, then perceptions would not be guaranteed to be 
associable, and if they are not associable, then transcendental apperception would not be 
possible. But since transcendental apperception is necessary for empirical cognition, and since 
we do have empirical cognition it follows that there must be an affinity for this empirical 
cognition. 
The argument, in brief, runs as follows: 
1) If there were no affinity of appearances (i.e., no objective ground for the 
association of the objects of perceptions), perceptions would not be guaranteed to 
be associable. 
2) If perceptions are not associable, then there would be no transcendental 
apperception (no necessity that it be possible for a cognitive subject to become 
aware of her own numerical identity). 
3) For empirical cognition to be possible, transcendental apperception must be 
possible. 
4) Therefore, there must be transcendental affinity if empirical cognition is to be 
possible. 
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There are two problems with this argument. First, the consequent of the first premise concerns 
whether or not perceptions are guaranteed to be associable. But the second premise, which 
reflects the second step discussed above, concerns whether or not perceptions are in fact 
associable. Thus, the argument works only if Kant can support something like the following 
version of the second premise: 
2*) If perceptions are not guaranteed to be associable, then there would be no 
transcendental apperception.136 
But (2*) is not nearly as defensible as (2). For consider the following counterexample: 
representations could fail to be guaranteed to be associable while at the same time some are in 
fact associated with one another while others are not (this latter class could include non-
conscious representations that do not contribute to cognition, which Kant holds to exist). Since 
Kant is concerned with explaining the possibility of experience understood as empirical 
cognition, this means that not all perceptions have to be associable; for representations that are 
not associated with one another simply would not contribute to cognition. But this is still 
consistent with there being both empirical cognition and transcendental apperception; for as long 
as there are some perceptions that are associable and associated with one another, then those 
could be joined together in transcendental apperception in order to produce empirical cognition. 
The second and more serious problem with the above argument is that the conclusion 
does not validly follow from the premises. For the conclusion introduces a much stronger notion 
of affinity than that with which the argument began. It begins with an affinity of appearances that 
is an objective ground for association, but it concludes with a transcendental affinity that is an a 
                         
136 Alternatively, Kant could modify both the second and third premises as follows: 2**) If perceptions 
are not guaranteed to be associable, then there would be no guarantee of transcendental apperception; 
and, 3**) For empirical cognition to be possible, there must be a guarantee of transcendental 
apperception. Even if this argument were to work, it would still face the second problem I raise below. 
 168 
priori ground for association insofar as it issues forth universal and necessary laws for 
connecting all appearances. Kant seems to think that he can get this conclusion by treating 
transcendental apperception as what produces transcendental affinity: 
But we can never encounter [affinity] anywhere except in the principle of the 
unity of apperception with regard to all cognitions that are to belong to me. In 
accordance with this principle all appearances whatever must come into the 
mind or be apprehended in such a way that they are in agreement with the unity 
of apperception, which would be impossible without synthetic unity in their 
connection, which is thus also objectively necessary. (A122) 
But even if all perceptions are subject to transcendental apperception, this does not suffice for 
producing synthetic unity among them. For all it means for an appearance to be subject to 
transcendental apperception is that it is necessary that it be possible for a cognitive subject to 
become aware of her numerical identity. But a remote appearance—one which a cognitive 
subject has never represented herself or come into contact with—could meet this condition: 
whether or not she has represented it, it is possible for her to become aware of her own numerical 
identity with respect to it once she has represented it.137 But suppose that she does not yet have a 
representation of it. According to Kant, transcendental apperception is guaranteed by means of 
an a priori synthesis through the categories, which produces an a priori synthetic unity. But if a 
cognitive subject has not yet even represented an appearance, it is not clear that she is in any 
position to synthesize it with other representations. But since such an act of synthesis is what 
produces the transcendental affinity, and since transcendental affinity is supposed to apply to all 
appearances both near and remote, a remote representation would fail to be part of the 
transcendental affinity. And that would seem to undermine Kant’s aim of showing that we have 
synthetic a priori cognition of all appearances, whether near or remote, by means of universal a 
priori laws of nature. 
                         
137 For a similar objection, see Van Cleve 1999: 84. 
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We shall see in the next section how the B-edition provides a better argument in response 
to this sort of worry. Before doing so, let us see how Kant uses the above argument for 
transcendental affinity to complete the subjective deduction. First, since transcendental 
apperception makes possible transcendental affinity, and since transcendental apperception 
makes necessary a synthesis through a priori laws, these same laws are also ones that the 
imagination can use for synthesis. Accordingly, Kant concludes that “The imagination is 
therefore also a faculty of a synthesis a priori” (A123).138 
7.5 Satisfaction of (D3) 
Kant’s Promissory Note puts us in a position to see how to interpret some puzzling 
aspects of his description of the subjective deduction in the A-edition’s Preface. Namely, the 
Promissory Note is relevant for satisfying the third desideratum for a satisfactory interpretation 
of the subjective deduction. That desideratum, discussed in Section 4.2 above, is the following: 
(D3) To specify Kant’s assumptions and method for carrying out the subjective 
deduction, and thereby to explain why the subjective deduction is (i) “like the 
search for the cause of a given effect”; (ii) “like a hypothesis”; and, (iii) 
something seeming like an opinion. 
In what follows, I shall consider (i)-(iii) in turn. 
7.5.1 “like the search for the cause of a given effect” 
In the A-Edition’s Preface, Kant suggests that the main question to be answered by the 
subjective deduction is “How is the faculty of thinking itself possible?” (Axvii). He 
                         
138 One oddity here is that Kant’s Promissory Note holds that this thesis is to be demonstrated by showing 
that there is a transcendental affinity, but Kant’s argument from above already advances this thesis 
without an argument for transcendental affinity. Perhaps Kant thought that his earlier discussion of 
transcendental affinity in the Provisional Explanation sufficed for stating this in the argument from above, 
or perhaps this is just sloppiness on Kant’s part, or perhaps the thesis is advanced only provisionally. 
 170 
immediately claims that “[this] question is something like the search for the cause of a given 
effect” (Axvii). Although it is odd for him to describe a question as being a search, we can safely 
interpret him to mean that the answering of this question is similar to the search for the cause of 
a given effect. How, then, is the subjective deduction something like this? 
On my interpretation, Kant’s inquiry into how the faculty of thinking is possible amounts 
to an inquiry into how the understanding plays a role in empirical cognition. Recall that the 
objective deduction begins with the assumption that the understanding has some such role but 
leaves it open how the understanding has a cognitive relation to intuition. On this interpretation, 
what is like a given effect is the understanding’s cognitive relation to empirical cognition, and so 
what is being sought is what makes it possible for the understanding to apply concepts within 
judgments to what is given in sensible intuition. But since the analogy is with the causal relation, 
whatever is similar to the cause is something whose occurrence necessitates and suffices to bring 
about the understanding’s cognitive relation to objects. This turns out to be the three a priori and 
transcendental subjective sources of cognition, which are responsible for bringing the 
understanding into a cognitive relation with objects.139 But it must be stressed that Kant’s claim 
is not that they are a cause of the understanding’s cognitive relation to objects. For Kant’s 
inquiry here is not psychological but rather epistemological. The three taken together are like a 
cause insofar as they are responsible for—or epistemically necessitate and suffice for—the 
understanding’s role in empirical cognition. 
 
 
                         
139 This explains why the understanding is not itself one of the three subjective sources: if the 
explanandum is the understanding’s cognitive relationship to objects of empirical cognition, an explanans 
that appealed to the understanding’s role in contributing to cognition would likely not be very helpful. 
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7.5.2 “something like a hypothesis” 
But like the search for a cause of a given or specific effect, one confronts a variety of 
factors that make it difficult to determine with certainty the exact cause. This is presumably one 
reason why Kant writes, after stating that the subjective deduction is something like the search 
for the cause of a given effect, it “is therefore something like a hypothesis”. This intuitive sense 
in which a search for a cause can lead one to hypothesize is exhibited by what we have seen. For 
although it is clear that there is no question whether the synthesis of reproduction operates on the 
basis of rules, nothing so far shows whether these rules can be merely empirical or must be a 
priori. So at this point either type of rule might seem to suffice for the synthesis of reproduction. 
This means, however, that it is at present undetermined by our evidence so far whether the 
faculty responsible for the synthesis of reproduction is a merely empirical faculty of imagination, 
operating on the basis of empirical rules, or an a priori faculty of imagination, operating on the 
basis of a priori principles. So with respect to the explanation of our given effect, we have no 
reason at present for opting for one of these explanations over the other. 
In addition to an everyday sense of a hypothesis, there is also reason to think that the 
subjective deduction might seem to be a hypothesis in Kant’s own technical sense: 
If the imagination is not simply to enthuse but is, under the strict oversight of 
reason, to invent, something must always first be fully certain and not invented, 
or a mere opinion, and that is the possibility of the object itself. In that case it is 
permissible to take refuge in opinion concerning the actuality of the object, 
which opinion, however, in order not to be groundless, must be connected as a 
ground of explanation with that which is actually given and consequently 
certain, and it is then called an hypothesis. (A770/B798) 
Notice that Kant’s characterization of a hypothesis appeals to the notion of opinion, which we 
shall consider in the next subsection. Setting that part of the above passage aside, Kant’s point 
here is that a hypothesis is not a simple enthusiasm, which would lack anything certain on which 
it is based. Rather, a hypothesis is grounded on a certainty of a peculiar sort: the possibility, but 
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not actuality, of the object itself. Furthermore, it must offer a ground of explanation of something 
actually given and thereby certain. 
This is analogous to Kant’s procedure in the subjective deduction. What is like a 
hypothesis in this context is the thesis that the understanding has a cognitive relation to objects in 
virtue of the three a priori and transcendental subjective sources of cognition. The subjective 
deduction aims to explain the possibility of the understanding’s cognitive relation to objects, and 
this is what counts as “the possibility of the object itself”. Finally, the “ground of explanation” in 
this case is the functioning of the three subjective sources in their synthetic activities. 
More specifically, since his discussion of the synthesis of reproduction includes a 
Promissory Note for showing the thesis that the imagination is a pure subjective source of 
cognition and states that this is to be assumed, we can also understand Kant as offering 
something like a hypothesis by holding that an a priori synthesis of imagination explains the 
understanding’s cognitive relation to objects. Since Kant has not yet given any reason for 
preferring this explanation over one that appeals merely to an empirical synthesis of the 
imagination, Kant’s explanation appears to lack certainty, making it seem to be a mere 
hypothesis. 
7.5.3 appears to be an opinion 
After stating that his inquiry “is something like the search for the cause of a given effect” 
and “is therefore something like a hypothesis”, Kant states that it follows from this that “it 
appears that I am taking the liberty in this case of expressing an opinion, and that the reader 
might therefore be free to hold another opinion” (Axvii). Again, we should consider what Kant 
means by “opinion”. Much later in the first Critique, he writes that “[h]aving an opinion is 
taking something to be true with the consciousness that it is subjectively as well as objectively 
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insufficient” (A822/B850), and the terms used in this definition are in turn explicated as follows: 
“Subjective sufficiency is called conviction (for myself), objective sufficiency, certainty (for 
everyone)” (A822/B85).  
On this characterization of opinion, we can see how Kant’s positing of a pure synthesis of 
reproduction might at this point be understood by his readers as expressing not only a hypothesis 
but also a mere opinion. Kant’s readers would view it as lacking certainty because Kant has not 
yet given a demonstration showing that it is necessary for the synthesis of reproduction. But for 
Kant’s readers to take him to be expressing an opinion, they would also have to take Kant to lack 
conviction for the claim that there is a transcendental faculty of imagination. And this is just 
what Kant worries about in the A-edition’s Preface: 
even in case my subjective deduction does not produce the complete conviction 
that I expect, the objective deduction that is my primary concern would come 
into its full strength (Axvii). 
Again, Kant’s point here is made clearer by understanding the specific meaning he gives to the 
notions of “conviction” and “persuasion”: 
If [taking something to be true] is valid for everyone merely as long as he has 
reason, then its ground is objectively sufficient, and in that case taking 
something to be true is called conviction. If it has its ground only in the 
particular constitution of the subject, then it is called persuasion. (A820/B848) 
So, in suspecting that Kant lacks conviction in taking it to be true that the imagination is 
responsible for a pure synthesis of reproduction, a reader would view Kant as taking this to be 
true only on the basis of something in the particular constitution of Kant’s personal subject or 
psychology. And it is clear enough why the reader might suspect this of Kant. For it might seem 
that cognition requires only that our imagination operates on the basis of empirical rules because 
Kant has not yet offered—as indicated by his Promissory Note—any reason why the imagination 
must be a pure faculty rather than merely an empirical one. But the fact that Kant has offered no 
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such reason for his more extravagant claim raises doubts about whether he has conviction or 
mere persuasion. For, as Kant elaborates in his later discussion of conviction and persuasion, the 
only test for distinguishing conviction from persuasion is the communication of the grounds of 
taking to be true. And since Kant has not yet communicated his grounds, the reader has no 
evidence that Kant’s taking it to be true that there is a pure faculty of imagination is not just 
grounded in Kant’s own personal psychology rather than any reason that could be valid for 
everyone. Without making good on the Promissory Note, the reader lacks any reason or evidence 
to think that Kant’s view is not merely an opinion, and so the reader might very well just have 
the impression that it is in fact mere opinion. 
7.6 Satisfaction of (D4) 
With this account of how Kant attempts to satisfy the Promissory Note and show that 
there is a transcendental affinity, we can see why Kant does not take his claim to be either a 
hypothesis or an opinion. That is, we can now consider Desideratum 4, given in Section 4.2, for a 
satisfactory interpretation of the subjective deduction. That desideratum, recall, is: 
(D4) To account for how Kant attempts to remedy the apparent problems resulting 
from the method described by (D3). 
In particular, satisfying (D4) requires explaining two remarks in the A-edition’s preface. After 
asserting that the subjective deduction is something like both the search for the cause of a given 
effect and a hypothesis, Kant writes parenthetically: 
although, as I will elsewhere take the opportunity to show, this is not in fact how 
matters stand (Axvii). 
Likewise, after describing how his readers might take him to express a mere opinion, he writes: 
In view of this I must remind the reader in advance that even in case my 
subjective deduction does not produce the complete conviction that I expect, the 
objective deduction that is my primary concern would come into its full strength, 
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on which what is said at pages [A] 92-3 should even be sufficient by itself. 
(Axvii) 
In this section, I shall elaborate on each of these claims, thereby completing my interpretation of 
the subjective deduction. 
7.6.1 Why the Subjective Deduction Is Not Supposed to be a Hypothesis or Opinion 
Recall that the subjective deduction appears to be an opinion, at least in its initial 
presentation, because Kant has had to assume that the imagination is a pure subjective source of 
cognition. But ultimately Kant attempts to make good on his Promissory Note by showing that 
the imagination operates in accordance with a priori principles and is responsible for the 
transcendental affinity of appearances. Accordingly, I suggest that the argument for 
transcendental affinity is the place Kant has in mind when he wrote that he will “elsewhere take 
the opportunity to show” that the subjective deduction is not a hypothesis. This later argument, 
which Kant thinks is decisive, amounts to giving an objective ground, which is more than a 
psychological fact peculiar to him. If this is so, then Kant’s view that the imagination is a pure 
subjective source of cognition is not an opinion, at least according to Kant himself. And since 
something is a hypothesis only insofar as it is also an opinion, this would also entail that the view 
is also not a hypothesis. 
7.6.2 Why A92-3 Is Supposed to Provide Conviction 
Now let us consider Kant’s claim that what is said at pages A92-3 should provide 
sufficient conviction for the purposes of the objective deduction. Those pages contain the first of 
three paragraphs of the A-edition’s “Transition to the transcendental deduction of the 
categories”, which I interpreted in Chapter 3. Notably A92-3 does not include the Principle of 
the Transcendental Deduction, according to which the categories are to be shown to be a priori 
conditions of the possibility of experiences, specifically the thinking encountered in a possible 
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experience. Nevertheless, the discussion of A92-3 indicates the way in which the categories 
might be shown to have objective validity by necessarily and a priori relating to all objects of 
experience. Although Chapter 3 elaborated on the Principle of a Transcendental Deduction, it did 
not discuss in detail what came before it in the Transition. Accordingly, I shall go into that here. 
Kant’s procedure in the Transition is to consider various ways in which there could be a 
relationship between a priori concepts and objects and to find the suitable one for the categories 
by rejecting various possible alternatives. He begins with the following claim: 
There are only two possible cases in which synthetic representation and its 
objects can come together, necessarily relate to each other, and, as it were, meet 
each other: Either if the object alone makes the representation possible, or if the 
representation alone makes the object possible. (A92/B124) 
Kant does not defend this claim further, but it is one that he had developed originally in his 
famous February 21, 1772 letter to Marcus Herz.140 The first case, Kant claims, would make the 
relationship merely empirical, and so the relationship described in the first case is not something 
that can be investigated for providing a transcendental deduction of any a priori concepts, 
including the categories. The second case, then, is the one to adopt for considering the objective 
validity of the categories. Kant is careful to point out, however, that the relationship described in 
the second case “does not produce its object as far as its existence is concerned” (A92/B125); 
rather, 
the representation is still determinant of the object a priori if it is possible 
through it alone to cognize something as an object. (A92/B125) 
Thus, the second case mentioned above is not committed to holding that objects are fully mind-
dependent. Instead of making the object exist, Kant holds that the representation makes an object 
possible insofar as it is cognizable. 
                         
140 See particularly 10: 130-1. 
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After rejecting the first case in which (synthetic) representations and objects can relate 
and endorsing the second for the categories, Kant then goes on to narrow the options further. He 
writes: 
But there are two conditions under which alone the cognition of an object is 
possible: first, intuition, through which it is given, but only as appearance; 
second, concept, through which an object is thought that corresponds to this 
intuition. (A92/B125) 
We saw above that we are to consider how representations relate to objects insofar as 
representations make possible cognition of those objects. But if we combine this with the 
familiar doctrine that cognition requires both intuitions and concepts, it follows that these are the 
two types of representation that could make the cognition of objects possible. Kant goes on to 
describe how the former type of representation was shown in the Transcendental Aesthetic to 
relate a priori to objects in virtue of being “the ground of the form of objects” and because only 
through the form of our sensible intuition can appearances be “empirically intuited and given” 
(A93/B125). 
We finally come to the question of how the categories, as a priori concepts, have a 
relationship to objects such that they make possible cognition of objects: 
The question now is whether a priori concepts do not also precede, as conditions 
under which alone something can be, if not intuited, nevertheless thought as 
object in general, for then all empirical cognition of objects is necessarily in 
accord with such concepts, since without their presupposition nothing is possible 
as object of experience. Now, however, all experience contains in addition to 
the intuition of the senses, through which something is given, a concept of an 
object that is given in intuition, or appears; hence concepts of objects in general 
lie at the ground of all experiential cognition as a priori conditions; consequently 
the objective validity of the categories, as a priori concepts, rests on the fact that 
through them alone is experience possible (as far as the form of thinking is 
concerned). For they are related necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, 
since only by means of them can any object of experience be thought at all. 
(A93/B125-6, my italics) 
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We can now see why Kant claims in the preface that what is said at A92-93 should suffice for 
any reader of the objective deduction, regardless of whether a reader might take the subjective 
deduction to be hypothetical or mere opinion. Even if Kant does not succeed in convincing the 
reader that the faculty of imagination is a pure subjective source of cognition, that thesis does not 
need to be established for the objective deduction. Such a reader should learn from A92-93 that 
the objective deduction would be successful if it were to show that the categories are necessary 
conditions for experience with respect to “the form of thinking”, and this is something that can 
be shown independently of whether we have transcendental faculty of imagination. This is borne 
out in the general structure of the objective deduction: it starts from the assumption that 
empirical cognition from a manifold of intuition requires thought, then shows that this thought 
requires transcendental apperception, and then shows that this in turn requires that the categories 
are applied to that manifold of intuition, thereby providing us with empirical cognition of objects 
and demonstrating the objective validity of the categories. Thus, even if the subjective deduction 
is unsatisfactory in completing all of its aims, its failure does not necessarily give reason for 
casting doubt on the objective deduction. But, since I have argued that the subjective and 
objective deductions overlap in significant ways, the failure of the subjective deduction with 
respect to some of its aims—e.g., showing that transcendental apperception is necessary for 
empirical cognition—would be a problem for the objective deduction. 
7.7 Summary 
In this chapter, I have completed my exposition of the A-edition’s subjective deduction. 
Prior to this chapter, there were three things remaining to be addressed: in addition to explaining 
Kant’s argument that the imagination is supposed to be a pure subjective source of cognition, 
desiderata three and four needed to be met. By explaining that the later discussion of 
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transcendental affinity is supposed to fulfill a Promissory Note given earlier, I hope to have 
clarified Kant’s argumentative strategy in the subjective deduction and the A-edition’s 
Transcendental Deduction chapter as a whole. Particularly, we see an additional reason for 
treating the subjective and objective deductions as two overlapping sides of one argument. I 
earlier noted one reason for this, viz., that they both share one and the same argument for 
transcendental apperception as a necessary condition for empirical cognition. But now we have 
two additional ways in which the two are intertwined. First, since Kant’s argument for 
transcendental affinity is required to complete the subjective deduction, and since that argument 
relies on the objective deduction’s conclusions about transcendental affinity, the subjective 
deduction can be completed only by means of carrying out the objective deduction. Second, the 
argument for transcendental affinity itself is important for both the subjective and objective 
deductions: for the former it is supposed to show that the imagination is a pure subjective source 
of cognition, and for the latter it is supposed to show that we have synthetic a priori cognition of 
universal laws of nature based on the categories. 
One would be right to worry that this complicated structure might make Kant’s 
arguments circular. Nevertheless, I do not believe that they are ultimately circular. This is best 
illustrated by a diagram of how I interpret the argument’s structure: 
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Chapter 8: The B-Edition on Pure Imagination and a Priori Laws of Nature 
In the Preface to the B-edition, Kant writes that the new edition of the first Critique aims 
“to remove as far as possible those difficulties and obscurities from which may have sprung 
several misunderstandings” concerning the A-edition (Bxxxvii), and he thus will make 
improvements in the “presentation” to “remove […] the obscurity in the Deduction of the 
Concepts of the Understanding” (Bxxxviii). He also notes that he has “found nothing to alter 
either in the propositions themselves or in their grounds of proof, or in the form and 
completeness of the book’s plan” (Bxxxvii). In sum, the changes to the Transcendental 
Deduction chapter are supposed to concern merely the presentation but not the basic premises or 
inferences of the argument. Despite this, I shall argue in this chapter that the B-edition does offer 
new considerations for an argument that there are a priori laws of nature that are legislated by the 
understanding through the categories. Thus, although the B-edition neither mentions the 
subjective deduction nor uses the concept of affinity, it does offer an argument similar to the one 
we saw in the last chapter from the A-edition. In presenting this argument, I shall also present a 
new solution to Dieter Henrich’s much-discussed “problem of the two-steps-in-one-proof”.141 
Since the secondary literature on that problem is vast, and since my main aim is to show how the 
B-edition’s argument supplements that of the A-edition, I shall not endeavor to canvass the other 
proffered solutions in the secondary literature. 
8.1 The Structure of the Transcendental Deduction Chapter in the B-Edition 
In the B-edition, the Transcendental Deduction chapter is divided into numbered 
headings. From §15 to §20, Kant provides an argument that leads to the following conclusion 
                         
141 1969: 642. For other prominent accounts of how to deal with this puzzle concerning the B-edition’s 
Transcendental Deduction chapter, see: Allison 2004: 159-201; Evans 1990; Kitcher 1990: 155-74; 
Longuenesse 1998: 212-27; and, Rauscher 2012. 
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stated in §20: “the manifold in a given intuition also necessarily stands under the categories” 
(B143). One might think that this completes Kant’s primary task of showing that the categories 
have objective validity. But in §21, he restates the result of §20 in terms of consciousness and in 
terms that allow him to draw an analogy with the Transcendental Aesthetic: 
the empirical consciousness of a given manifold of one intuition stands under a 
pure a priori self-consciousness, just as empirical intuitions stand under a pure 
sensible one, which likewise holds a priori. (B144) 
Kant then states that “[i]n the above proposition, therefore, the beginning of a deduction of the 
pure concepts of the understanding has been made” (B144). He continues by claiming that “the 
aim of the deduction will first be fully attained” in §26 through “the explanation of its [the 
category’s] a priori validity in regard to all objects of our senses” (B145). This is a puzzling 
claim. The argument of §§15-20 demonstrated that the application of the categories to the 
manifold in a given intuition in general is justified because their application is a necessary 
condition for experience. From this, it seems to follow a fortiori that they are also justified in 
their application to our sensible intuition. From this puzzling claim, Dieter Henrich has claimed 
that a successful interpretation must show how “sections 20 and 26 offer two arguments with 
significantly different results, and that these together yield a single proof of the transcendental 
deduction”.142 That is, a successful interpretation must show how the argument of §§15-20 is 
insufficient to achieve the aim of the Transcendental Deduction and how §26 provides what is 
further needed. 
In this chapter, I shall focus on explaining the argument of §26, and I show that its 
primary aim is to show that the understanding legislates a priori laws of nature based on the 
categories. This goes beyond what was shown in §§15-20, which provides a limited argument 
                         
142 1969: 642. 
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that the categories have objective validity for any manifold of a given intuition. In the remainder 
of this chapter, I aim to do just that. 
8.2 Kant's Description of the Relationship between the Two Steps 
To begin with, it is helpful to see how Kant himself describes the difference between his 
earlier results and what is now to be accomplished. He describes this in two places. First, in §26, 
he writes: 
Now the possibility of cognizing a priori through categories whatever objects 
may come before our senses, not as far as the form of their intuition but rather 
as far as the laws of their combination are concerned, thus the possibility of as 
it were prescribing the law to nature and even making the latter possible, is to be 
explained. (B159-60) 
A contrast is drawn here between what Kant plans to explain now in §26 and what was earlier 
explained. What was earlier explained was the possibility of cognizing a priori through 
categories whatever objects may come before our senses, i.e., appearances, as far as the form of 
their intuition is concerned. In a handwritten note written by Kant in his personal copy of the A-
edition, Kant calls what is needed “in order to cognize objects as such” the “form of their 
intuition” (at A126). Since the argument in §§15-20 showed that the categories are required for 
having the concept of an object, it follows that the above claim in §26 refers to the argument in 
§§15-20 as demonstrating that the categories necessarily apply to appearances insofar as we 
cognize them as objects, i.e., insofar as the form of their intuition is concerned. This indicates, 
then, that Kant recognized that the argument in §§15-20 applies to our sensible intuition. 
Accordingly, §20’s title states that “All sensible intuitions stand under the categories” (B143). 
As the passage given above also notes, the argument in §§15-20 did not demonstrate that the 
objects coming from intuition (sensible or otherwise) necessarily stand under the categories in 
regard to the laws of their combination, i.e., in regard to a priori laws of nature prescribed by the 
categories. This is what Kant now wants to argue in §26. We already saw in the last chapter a 
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similar division, with the argument from above accomplishing something like §§15-20 and the 
argument from below corresponding to that of §26. Unlike the argument in §§15-20, however, 
the argument in §26 does not apply to all possible forms of intuition, but merely to our sensible 
intuition (why this is so will be explained shortly). 
Second, §21 describes how §26 will rely on the earlier results to complete the 
transcendental deduction, viz., by showing 
from the way in which the empirical intuition is given in sensibility that its unity 
can be none other than the one the category prescribes to the manifold of a given 
intuition in general according to the preceding §20 (B144-5). 
Since Kant, as we have seen, recognizes that §20 applies to sensible intuition, the relevant 
contrast here is not between intuition in general and empirical intuition. Rather, the distinction of 
significance here is between what is true of a single given intuition (the concern of §§15-20) and 
what is true of empirical intuition insofar as intuitions are combined with one another and insofar 
as a possible intuition is not given to a subject (the concern of §26). That is, the argument in 
§§15-20 was insufficient insofar as it did not demonstrate two things: (i) that the categories 
necessarily apply to the way intuitions relate to one another insofar as they stand under laws of 
combination; and, (ii) that the categories necessarily apply to intuitions not immediately given to 
consciousness, i.e., ones that present to us remote appearances. If Kant can show that the laws of 
combination of (i) apply universally to all possible intuition, then (ii) would follow because 
remote appearances would be connected to local appearances by laws of combination based on 
the categories. Accordingly, the title of §26 promises a demonstration of “the universally 
possible use” of the categories in experience (B159). 
So described, the task of §26 is largely the same as that of the A-deduction’s attempted 
fulfillment of the Promissory Note. Although the Promissory Note is primarily directed at 
showing that the imagination is a pure subjective source of cognition, this is carried out by 
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showing that there are a priori laws based on the categories that guide the imagination’s 
synthesis, and since these laws apply to all appearances—whether near or remote—the 
categories accordingly apply to all intuition—whether given or not. Hence, the two 
Transcendental Deduction chapters are roughly the same, even though the B-edition mentions 
neither a subjective deduction nor affinity. Before presenting Kant’s argument of §26, I shall set 
out in the next two sections how Kant frames that argument. 
8.3 Conclusions Stated in §26 
Now that we have seen how Kant describes the relationship between the earlier results 
and §26, let us consider the various passages in §26 that express conclusions of some sort. First, 
most interpreters identify the primary argument of §26 as occurring in its first three paragraphs, 
which end with the following: 
Consequently all synthesis, through which even perception itself becomes 
possible, stands under the categories, and since experience is cognition through 
connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of 
experience, and are thus also valid a priori of all objects of experience. (B161) 
Although this is indeed an important result, it is not Kant’s primary conclusion. As we just saw, 
Kant’s main aim in §26 is to show that there are a priori laws of nature based on the categories 
and that these laws combine appearances both near and remote. Given these aims, we can 
identify two passages later in the text that express Kant’s main conclusion: 
Categories are concepts that prescribe laws a priori to appearances, thus to nature 
as the sum total of all appearances (natura materialiter spectata) (B163) 
all appearances of nature, as far as their combination is concerned, stand under 
the categories, on which nature (considered merely as nature in general) 
depends, as the original ground of its necessary lawfulness (B165). 
As I shall show, this conclusion is arrived at from both the argumentation from B159-60 and 
from B164-5. 
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8.4 Motivations for Carrying out §26 
Kant found the need to offer further argumentation for this claim because of the worry 
that appearances, despite being subject to the categories, might not follow a priori laws 
prescribed by the categories but instead only a posteriori laws that are derived from contributions 
of both the categories and experience. This is a worry that remains even after the conclusion of 
§20 because Kant thinks that all laws of combination of appearances depend on the imagination 
(B164). The imagination is “the faculty for representing an object even without its presence in 
intuition” (B151). Since the laws of combination of appearances relate all possible intuitions to 
one another, including those that are not given directly in intuition, the imagination is therefore 
necessary not only for cognition of such laws but also for cognition involving intuition that is not 
given immediately to consciousness. 
This reliance on the imagination is a source of concern because imagination depends not 
only on “understanding for the unity of its intellectual synthesis” but also “on sensibility for the 
manifoldness of apprehension” (B164). The imagination requires that a manifold be apprehended 
as a unity through time (what Kant calls the “the manifoldness of apprehension”), and, since it is 
apprehended through time, this manifold must come from sensibility rather than the 
understanding. Since the laws of combination of appearances depend on the imagination, and 
since the imagination depends on sensibility for the manifoldness of apprehension, it follows that 
the laws of combination depend on the sensibility for the manifoldness of apprehension. This 
seems, however, to open up the possibility that the laws of combination of appearances are 
dependent on empirical intuition, and that would make those laws a posteriori rather than a 
priori. If that were so, then it would not be the case that the categories “can determine a priori the 
combination of the manifold of nature without deriving from the latter” (B163). 
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Kant's principal argument in §26, then, is meant to discount the possibility that the laws 
of combination of appearances are derived merely from the manifold of nature, i.e., from 
experience. Kant argues that although the laws of combination of appearances depend on the 
manifoldness of apprehension given by sensibility (the unity of a manifold through time), these 
laws are nevertheless prescribed a priori by the categories. 
8.5 Principal Argument of §26 
Kant leads into his principal argument by stating the following: 
the question now arises how it is to be conceived that nature must follow [the 
categories], i.e., how they can determine a priori the combination of the manifold 
of nature without deriving from the latter. Here is the solution to this riddle. 
(B163) 
Again, it might seem that the argumentation from §15 to §20 has already shown both that the 
categories must apply to appearances and how they must do so (namely, via transcendental 
apperception). But again, the worry here is not so much about whether the categories apply to 
particular appearances; rather, the worry concerns the application of the categories to the 
combination of appearances, particularly their combination by means of a priori laws that the 
categories supposedly prescribe to nature. 
Kant begins his solution to the aforementioned riddle by reminding the reader of his 
Transcendental Idealism, his view that we cognize only appearances and not things in 
themselves: 
It is by no means stranger that the laws of appearances in nature must agree with 
the understanding and its a priori form, i.e., its faculty of combining the 
manifold in general, than that the appearances themselves must agree with the 
form of sensible intuition a priori. For laws exist just as little in the appearances, 
but rather exist only relative to the subject in which the appearances inhere, 
insofar as it has understanding, as appearances do not exist in themselves, but 
only relative to the same being, insofar as it has senses. The lawfulness of things 
in themselves would necessarily pertain to them even without an understanding 
that cognizes them. But appearances are only representations of things that exist 
without cognition of what they might be in themselves. (B164) 
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It is noteworthy that Kant made the same sort of appeal in his discussions of transcendental 
affinity in the A-edition Transcendental Deduction chapter. It is likewise notable that Kant did 
not explicitly appeal to Transcendental Idealism in his argument from §15 to §20. But as we see 
in how Kant proceeds, it forms a crucial starting premise of how he continues his argument: 
As mere representations, however, [appearances] stand under no law of 
connection at all except that which the connecting faculty prescribes. (B164) 
Kant begins by stating that if appearances are combined or connected in accordance with laws, 
then they can only be so by means of a faculty of the mind, or what Kant called in the A-edition 
a subjective source of cognition. Kant’s support for this statement seems to be the 
Transcendental Idealism he just outlined: if appearances are mere representations, then 
representations do not come prepackaged as connected according to laws. Kant’s argument, as 
we shall see, does not rely on any claim about there actually being laws of connection; rather, all 
that he needs to assert is that a faculty of the mind is responsible for the connections we 
experience between appearances. 
Kant immediately identifies the faculty responsible for connecting appearances with the 
imagination: 
Now that which connects the manifold of sensible intuition is imagination, 
which depends on understanding for the unity of its intellectual synthesis and on 
sensibility for the manifoldness of apprehension. (B164) 
Although Kant somewhat prepares the reader for this identification in the B-edition (B151-2), the 
A-edition is much more helpful in this regard. For recall from Section 5.3 that insofar as the 
imagination is the faculty responsible for the synthesis of reproduction and hence responsible for 
association, it makes possible the representation of any combinations or connections between 
appearances. Whereas in the A-edition, Kant attributed the synthesis of reproduction to the 
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imagination, he here attributes the “synthesis of apprehension” to the imagination.143 Here, he 
characterizes this synthesis of apprehension as performing two functions: apprehending manifold 
representations (making the synthesis dependent upon sensibility) and unifying those 
representations together (which makes it dependent on the understanding as what provides for 
unification). 
So far, Kant’s point is that appearances are connected by means of the imagination’s 
synthesis of apprehension. But from this Kant moves quickly to bring in the categories: 
Now since all possible perception depends on the synthesis of apprehension, but 
the latter itself, this empirical synthesis, depends on the transcendental one, thus 
on the categories, all possible perceptions, hence everything that can ever reach 
empirical consciousness, i.e., all appearances of nature, as far as their 
combination is concerned, stand under the categories, on which nature 
(considered merely as nature in general) depends, as the original ground of its 
necessary lawfulness (as natura formaliter spectata). (B164) 
Here, Kant relies on the earlier result of §26, which is more commonly interpreted as the main 
conclusion of §26. Namely, he appeals to the conclusion that all synthesis stands under the 
categories (we shall consider this claim in the next section). Kant here applies this earlier 
conclusion to the imagination’s synthesis of apprehension: although it is empirical, it too must 
stand under or depend on the categories. And Kant understands by this that the synthesis of 
apprehension operates in accordance with a priori laws: for insofar as categories apply to 
synthesis, they furnish laws of synthesis, whereas insofar as they apply to objects, they furnish 
concepts of objects. But Kant also asserts in the above passage that all possible perception is 
made possible by the synthesis of apprehension. Although we shall come back to this striking 
claim in the next section, it thus follows from Kant’s other claims that all possible perception is 
connected by a priori laws of combination. 
                         
143 This point is more strongly brought out in the footnote on B162. 
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Put schematically, Kant’s argument runs as follows: 
(1) All possible perception depends, and hence all possible appearances, on the 
synthesis of apprehension. [supported earlier in §26 and in the A-edition’s 
discussion of the imagination, to be considered in Section 8.6] 
(2) The imagination’s synthesis of apprehension stands under the categories. 
[supported earlier in §26, to be considered in section 8.7] 
(3) The synthesis of apprehension operates according to a priori laws of combination. 
[from 2] 
(4) All possible appearances are connected by a priori laws of combination. [from 1, 
3] 
This argument, if sound, achieves what I have stated is Kant’s aim in §26. It also would fulfill 
the Promissory Note of the subjective deduction: for it shows that the imagination is a pure 
subjective source of cognition insofar as it operates in accordance with a priori laws of 
combination. But it is not so clear whether this argument is sound or whether it is more 
successful than the A-edition’s attempt at fulfilling the Promissory Note. For premises (1) and 
(2) still need to be examined, and we shall turn to that task in the next two sections. 
8.6 Premise 1 
To understand Kant’s support for both premises (1) and (2), we must return to the earlier 
argumentation from B160-1. There, he begins with the following explanation of the synthesis of 
apprehension, thereby addressing premise (1): 
First of all I remark that by the synthesis of apprehension I understand the 
composition [Zusammensetzung] of the manifold in an empirical intuition, 
through which perception, i.e., empirical consciousness of it (as appearance), 
becomes possible. (B160) 
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This synthesis of apprehension makes possible perception or empirical consciousness. But two 
points are worth noting here. First, as we have already seen, it seems likely that Kant uses 
“synthesis of apprehension” in a different way than in the A-edition.144 Here, it seems that 
“synthesis of apprehension” includes the A-edition’s synthesis of apprehension and synthesis of 
reproduction. For recall that both of those syntheses were prerequisites for empirical 
consciousness, prior to considering any contribution of the understanding.145 Second, the 
synthesis of apprehension need not suffice on its own for empirical consciousness; for as we 
have already seen, transcendental apperception is also required for any empirical consciousness. 
This is all that Kant directly states that could support premise (1), which states: 
(1) All possible perception depends, and hence all possible appearances, on the 
synthesis of apprehension. 
Since we have seen from the A-edition’s discussion of the empirical threefold synthesis how 
empirical cognition and consciousness require synthetic activities of the mind, it is fairly clear 
why Kant claims that all possible perception, i.e., all empirical consciousness, relies on 
something like the synthesis of apprehension. But it is less clear why it is supposed to follow 
from this that all possible appearances depend on the synthesis of apprehension. This is not so 
surprising if we note that Kant does not use “consciousness” [Bewusstsein] to refer to only what 
a subject is phenomenally aware of. For Kant holds that obscure representations are conscious,146 
                         
144 But even the A-edition is not clearly consistent with its use of the term “apprehension”; for at A120 
Kant blurs the distinction between apprehension and reproduction by attributing apprehension to 
imagination. 
145 But see the footnote at B162, where Kant suggests that there is no real distinction between the 
synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of apperception. Again, this recalls the A-edition, which 
holds that although we can consider apprehension, reproduction, and recognition as distinct syntheses, 
they really occur through one and the same action, thereby warranting the description of them as a 
“threefold synthesis”. 
146 “[A] certain degree of consciousness, which, however, is not sufficient for memory, must be met with 
even in some obscure representations” (B414-5n.) 
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and this consciousness seems to be what permits us to become indirectly aware of them.147 A 
cognitive subject is indirectly conscious of a representation when she infers that she has that 
representation.148 This suggests how Kant can claim that the synthesis of apprehension applies to 
all appearances, not just those that are directly given to us but also those that are remote or not 
directly given to us. We can cognize such remote appearances because we can infer them based 
on their connection(s) to appearances that we are directly given. Such inferences require that a 
manifold of a given intuition be apprehended together with the representation(s) of the remote 
appearance (such representations will be imaginary insofar as they present an object without its 
presence in intuition). Hence, insofar as remote appearances are cognizable, they must be subject 
to the synthesis of apprehension. 
This still is not quite enough. For this argument only shows that all appearances are 
subject to the synthesis of apprehension only conditionally, viz., only on the condition that they 
are cognized. This recalls the objection I raised against Kant’s argument for transcendental 
affinity: that argument shows that all appearances stand in a transcendental affinity only on the 
condition that they are apperceived. Nevertheless, Kant’s support for premise (2) provides a 
means for handling both objections. 
                         
147 “[W]e can still be indirectly conscious of having a representation, even if we are not directly conscious 
of it. - Such representations are then called obscure; the others are clear, and when their clarity also 
extends to the partial representations that make up a whole together with their connection, they are then 
called distinct representations, whether of thought or intuition.”(A 7: 135; cf. LB 24: 119, MM 29: 879) 
148 “Our representations are either obscure or clear, etc. Obscure representations are those of which I am 
not immediately conscious, but nevertheless can become conscious through inferences.” (MM 29: 878-9) 
“A representation is obscure […] of which one is not conscious immediately. Namely, one can become 
mediately conscious of this cognition by means of reason, and thus a way remains to make an otherwise 
obscure cognition clear, distinct, and thus to make insight into it easier. E.g., if I see the Milky Way with 
the naked eye, I see nothing but a white band, but if I make use of a tubus, then I at once become aware of 
the individual parts as individual stars, and then judge at once by means of reason that these must be the 
stars that I saw with the naked eye merely as a white band. I am conscious of this representation 
mediately, then, but not immediately; hence in the beginning it is only obscure, but afterwards it is 
distinct, mediate, or clear.” (LB 24: 119) 
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8.7 Premise 2 
Kant’s argument for premise (2), the thesis that all synthesis stands under the categories, 
might seem unnecessary. For since any synthesis requires the use of the understanding (B129-
30), it would seem that even the synthesis of apprehension has some relationship to the 
categories. Kant's worry is not, however, that the synthesis of apprehension does not require the 
understanding; rather, the worry is that this particular synthesis is not exercised a priori through 
the categories. Without showing that it is exercised a priori, Kant would not be able to show that 
the understanding legislates a priori laws of nature. This premise is of particular interest because 
it is also what brings in new considerations beyond the A-edition’s argument for transcendental 
affinity. 
Kant’s argument for premise (2) begins as follows: 
We have forms of outer as well as inner sensible intuition a priori in the 
representations of space and time, and the synthesis of the apprehension of the 
manifold of appearance must always be in agreement with the latter, since it can 
only occur in accordance with this form. But space and time are represented a 
priori not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but also as intuitions themselves 
(which contain a manifold), and thus with the determination of the unity of this 
manifold in them (see the Transcendental Aesthetic).* (B160) 
The most notable feature of this passage is Kant’s appeal to the distinction between forms of 
intuition and “formal intuitions”, and this distinction is newly made explicit in the B-edition. He 
explains it further in the footnote within the above passage, indicated by the asterisk: 
Space, represented as object (as is really required), contains more than the mere 
form of intuition, namely the comprehension [Zusammenfassung] of the 
manifold given in accordance with the form of sensibility in an intuitive 
representation, so that the form of intuition merely gives the manifold, but the 
formal intuition gives unity of the representation. (B160)149 
                         
149 Kant’s footnote does not end here, and the rest of it has generated much scholarly debate, which I 
avoid here. 
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As forms of intuition, space and time provide an order in which an object’s manifold 
representations appear to a cognitive subject. As formal intuitions, space and time are themselves 
objects containing a unified manifold of intuition, viz., manifold representations of points or of 
instants, respectively. That we have such formal intuitions was earlier illustrated in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic: our possession of a priori cognition of geometry and arithmetic, which 
require unified manifolds of points or instants rather than manifolds of sensible objects, exhibits 
that we have such a priori formal intuitions. 
In the first sentence of the passage above, Kant indicates the significance of our 
possession of these formal intuitions, beyond mere forms of intuition, and he fleshes it out in 
how he continues: 
Thus even unity of the synthesis of the manifold, outside or within us, hence 
also a combination with which everything that is to be represented as 
determined in space or time must agree, is already given a priori, along with (not 
in) these intuitions, as condition of the synthesis of all apprehension. (B160-1) 
Since the synthesis of apprehension operates upon representations presented in space and time, 
they are subject to the conditions that make possible our representations of space and time 
themselves, including the conditions that make them possible as formal intuitions. Since each of 
our formal intuitions is a unity, one of these conditions is that their unity “presupposes a 
synthesis” (B161 fn.). And since they are a priori unities, they likewise presuppose an a priori 
synthesis. Hence, to paraphrase the above passage, the a priori unity of the synthesis of our 
formal intuitions is a condition for the synthesis of apprehension. If space and time were merely 
represented a priori as forms of intuition but not as a priori formal intuitions themselves, then 
this result would not have been obtained because they then would not have contained a manifold 
requiring such an a priori synthesis. 
Kant’s next step is to bring in the categories: 
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But this synthetic unity can be none other than that of the combination of the 
manifold of a given intuition in general in an original consciousness, in 
agreement with the categories, only applied to our sensible intuition. (B161)  
Essentially, Kant here relies on the argument from §§15-20, where he argued that the manifold 
of a given intuition stands under the categories because its unity comes from an a priori synthesis 
of apperception. Since the formal intuitions of space and time are each a manifold of a given 
intuition, they too derive their unity from the a priori synthesis of apperception through the 
categories. 
But since Kant had already shown that the synthesis of apprehension stands under 
whatever conditions make possible the formal intuitions of space and time, it follows that the 
synthesis of apprehension stands under the categories: 
Consequently all synthesis through which even perception itself becomes 
possible stands under the categories, and since experience is cognition through 
connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of 
experience, and are thus also valid a priori of all objects of experience. (B161, 
translation slightly modified) 
Since the synthesis of apprehension was earlier defined as the synthesis through which 
perception becomes possible, the first part of this sentence amounts to a statement of premise (2). 
Kant then draws the further conclusion that the categories are “valid a priori of all objects of 
experience”. I interpret this to mean that the categories apply to all appearances, whether near or 
remote. Hence, Kant is prematurely asserting something that follows only from the later 
argument concerning laws of combination: if all possible appearances are connected by a priori 
laws of combination based on the categories, then the categories apply to all appearances, 
whether near or remote. This further claim also goes beyond the conclusion given in §20 that the 
manifold in a given intuition necessarily stands under the categories; for that earlier conclusion 
does not show that remote appearances are subject to the categories. 
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I shall now summarize the argument, in order to show how it offers resources beyond the 
A-edition’s attempt to establish transcendental affinity. Kant's strategy for establishing premise 
(2) is to show that, since we have a priori formal intuitions of space and time which are 
themselves dependent on the categories, and since the synthesis of apprehension is dependent on 
the representations of space and time, it too is dependent on the categories. Schematically, the 
argument runs as follows: 
(i) The conditions for our representations of space and time are likewise conditions 
for the synthesis of apprehension. 
(ii) We have formal intuitions of space and time, which are manifolds of intuition that 
are given a priori. 
(iii) An a priori synthesis of apperception through the categories is a condition for our 
formal intuitions of space and time. [from (ii) and the result of §20]. 
(iv) The synthesis of apprehension stands under the categories. [from (i) and (iii)] 
Since this argument crucially relies on an appeal to the a priori formal intuitions of space and 
time, we can see why Kant claims in §21 and at the beginning of §26 that the argument of §26 
must take into account the particular nature of our senses. Kant’s argument up through §20 had a 
broader scope, applying to intuition in general. But since intuition in general need not provide 
formal intuitions in addition to forms of intuition, the argument of §26 needs to appeal to the 
particular nature of our intuition. 
More importantly, Kant’s new appeal to formal intuitions in the B-edition helps address 
the main problem I raised against the A-edition’s argument for transcendental affinity. That 
argument was flawed insofar as it only conditionally applied to all appearances, namely 
appearances that are in fact apperceived or empirically cognized. Other appearances, however, 
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are not guaranteed to stand under the categories. Kant’s appeal to formal intuitions helps to show 
that a priori laws of combination, prescribed by the categories, apply to all appearances (near or 
remote) and not just conditionally. For it is not conditional that all objects of experience appear 
within space and time. So even if a particular appearance is not given, and so neither apperceived 
nor empirically cognized, it nevertheless must be within space and time, which must be 
apperceived according to Kant. Thus, a priori laws of combination are guaranteed to apply to all 
appearances because those a priori laws apply to whatever might appear in space and time. 
8.8 Summary 
In this chapter, I have shown that the B-edition parallels the A-edition in offering an 
argument for a priori laws of nature that are based on the legislation of the understanding by 
means of the categories. This argument, however, brought in the notion of formal intuition to 
shore up one of the problems with the A-edition’s argument. Whether this new argument is 
satisfactory is outside the scope of this dissertation. For a full evaluation of the argument’s 
success would also require an interpretation of the first part of the objective deduction—the 
argument from above in the A-edition and the argument in §§15-20 in the B-edition—which 
attempts to show that the categories have objective validity insofar as they are necessary 
conditions for the thinking encountered in any empirical cognition of a given manifold of 
intuition. In Section 6.5, I gestured toward how that argument is supposed to work. Nevertheless, 
I hope the present chapter helps us understand that earlier argument insofar as that argument is 
intimately connected with what I have been able to explain.  
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Note on Translations and Abbreviations 
Kant’s works are generally cited according to the Akademie edition’s page numbers, and 
most quotations are given from the translations in the Cambridge Edition of the Works of 
Immanuel Kant. Four exceptions are the following: (i) citations from the Critique of Pure Reason 
are given according to the standard pagination of the A- and B-editions; (ii) Kant’s Reflexionen 
are cited using Adickes’s numberings rather than the Akademie edition’s page numbers; (iii) I 
have translated any quotations of works that have not yet appeared in the Cambridge Edition; 
and, (iv) I have modified some translations from the Cambridge Edition and have indicated when 
I have done so. 
I have used the following abbreviations for citing Kant’s works, along with four other 
primary texts: 
A Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (Ak. 7: 119-333) = Anthropology from a 
Pragmatic Point of View. Translated by Robert B. Louden in Anthropology, History and 
Education, edited by Günter Zöller and Robert B. Louden, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press (2007): 231-429. 
AV Meier, Georg Friedrich. Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre. Halle: Johann Justinus Gebauer, 
1752. 
 Br Kant’s Briefwechsel (Ak. 10-12) = Correspondence. Translated and edited by Arnulf 
Zweig. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1999). 
FS Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren (Ak. 2: 44-61) = The False 
Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures. Translated and edited by David Walford in 
collaboration with Ralf Meerbote in Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press (1992): 86-105. 
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GL Wolff, Christian. Vernünftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes 
und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkenntnis der Wahrheit. 4th ed. Herausgegeben und 
bearbeitet von Hans Werner Arndt. Christian Wolff Gesammelte Werke 1. Edited by J. 
Ecole, H. W. Arndt, R. Theis, W. Schneiders, and S. Carboncini-Gavanelli. Hildesheim: 
Georg Olms Verlag, 2006 [1713]. 
GM Wolff, Christian. Vernünfftige Gedancken: von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des 
Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt. Mit einer Einleitung und einem kritischen 
Apparat von Charles A. Corr. 2 vols. Christian Wolff Gesammelte Werke 2. Edited by J. 
Ecole, H. W. Arndt, R. Theis, W. Schneiders, and S. Carboncini-Gavanelli. Hildesheim: 
Georg Olms Verlag, 2003 [1751]. 
ID De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis (Ak. 2: 385-419) = On the 
Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World (Inaugural Dissertation). 
Translated and edited by David Walford in collaboration with Ralf Meerbote in 
Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1992): 377-
416. 
KU Kritik der Urteilskraft (Ak. 5: 165-485) = Critique of the Power of Judgment. Translated 
by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2000). 
LBl Logik Blomberg (Ak. 24: 16-301) = The Blomberg Logic. Translated by J. Michael 
Young, in Lectures on Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1992): 5-246. 
LBu Logik Busolt (Ak. 24: 608-86) 
LJ Logik, as compiled by Benjamin Jäsche (Ak. 9) = The Jäsche Logic. Translated by J. 
Michael Young, in Lectures on Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1992): 
527-640. 
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LPh Logik Philippi (Ak. 24: 311-496) 
LW Wiener Logik (Ak. 24: 790-937) = The Vienna Logic. Translated by J. Michael Young, 
in Lectures on Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1992): 249-377. 
MD Metaphysik Dohna-Wundlacken = The Dohna-Wunclacken Logic. Translated by J. 
Michael Young, in Lectures on Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1992): 
431-516. 
MAN Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft (Ak. 4) = Metaphysical 
Foundations of Natural Science. Translated by Michael Freedman, in Theoretical 
Philosophy after 1781, edited by Henry E. Allison and Peter Heath, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press (2002): 183-270. 
ML1 Metaphysik L1 (Ak. 28: 195-301). Translated and edited by Karl Ameriks and Steve 
Naragon, in Lectures on Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1997): 
19-106. 
ML2 Metaphysik L2 (Ak. 28: 531-594). Translated and edited by Karl Ameriks and Steve 
Naragon, in Lectures on Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1997): 
299-356. 
MM Metaphysik Mrongovius (Ak. 29: 747-940). Translated and edited by Karl Ameriks and 
Steve Naragon, in Lectures on Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
(1997): 109-288. 
MV Metaphysik Volckmann (Ak. 28: 440-50). Translated and edited by Karl Ameriks and 
Steve Naragon, in Lectures on Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
(1997): 289-298. 
N Nachträge zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1. Auflage) (Ak. 23: 15-50) 
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PE Vorlesungen über Philosophische Enzyklopädie (Ak. 29: 5-45) 
PRO Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird aufterten 
können (Ak. 4) = Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that Will Be Able to Come 
Forward as Science. Translated by Gary Hatfield, in Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, 
edited by Henry E. Allison and Peter Heath, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
(2002): 53-169. 
R Reflexionen aus dem handschriftlichen Nachlaß (Ak. 17-19) = Notes and Fragments. 
Edited by Paul Guyer. Translated by Curtis Bowman, Paul Guyer, and Frederick 
Rauscher. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2005). 
UE Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere 
antbehrlich gemacht warden soll. (Ak. 8) = On a Discovery Whereby Any New Critique 
of Pure Reason Is to Be Made Superfluous by an Older One. Translated by Henry Allison 
in Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, edited by Henry E. Allison and Peter Heath, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2002): 283-336. 
V Meier, Georg Friedrich. Vernunftlehre. Halle: Johann Justinus Gebauer, 1752. 
WF Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die die Metaphysik seit Leibnitzens und Wolf’s 
Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat? (Ak. 20: 255-351) = What Real Progress Has 
Metaphysics Made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff? Translated by Peter 
Heath, in Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, edited by Henry Allison and Peter Heath, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2002): 353-424. 
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